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I. INTRODUCTION
ach communications medium has unique attributes, and the
Internet is no exception. Although other communications media
may offer some of the characteristics of the Internet, none
offers them all. The Internet allows communication between parties in
remote parts of the world, often in a matter of seconds.' The Internet
permits communications with many people simultaneously and inexpen-
sively. If a communication would be interesting to others, the recipient can
inexpensively generate as many copies of the communication as desired
and send that communication all over the world.2 The Internet allows its
users to locate information quickly and at a low cost by using the text
searching capabilities available on the World Wide Web.3 Such information
is available to the seeker of that information twenty-four hours per day.
Additionally, where computers controlling other machines or devices are
connected to the Internet, an Internet user may control those devices from
thousands of miles away.
' See Dave Barry, Lost in Cyberspace, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1996, at 85;
Michael C. Hyzy, Harnessing the Power of Electronic Information, J. MGMT.
CONSULTING, May 1996, at 46, 47.
2See generally Barry, supra note 1, at 85.
3Seegenerally Web Searching: It's a Text Thing, IMAGING WORLD, Sept. 1996,
at 53 (describing various Internet search engines). For a discussion of the World
Wide Web, see infra notes 446-95 and accompanying text.
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These unique characteristics have led various commentators to question
whether legal rules adopted for other methods of communication make
sense and should be applied in the context of the Internet.4 Rules that are
perfectly logical and operate smoothlywith otherrules when appliedto one
communications medium may not make sense when applied to a new
communications medium. To answer questions regarding the wisdom of
applying old substantive rules in the context of this new medium, however,
one should consider the policy justifications for the underlying rules. If
rules of law are divorced from their underlying policy justifications, then
errors and unfavorable outcomes are likely to result when those rules are
applied to situations that were not contemplated when the rules were made.
Thus, by considering policy goals, legal rules can be more logically
adapted to new situations.
In the area of personal jurisdiction, commentators have begun to
explore the applicability of the minimum contacts test to the Internet.5
4 See generally William Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real
World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197 (1995)
(arguing that legislation is better suited to address cyberspace legal issues); Cynthia
Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Frameworkfor Addressing
Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1083
(1996) (arguing that existing libel analysis should be applied to on-line sources);
Gary Hamilton, Trademarks on the Internet: Confusion, Collusion or Dilution?, 4
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (1995) (stating that current trademark laws can be
applied to Internet commerce); PeterD. Kennedy & James A. Hemphill, Publishing
on the Internet: Pitfalls and Protections, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 33 (1995)
(discussing possible liabilities and protection from liability involving on-line
publication); Nicholas Robbins, Baby Needs a New Pair of Cybershoes: The
Legality of Casino Gambling on the Internet, 2 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. 339 (1996)
(analyzing the application of state and federal laws to developments in Internet
gambling); Eric McCarthy, Comment, Networking in Cyberspace: Electronic
Defamation and the Potentialforlnternational Forum Shopping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 527 (1995) (arguing that defamation standards which create accountability
and balance information flow must be created).
5 See generally Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA.
J. L. & TECH. 3 (Spring 1997) <http://www.student.Virginia.EDU/-vjolt/
graphics/vol l/homeart3.html> (arguing that the enforcement of current laws to the
Internet should be carefully examined); Counts & Martin, supra note 4; Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996) (arguing that an
evolution of conventional jurisdictional doctrines is necessary for Internet
disputes); Corey B. Ackerman, Note, World-Wide Volkswagen, Meet The World
Wide Web: An Examination ofPersonal Jurisdiction Applied to a New World, 71
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 403 (1997) (applying the purposeful availment approach to the
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Many have attempted to apply existing personal jurisdiction doctrine to the
Internet without stopping to consider whether existing rules make sense in
that context. Because the Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the
policy justifications for imposing limits on state jurisdiction, that inquiry
is a difficult one. Unlike many substantive doctrines where at least some
overarching policy justifications are evident, the Court continues to search
for key principles in the area of personal jurisdiction.6 Thus, when
considering the question of personal jurisdiction in the context of the
Internet, one should stop to ask whether the existing rules make sense, both
generally and in the specific context of the Internet. If the rules generally
draw improper boundaries, then they probably do likewise in the specific
context of the Internet. To answer the question of whether existing rules
make sense generally, however, one must identify the proper theoretical
foundation for limitations on personal jurisdiction of the states.
This Article considers the problem of personal jurisdiction from the
standpoint of allocating jurisdictional power between the different states.
Of course, the Internet is international in scope and questions of personal
jurisdiction are likely to be even more problematic when countries with
heterogeneous legal systems and jurisdictional approaches are thrown into
the mix. Jurisdiction in that context also raises problems in foreign
relations.7 Litigation over personal jurisdiction problems concerning data
communications has thus far focused primarily on domestic disputes.'
Internet as a reasonable means of addressing personal jurisdiction); Gwenn M.
Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction over World Wide
Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (1997) (arguing that a proper
application of the purposeful availment approach to Internet disputes will result in
fair jurisdictional results); David Thatch, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the
World Wide Web: Bits (and Bytes) ofMinimum Contacts, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 143 (1997) (applying several Supreme Court decisions and rules to
the Internet); Richard Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 339 (1996) (arguing that the existing legal system can address cyberspace
challenges).
6 See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
7 See Allan R. Stein, Styles ofArgument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REv. 689, 739-40 n.220 (1987); see also
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REv. 279, 331 (1983). These problems are beyond the
scope of this Article.
' See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
Compuserve v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Transcraft Corp. v.
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Before international cases begin to proliferate, the United States first needs
to adopt a coherent approach to domestic jurisdictional problems. This
Article proposes such an approach.
Specifically, this Article proposes some general rules that should apply
in tort cases involving data communications. As will become apparent, the
proposed jurisdictional rules follow from limits on state regulatory power,
which constrain a state's sovereign power to regulate persons, property, and
conduct within its territory. In tort cases, a state should be able to exercise
jurisdiction in cases arising out of data communications originated by a
resident of the state, received within the state, or processed by a computer
within the state, if the communication comprises an event upon which the
defendant's liability allegedly depends. In addition, a state should have the
power to exercise jurisdiction in cases where data communications
proximately cause substantial effects within the state. In the case of an
omission, a state should have the power to regulate that omission if the act
likely would have been performed in the state or if the omission proxi-
mately causes effects within the state. In other words, states should have
the power to exercise personal jurisdiction in cases involving allegedly
tortious conduct that occurs within the state or tortious conduct that occurs
outside the state and proximately causes effects within the state.
The proposed rules would resolve a split of authority that has devel-
oped in data communications cases, particularly in cases involving World
Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue
Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,
No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); Cody v. Ward, 954
F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Co., Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Ill. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom. IDS Life Ins. Co. v.
SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 1998); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes
Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Dist. 1996); EDIAS Software Int'l v. Basis Int'l Ltd.,
947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616
(C.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Bensusan Restaurant Corp.
v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affid, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997);
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); McDonough
v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); Plus Sys., Inc. v. New Eng.
Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992); California Software Inc. v.
Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Pres-Kap v. System
One, DirectAccess, 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Butsee Minnesota
v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), af'd, 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
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Wide Web sites. That split is discussed in Part II. The split arises mainly
due to the shortcomings of the minimum contacts test-a test that should not
be applied in its current form to issues of personal jurisdiction involving
data communications. Instead, when faced with an appropriate case, the
Supreme Court should modify the minimum contacts test as described in
the previous paragraph and in Part III.
To understand why, however, one must focus on the proper policy
justifications for limits on state jurisdiction. That focus invites three
inquiries-(1) an identification of the proper policy basis for restricting state
exercises of personal jurisdiction and an examination of whether the
minimum contacts test is consistent with that policy basis; (2) an examina-
tion of whether personal jurisdiction should be restricted by the Due
Process Clause; and (3) an examination of whether the proposed rules are
consistent with historical jurisdictional doctrine. This Article addresses
each of these questions.
First, the Court has struggled to identify a theory underlying the
doctrine of personal jurisdiction. However, that theory must be identified
to allow difficult questions to be resolved. Cases involving data communi-
cations fit the description-they are difficult to resolve. The theoretical basis
for jurisdictional restrictions is addressed in Part IV. This Article contends
that the scope of sovereign regulatory power should be and has been the
theoretical basis for restricting personal jurisdiction. These limits stem
from Lockean notions of consent?-one who has not consentedto the power
of a sovereign, either expressly or tacitly, is not subject to its jurisdiction.
Tacit consent results from a defendant's conduct which is within the scope
of a state's regulatory power.
Defining personal jurisdiction limits to be consistent with the scope of
state regulatory power is justified for several reasons. In addition to the
judicial function, courts also perform a regulatory function. Thus,
regulatory jurisdictional limits should also apply to courts. In addition,
other exercises of judicial jurisdiction and other exercises of sovereign
authority generally are similarly limited. For practical purposes, a state's
regulatory jurisdiction is only meaningful if its laws are enforced through
exercises of judicial jurisdiction. Even if a state would choose to apply
another state's law, the first state still has an interest in exercising judicial
jurisdiction. The modem minimum contacts test should evolve consistently
with the above theory. The test is currently underinclusive.
Second, commentators have sometimes criticized the applicability of
the Due Process Clause to the personal jurisdiction inquiry. Because this
'See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Article proposes a step beyond the minimum contacts test, one should
consider whether such a step is necessary-i.e., whether due process should
restrict state jurisdiction at all. This Article contends in Part V that personal
jurisdiction is properly restricted as a matter of substantive due process.
Third, it is helpful to consider whether the proposed rules and their
theoretical underpinnings are consistent with the historical treatment of
personal jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court chooses to reexamine the
minimum contacts test, it will likely choose to adopt a test that is as
consistent as possible with past cases. Thus, Part VI reviews the historical
treatment of personal jurisdiction in light of the theoretical justification for
jurisdictional restrictions. This Article views the history of personal
jurisdiction as evolving from a view of territorial sovereignty that gave
states power over persons and property within their borders to a view that
gave states power over persons, property, and certain conduct within their
borders. Territorial sovereignty, however, has been the thread which links
seemingly competing views throughout history. To summarize briefly, one
of the earliest Supreme Court cases dealing with personal jurisdiction,
Pennoyer v. Neff," is based upon a view of consent that requires physical
presence of one's person or property within the territorial boundaries of the
sovereign. However, modem cases recognize that defendants may tacitly
consent to sovereign authority through their conduct.
In Part VII, the proposed rules are applied to a number of factual
scenarios which have arisen or are likely to arise in the context of litigation
over data communications. For the benefit of those not acquainted with
various terminology related to data communications and the Internet, an
Appendix is provided describing such terminology.
I1. THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY REGARDING
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNET CASES
As data communications have become more prevalent and more widely
used by a greater number of people, litigation centering around such
communications has increased. Several recent cases' have struggled with
the issue of whether certain data communications are sufficient to subject
the party responsible for those communications to personal jurisdiction.
Specifically, disputes involving World Wide Web sites have produced
several decisions on the issue. Recent case law addressing the issue of
whether a Web site operator can be sued in any state for trademark
'0 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
" See supra note 8.
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infringement occurring on a Web page illustrates the confusing and
unpredictable application of the existing minimum contacts rule to data
communications. A comparison of the approaches taken in these cases
reveals the shortcomings of the minimum contacts test in a world where
increasingly powerful methods of communication allow communications
that cause potentially widespread effects far from their source. Attempts to
apply the minimum contacts test to Internet communications have resulted
in a split of authority with fairly solid reasoning to support each side.
Because the minimum contacts test lacks a clear policy foundation, one
cannot easily predict how the Supreme Court might resolve the split.
Unfortunately, more difficult Internet jurisdiction questions are lurking
while recent decisions portend more uncertainty in attempting to answer
those questions. This Part will address the split of authority and the
reasoning on each side of the divide.
As noted above, 3 World Wide Web sites raise a controversial
jurisdictional question. Courts are split as to whether the operation of a
World Wide Web server is enough to subject a defendant to personal
jurisdiction in certain instances. 4 The competing views will now be
2 Several courts have also addressed the issue of whether general jurisdiction
may result from the operation of a Web page. Thus far, courts have unanimously
rejected the proposition that operation of a Web page subjects a defendant to
general personal jurisdiction. See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F.
Supp. 1258, 1268-69 (N.D. Ill. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom. IDS
Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 1998);
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826, 1828-29 (S.D. Cal.
1996).
13 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14 Compare Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass.
1997) (finding jurisdiction because the defendant availed itself of benefits in the
forum state through purposefully directing its advertising at all states and did not
avoid advertising in the forum state); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding jurisdiction because defendant transmitted
advertising information to all Internet users, knowing the information would be
distributed globally and because forum residents had accessed the Web site over
100 times); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(finding jurisdiction because of the establishment of a Web site intended to
interfere with plaintiff's business by an unauthorized use of plaintiff's trademark),
affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); and Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding jurisdiction because the defendant
directed its advertising at all states and because the Internet is designed to
communicate with people in every state at all times during the day or night); with
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying
[VOL. 87
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
discussed, beginning with the view which holds that the operation of a Web
server can subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction.
Several courts have applied the purposeful availment test to find
personal jurisdiction in trademark infringement cases involving allegedly
improper uses of trademarks on a Web page. In Inset Systems, Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 5 the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation,
established a Web page using an Internet domain name 6 that allegedly
infringed upon the plaintiffs trademark. 7 Purposeful availment was the
focus of the court's personal jurisdiction analysis. 8 In finding the exercise
of personal jurisdiction to be proper, the court found that the defendant
directed its advertising activities at all states, including the forum state.
Because the Internet is designed to communicate with people in every state
and Internet advertising is available twenty-four hours per day, the court
found that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
doing business in Connecticut. 9
Similarly, in Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc.,20 the court found personal
jurisdiction appropriate due merely to the maintenance of a Web site.
jurisdiction because the operation of a passive Web site did not amount to
purposeful availment); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
1097 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying jurisdiction because the communications involved
were not found to be the type and quality of communications required by courts as
the basis for personal jurisdiction); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620,
1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (denying jurisdiction on the basis of the
analogy that advertising in a national magazine is not targeted at any particular
state); and Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(denying jurisdiction because merely creating a Web site does not amount to the
purposeful availment of the benefits of any particular state), ajfd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d
Cir. 1997).
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
6 domain name is an alphanumeric address assigned to computers which are
connected to the Internet. The purpose of a doniain name is to allow humans to
remember Internet addresses without having to memorize purely numeric
addresses. See ANDREW R. BASILE, JR. ET AL., ONLINE LAW: THE SPA's LEGAL
GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 229 (Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed.,
1996).
17 SeelnsetSys., Inc., 937 F. Supp. at 162-63.
18 See id. at 164-65.
See id. at 165.
20 Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also
Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding
personal jurisdiction under the Calder effects test due to purposeful establishment
of a Web site with an intent to interfere with the plaintiff's business by using its
trademark), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Rejecting the contention that Cybergold maintained a "passive website,"
the court held that Cybergold consciously decided to transmit advertising
information to all Internet users, knowing that the information would be
transmitted globally.2 In finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction
proper, the court determined that forum residents had accessed the Web site
over one hundred times.2 In disputes such as trademark infringement cases,
where Web site accesses affect third parties, such evidence of local access
may be required to allow a court to exercise jurisdiction.? If no state
residents have accessed a Web page, then arguably no damage to the
plaintiff's intangible interests has occurred in the state.24
On the other hand, some courts have found that the operation of a Web
site which allegedly infringes a trademark does not amount to purposeful
availment, making the exercise of personal jurisdiction inappropriate. In
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,25 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in a somewhat mixed-up opinion, rejected the exercise
of personal jurisdiction because there was no purposeful availment by the
defendant. The Florida defendant was accused of service mark infringe-
ment by an Arizona plaintiff due to the use of the service mark on the
defendant's Web page.26 The court relied upon the passive nature of the
Web page and the fact that no evidence showed that the Web site had been
accessed from Arizona, save for one or more accesses by the plaintiff. In
addition, the court held that setting up a Web site with the knowledge that
21 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
2 See id.
I See also Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that number of "hits," or visits, to a Web site from the forum may be
significant).
24See infra note 351 and accompanying text Cases finding personal jurisdiction
appropriate in the state of the plaintiff's residence in libel cases have reasoned that
libel causes economic harm to the plaintiff which is suffered in her home state. See
EDIAS Software Int'l v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413,420 (D. Ariz. 1996);
California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1361
(C.D. Cal. 1986). Such reasoning is flawed. Almost any tort causes some economic
damage to the plaintiff. In most cases, economic damage is not an event upon
which the defendant's liability depends. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding indirect financial loss irrelevant
to jurisdictional questions), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). Like intellectual
property interests, a person can be deemed to have areputation everywhere and that
intangible interest is harmed wherever a libel is published.
I Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).26See id. at 415.
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it is accessible everywhere cannot constitute purposeful availment. "While
there is no question that anyone, anywhere could access that home page
and thereby learn about the services offered, we cannot see how from that
fact alone it can be inferred that Cybersell FL deliberately directed its
merchandising efforts toward Arizona residents."'27 The court was troubled
by the implications of a contrary decision: "Otherwise, every complaint
arising out of alleged trademark infringement on the Internet would
automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever the plaintiff's
principal place of business is located. That would not comport with
traditional notions of what qualifies as purposeful activity invoking the
benefits and protections of the forum state."'2
The Ninth Circuit proceeded to observe that Cybersell did nothing to
encourage access to its Web site in Arizona. Furthermore, there was no
evidence that any Arizona resident in fact purchased services from
Cybersell due to the Web page. "[Cybersell] entered into no contracts in
Arizona, made no sales in Arizona, received no 'telephone calls from
Arizona, earned no income from Arizona, and sent no messages over the
Internet to Arizona."'29 The court also observed that no money was
transferred using the Web site and that the interactivity of the Web page
was limited.3" All of these factors are, at best, marginally relevant to the
jurisdictional issue. The cause of action at issue in Cybersell was service
mark infringement. Thus, the relevant contacts for a specific jurisdiction
analysis were those specifically relating to the cause of action. Typical of
many decisions under the minimum contacts test, the Ninth Circuit felt
obliged to analyze numerous other factors to justify its decision even
though such factors had little relevance to the jurisdictional inquiry.
Because these contacts are more appropriately relevant to a general
jurisdiction inquiry, it is understandable that the Ninth Circuit focused little
upon the nature of the cause of action at issue and the link between the
analyzed contacts and the resulting cause of action.
In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,3 the court rejected the exercise
of personal jurisdiction, finding no purposeful availment. The court
reasoned that any confusion resulting from the Web page access occurs
27Id. at 419.
nId. at 420.
291Id. at 419.
30 See id.
3 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd,
126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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where the Web page is located.32 Perhaps this reasoning is based upon the
court's erroneous view that any information on the Web page is viewed
where the Web site is located.33 No purposeful availment occurred because
the defendant simply created a Web site, allowing access to anyone who
could locate it. Applying a stream of commerce analysis, the court reasoned
that the defendant had done nothing special to target consumers in the
forum state.3
4
Similarly, in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,35 the court held that personal
jurisdiction could not be exercised in a trademark infringement case where
the infringement allegedly occurred due to the Internet domain name.
Drawing an analogy to advertising in a national magazine, the court found
that a Web site, although it can be viewed in all fifty states, is not targeted
at any particular state.36 The court cited Bensusan with approval, agreeing
that creating a Web site is not an act purposefully directed towards the
forum state.37 Because a finding of jurisdiction could subject a defendant
to nationwide jurisdiction, exercising jurisdiction would be inappropriate
as it could have a "devastating impact" on users of the World Wide Web.
31
The analysis of courts on both sides of the issue can be criticized.
Those finding jurisdiction have concluded that purposeful availment is
demonstrated merely by establishing a Web site that can be accessed
anywhere in the world. This common thread runs through the decisions
discussed above. Under existing case law, one might reasonably conclude
that the Web site owner has purposefully established contact with every
state in which the message communicated by the Web page is received.39
Purposeful availment analysis may thus result in a conclusion that a Web
site operator has reached out to all states and can reasonably expect to
answer in the courts of any state for the harm their message proximately
causes in that state.40
32 See id. at 299.
33 See id.
34 Seeid. at 301.
3' Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997).36 See id. at *31.
37 See id. at *51.
381 Id. at *64-65.
31 See generally Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D.
Mo. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996).
40 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1328 (holding that a Web site operator con-
sciously decides to transmit information to any Internet user accessing its Web
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However, these cases have failed to explain why such availment is any
more purposeful than advertising directed to all fifty states. In the latter
context, some courts have held that such advertising does not constitute
purposeful availment.4' In the case of a Web site, the operator does not
know the exact locations from which the Web site will be accessed, while
an advertiser normally knows where the advertisement will be circulated.
In some ways, then, operation of a Web site is less purposeful than
advertising.42 Similarly, personal jurisdiction normally depends upon the
action of the defendant, rather than the actions of third parties. Although
the defendant may set up the Web site, it is then accessed by third parties,
raising the issue of why the number of "hits"43 on the Web site is relevant.
The reasoning of those courts and several commentators who view a
Web site as insufficient to establish jurisdiction is even less convincing.4 4
This view sees a Web server as passive.45 In other words, the Web site
owner places a Web server on a computer connected to the Internet and it
remains there passively until outsiders come to visit that site. According to
this view, purposeful availment cannot occur because the Internet does not
allow one to determine the geographical location of the visitor to the Web
page). But see Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that creating a Web site does not amount to purposeful availment
of the benefits of any particular forum), affid, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Burk,
supra note 5, 54 (arguing that this analysis is erroneous because a Web site
operator's inability to discriminate by jurisdiction makes his contacts less
purposeful).
41 See Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40,43 (8th Cir. 1988);
Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Watson, Ess, Marshall & Enggas, 675 F.2d 587, 589
(2d Cir. 1982); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears, 744 F. Supp. 1289, 1297 (D. Del.
1990).
41 The jurisdictional rules proposed below would allow exercise of personal
jurisdiction over an advertiser where the content of the advertising forms the basis
of the cause of action.
41 A "hit" is a term used to describe a visit to a Web site.
44 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997);
Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997) (finding no jurisdiction); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295,299-300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding no jurisdiction), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.
1997); Burk, supra note 5, 44-52; Ackerman, supra note 5, at 423-25; Kalow,
supra note 5, at 2271-72.
41 See Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 419-20 (noting that operation of a passive
Web site does not amount to purposeful availment); Ackerman, supra note 5, at
424 (referring to a passive Web site).
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page.46 Finally, due process prevents the exercise of jurisdiction over Web
site operators in states where the Web site is accessed because such Web
site owners should be allowed to structure their conduct with a reasonable
assurance as to where that conduct will subject them to suit.47
Initially, one might criticize the focus on the accessor of the Web page
as well as the level of analysis used to approach the question of personal
jurisdiction. Those finding jurisdiction lacking because the Web site
operator has not purposefully established a relationship with the state from
which the Web site is accessed seem to focus on the conduct of the
accessor rather than the Web site operator. 48 True, the accessor takes
affirmative steps to access a Web page and the Web page essentially cannot
determine the geographical location of the accessor. Still, the Web site
operator did take affirmative steps to be able to communicate with the
accessor. By programming the computer that contains the Web site server,
the Web site operator has set up an automated method to communicate with
accessors, no matter where located, by using the Internet.49 A Web site
operator commonly intends to enable accessors all over the United States
to access its Web server and expects such access.5" On most Web sites, the
Web site operator has chosen to communicate with anyone who is willing
to listen, no matter where they are located. One should certainly consider
the relevant conduct of the Web site operator when analyzing the jurisdic-
tional question.
46 See Burk, supra note 5, 45. This is not entirely true as many Internet
uniform resource locators outside of the United States indicate the country in which
the computer is located. However, because Telnet access might allow someone in
China to use a computer in Great Britain to access another computer in Texas,
filtering access based upon one's Internet domain name would likely not allow
complete control over what country's citizens access a Web page. Still, some
control is possible.47 Of course, this principle is just as circular and unenlightening in the computer
context as it is in any context. Assurances as to where a Web site owner will be
subjected to jurisdiction cannot be established until the jurisdictional rules creating
those assurances are agreed upon.
41 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (analyzing personal jurisdiction involving a Web page and finding that a
Web page's information is viewed where the Web site is located and that any act
of trademark infringement occurs where the Web site is located), aff'd, 126 F.3d
25 (2d Cir. 1997).49 See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996).
50 See, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo.
1996).
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In addition, a jurisdictional analysis addressing personal jurisdiction
over Web site operators should involve a lower level of analysis. To
understand the jurisdictional question better, one should also focus on the
communication between the accessor's computer and the Web site
operator's computer. The nature of Web access lends itself to viewing such
access to'be similar to a visit by the accessor to the Web site operator, but
this view is not consistent with how the Web really works. Suppose that
a Web site is in Maine and the accessor is in Texas. Those rejecting
purposeful availment tend to view a Web site access in such circumstances
as analogous to a visit by the accessor to Maine to pick up a newspaper
published by the Web site operator that is available only in Maine,
followed by the accessor returning to Texas and reading the paper there.52
This is certainly one possible view when employing a high level of
analysis, divorced from the lower level data communications taking place.
When an accessor "visits" a Web site, however, the accessor does not
make a visit analogous to a physical visit. A Web site access involves a
two-way data communication in a request/response protocol.5 The
accessor's computer sends a request to the Web site operator's computer,
and the Web server, in response to the request, sends a copy of the Web
page to the accessor's computer.54 If one is intent upon using analogies to
address the jurisdictional question, a more appropriate one can be chosen
than the one discussed above. A Web site access is analogous to the Texas
accessor sending a post card to Maine requesting a free copy of a newspa-
per published by the Web site operator, followed by the sending of the
newspaper from Maine to Texas. Of course, in reality, the Maine Web site
operator does not know exactly where the newspaper is being sent; the Web
site operator has instead employed automated equipment for the distribu-
tion.
Depending upon one's view ofjust how purposeful an availment must
be, one might find jurisdiction under the purposeful availment test when
the actual technical details of a Web site access are considered. If the
purposeful availment test means that defendants have to know they are
5' See Kalow, supra note 5, at 2247 (referring to Internet users "traveling" to
Web sites).
52 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp., 937 F. Supp. at 299 (analyzing personal
jurisdiction involving a Web page and finding that a Web page's information is
viewed where the Web site is located and that any act of trademark infringement
occurs where the Web site is located), afd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
53See infra note 450 and accompanying text.
54See infra note 453 and accompanying text.
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creating a connection with a forum state, then jurisdiction is more
questionable.55 If the purposeful availment test means that defendants need
only commit a purposeful act that has reasonably foreseeable effects in
other states, then one might well find personal jurisdiction appropriate in
any state in which a Web page is accessed and causes tortious injury.16
Thus, when the technical details, as discussed above, of Internet communi-
cations are considered, thejurisdictional analysis is not quite as straightfor-
ward under the minimum contacts test as some courts and commentators
argue.
In fact, the question is a difficult one that illustrates some of the
problems raised by looking to seemingly analogous cases. When courts
choose the wrong analogy, erroneous conclusions are likely to result in
close cases such as those involving Internet communications. Courts should
address such issues by applying high-level jurisdictional principles to new
circumstances and by resisting the temptation to use too many analogies.
The World Wide Web scenario also illustrates the inappropriateness of the
purposeful availment test in the context of the Internet. Purposeful
availment makes little sense where parties can engage in so much useful
interaction without knowledge of, or concern about, geographical
location.57
Uncertainty reigns. Where the content of a Web page gives rise to a
cause of action, such as trademark infringement, some courts view the
establishment of a Web site as purposeful availment of the protections and
power of the laws of all fifty states.5" However, other courts apparently
view the setting up of a Web site as establishing no purposeful connection
with any state. 9 Unfortunately, under existing precedent, one cannot
11 One might be able to show that the contents of a Web page were particularly
targeted at consumers in certain states, subjecting the defendant to liability in those
states, even though the defendant had no idea of the actual geographical location
of those accessing its Web site. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (referring to actions
specifically targeting a particular state).
6 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (finding jurisdiction, at least
partially, because "the brunt of the harm" was suffered in the forum state). But see
Burk, supra note 5, 56.
See Burk, supra note 5, 44; Thatch, supra note 5, at 152-53.
See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997);
Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), af'd, 141 F.3d
1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.
1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
59 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
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determine which courts are right. Because the Supreme Court has never
clearly explainedthepolicybehind the purposeful availment requirement,6"
one cannot analyze the results of these cases in light of the purposes of the
rule. Instead, such cases provide little basis for their conclusions leading to
more jurisdictional uncertainty. In addition, some judges have been swayed
by policy considerations 6' concerning how Web use might be affected by
their decisions with little empirical evidence proving whether their
concerns are justified.
In other words, uncertainty reigns because of the Supreme Court's
failure to adequately explain the policies that underlie its test for personal
jurisdiction. Perhaps cases involving the Internet, such as the World Wide
Web cases discussed above, will cause the Supreme Court to offer a policy
basis for the personal jurisdiction doctrine and to refine the minimum
contacts test to reflect the proper policy concerns. Such refinement is
overdue, because the current minimum contacts test is underinclusive,
difficult to apply, and uncertain in predicting results in many cases. The
present cases are only the tip of the iceberg. Rogue applets,62 negligent use
of cookies,63 push technology,6' and future Internet enhancements will
complicate jurisdictional analysis further. Whatever test is chosen should
allow the flexibility to adapt to such new problems in reliance upon the
policy basis for the test.
III. PROPOSED LIMITS ON STATE
EXERCISES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Several commentators have proposed approaches to personal jurisdic-
tion in the context of the Internet.65 Unfortunately, these approaches
generally rely upon existing precedent and merely attempt to apply it to the
Internet.66 These commentators necessarily assume that the minimum
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
60 See Stein, supra note 7, at 700.
61 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 460-68 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 474-80 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 490-95 and accompanying text.
65See generally Burk, supra note 5, 40-52; Counts & Martin, supra note 4,
at 1126-30; Perritt, supra note 5, at 13; Ackerman, supra note 5, at 425-32;
Zembek, supra note 5, at 367-80.
66 See Burk, supra note 5, 44-52 (applying purposeful availment, stream of
commerce, and Calder in the context of the Internet); Counts & Martin, supra note
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contacts approach as currently applied by the Supreme Court correctly
defines the legitimate scope of state power to adjudicate. As explained
above, however, the minimum contacts test as applied is underinclusive
and improperly restricts state judicial power. Concepts such as purposeful
avaiiment and a reasonable expectation of being haled into court make little
sense in the context of the Internet. Yet, commentators use these concepts
to draw lines as to the proper scope of personal jurisdiction. ' Purposeful
availment and reasonable expectations are poor enough measures of
jurisdiction in other contexts, but they become even clumsier in the context
of the Internet.
Some commentators apply prior personal jurisdiction decisions to
Internet disputes by analogizing them to cases involving telephone
communications or the -distribution of publications.6 8 Although the
temptation to resort to such analogies is strong, they should not be used to
address questions of jurisdiction involving data communications. Data
communications present unique problems of their own, especially in the
context of the Internet.69 Moreover, commentators necessarily assume,
without explanation, that the decisions applied by analogy are correct. In
a way, such analysis suffers from the same problems as current minimum
contacts doctrine. Application of existing case law in the absence of an
inquiry as to whether that case law sets the proper jurisdictional boundaries
4, at 1126-30 (addressing purposeful availment, the Calder effects test, and stream
of commerce in the context of libel); Perritt, supra note 5, at 20-24 (referring to
Hansen v. Denckla, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Asahi in the context of
jurisdiction in Internet cases); Ackerman, supra note 5, at 425-32 (applying
purposeful availment in the context of the Internet); Kalow, supra note 5, at 2269-
74 (applying purposeful availment to issues of personal jurisdiction and the
Internet); Thatch, supra note 5, at 169-76 (applying several Supreme Court cases
to the Internet); Zembek, supra note 5, at 367-80 (addressing personal jurisdiction
over the Internet using analogous situations).
67 See Burk, supra note 5, 44-59; Counts & Martin, supra note 4, at 1126-30;
Ackerman, supra note 5, at 425-32.68 See Perritt, supra note 5, at 17-19 (applying print publication decisions to the
Internet); Ackerman, supra note 5, at 426-28 (applying national advertising cases
to Internet); Zembek, supra note 5, at 358-59, 367-80 (arguing that courts should
use analogous technological developments and legal paradigms to approach
personal jurisdiction issues on the Internet); see also Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,
No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
61 See Burk, supra note 5, 14 (noting that rules for on-line commerce should
be different than other rules because data communications over the Internet are
indifferent to physical location).
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may improperly establish new boundaries without considering the policy
basis for jurisdictional tests.
Several commentators have expressed judgments as to which exercises
ofjurisdiction are fair."0 Unfortunately, they offer no measure to determine
what is fair. The same criticisms made below as to fairness as a jurisdic-
tional measure are equally applicable here. Fairness offers no clear lines to
determine which exercises of jurisdiction are proper. Similarly, fears over
crippling the World Wide Web due to expansive exercises of personal
jurisdiction are unfounded.7 Jurisdictional considerations are more
properly based upon measures of state authority than policy considerations
of the effect that jurisdiction will have on particular actors. These concerns
are better addressed by doctrines such as forum non conveniens.
The time has come to lay the current version of the minimum contacts
test to rest and establish new jurisdictional boundaries based upon the
proper scope of a state's sovereignty. Rather than attempting to establish
a one-size-fits-all test, boundaries should be established by a higher level
inquiry. Jurisdictional inquiries should center on the issue of whether a
particular exercise of jurisdiction falls within the scope of a state's
sovereign authority. One might contend that a more abstract inquiry is
likely to lead to more litigation over jurisdictional questions and increase
uncertainty. Although such concerns are valid, the minimum contacts test
has neither decreased jurisdictional challenges nor decreased uncertainty.
In addition, courts have had little difficulty applying similarly abstract
jurisdictional tests in the area of tax jurisdiction, criminal jurisdiction, and
eminent domain jurisdiction. Borderline cases will always present
difficulty no matter what test is applied. A higher level inquiry which
addresses the policy concerns underlying jurisdiction is more likely to
produce better outcomes in borderline cases than a more well-defined test
that fits some situations well, but is awkward to apply in others. In the
context of data communications, the minimum contacts test is awkward to
apply because bright-line tests, such as purposeful availment, simply do not
fit the world of computer networks.
Because of the unique nature of data communications, the personal
jurisdictional inquiry needs to be freed from the bondage of the current
minimum contacts test. Data communications, particularly those over the
0 See Counts & Martin, supra note 4, at 1132; Ackerman, supra note 5, at 425.
71 Commentators have expressed that fear. See Burk, supra note 5, 60;
Ackerman, supra note 5, at 428.
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global Internet, are primarily indifferent to geographic boundaries.
Because users of computer networks communicate, sometimes anony-
mously, with individuals that they have never met and without knowing
where those individuals are located, concepts such as purposeful availment
make little sense in the context of data communications.73 To place proper
limits on state jurisdiction in the context of data communications, the
inquiry should properly focus on whether a state has the sovereign power
to regulate the persons, property, or conduct at issue in the case. States
should plainly maintain their traditional jurisdiction over their citizens and
persons or property within their boundaries, but jurisdiction over conduct
should be more expansive. Thus, I propose a broader view of what contacts
amount to minimum contacts.
In tort cases, a state should have power over conduct within its borders
as well as conduct proximately causing significant effects within the state.74
Such a test is consistent with the scope of a state's regulatory power and
with the scope of its criminal jurisdiction. Thus, such conduct amounts to
minimum contacts. In the context of data communications, a state should
have the power to regulate and exercise jurisdiction over data communica-
tions originated by a resident of the state, received within the state, or
processed by a computer in the state. In addition, a state should have the
power to regulate data communications which proximately cause substan-
tial effects within the state. In the case of an omission, states should have
the power to regulate and'exercise jurisdiction over that omission if the
undone act likely would have been performed in the state or if the omission
proximately causes effects within the state.
As discussed below, the proposed test marks a logical next step in the
evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine, especially considering the
policy basis for restrictions on state court jurisdiction. Still, if the Supreme
Court is to adopt this proposal, any new test for personal jurisdiction should
be as consistent as possible with the historical treatment ofjurisdiction and
with prior cases under the minimum contacts test. In addition, the proposed
test must be reconciled with the criticisms of some commentators that
72 See Burk, supra note 5, 14-20; Perritt, supra note 5, at 2; Matthew
Bumstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice ofLawin Transnational Cyberspace,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 81 (1996); Zembek, supra note 5, at 348.
3 See Burnstein, supra note 72, at 82.
74 See Arthur Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63
WASH. U. L.Q. 377,404-05 (1985) (arguing that to assert personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident, some act giving rise to a tort must occur in the state in question).
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personal jurisdiction should not be a concern of due process at all. Before
applying the proposed test to various factual scenarios involving data
communications, the following three Parts will demonstrate (1) that
personal jurisdiction limits should be congruent with regulatory jurisdic-
tional limits and other limits on state sovereign power; (2) that personal
jurisdiction is properly restricted as a matter of substantive due process;
and (3) that the proposed test marks another logical step in the historical
evolution of the personal jurisdiction doctrine.
IV. THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS ON STATE
EXERCISES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Radner: "New Shimmer is a floor wax."
Akroyd: "No, new Shimmer is a dessert topping."
Radner: "It's a floor wax."
Akroyd: "It's a dessert topping."
Chase: "Hey, hey, calm down you two, new Shimmer's a floor wax and
a dessert topping."75
Personal jurisdiction doctrine seeks to prevent overreaching by sovereign
states.76 Personal jurisdiction seeks to protect individual liberty interests.'
Personal jurisdiction seeks to prevent overreaching by sovereign states and
protect individual liberty interests.78
The Supreme Court has vacillated over the question of whether the due
process requirements for personal jurisdiction result from limits on
sovereign power or concerns for fairness to the individual.79 Commentators
75 THE NOT READY FOR PRIME TIME PLAYERS, Shimmer, on SATURDAY NIGHT
LIVE (Arista Records 1976).76 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); see also John Drobak, The
Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L. REv. 1015, 1028 (1983)
(arguing that Pennoyer is the case best representing ajurisdictional doctrine based
on sovereignty).
77 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985);
Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
n.10 (1982); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
78 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
(1980); Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235,251 (1958).79 See Stein, supra note 7, at 689. Others view the Court as simply combining
contradictory aspects of various jurisdictional theories rather than vacillating over
the question. See Stewart Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of
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come out on both sides of the fence. Some see personal jurisdiction limits
as stemming from limits on state sovereignty."0 Others see these personal
jurisdiction limits as derived from a concern over fairness to the
individual.8 Unfortunately, no one really knows what theory in fact limits
state exercises of personal jurisdiction because the Supreme Court has
never clearly explained the basis for the doctrine. Modem personal
jurisdiction cases establish some generalized tests for testing jurisdiction,
but these tests do not constitute a theory of jurisdiction. Tests serve as
proxies for other values, but those values remain a mystery. The Court's
failure to identify a jurisdictional theory has led to unprincipled decision-
making and left lesser courts with little guidance as to how to resolve new
problems such as those presented by cases involving data communica-
tions.8 2
When addressing novel jurisdictional issues, consideration of the
theoretical basis for jurisdictional rules is particularly important. Jurisdic-
tional boundaries, if they are to be properly established, should be drawn
with some guidance as to why they are being drawn as opposed to merely
providing a method of how to draw them. Data communications, in
particular communications over the Internet, present novel jurisdictional
issues as illustrated in Part II. Unfortunately, commentators addressing the
issues thus far have constrained themselves to the application of the
modem manifestation of the minimum contacts test, necessarily assuming
that this test properly defines the boundaries of jurisdiction. Little or no
attention has been paid to the theoretical basis for jurisdictional tests.
Like many tests, the minimum contacts test has become increasingly
difficult to apply due to dramatic changes in our country since its creation.
Given the unique nature of data communications, particularly the new types
of communication made possible by the Internet, the time may be ripe for
the development of a new test. Specifically, the Supreme Court may wish
Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REv. 429,459 (1981).
See Stein, supra note 7, at 689; Weisburd, supra note 74, at 379.
81 See Jay, supra note 79, at 453-54; Martin H. Redish, Due Process,
Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1112, 1137-42 (1981); von Mehren, supra note 7, at 300-11; Ralph Whitten,
The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-
Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735, 834 (1981).
82 See Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty andPersonal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up
the Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 105 (1991)
(arguing that decisionmaking in personal jurisdiction cases is unprincipled).
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to respond to these new jurisdictional challenges and establish a new test
for determining the scope of personal jurisdiction, or at least modify the
current test. That test should be based upon general theoretical principles
limiting the jurisdiction of states. This Article contends that the modem
manifestation of the minimum contacts test is ill-suited to address problems
of personal jurisdiction involving data communications. Instead, a new
minimum contacts test should be established, based upon theoretical
principles that logically establish the boundaries of state jurisdictional
power.
Should the Court choose to use a case involving data communications
to revamp the minimum contacts test, it is obviously unrealistic to ex-
pect the Court simply to discard the minimum contacts test and start over.83
Historical practice has been an important factor in the Court's personal
jurisdiction doctrine. 4 In addition, the Court normally tries to adopt a
test consistent with many of its past cases but more adaptable to future
cases.85 This Article proposes a modification to the minimum contacts test
that is sensitive to both of these concerns. Even if the Court were to write
on a blank slate, however, it should adopt a test similar to that proposed
here.
This Part considers what principles should limit state exercises of
personal jurisdiction. In making this inquiry, however, one might ask why
state court jurisdiction should be limited at all. After all, no explicit
provision of the Constitution limits state court jurisdiction. Thus, in
establishing limits on personal jurisdiction, the question that must be
addressed is why a state should be prevented from exercising jurisdiction,
not why the state should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction. 86 Still, positive
justifications as to why a state should be able to exercise jurisdiction may
strengthen the justifications for preventing a state from exercising
jurisdiction. This Part contends that territorial sovereignty should impose
limits on state exercises of jurisdiction and, conversely, that sovereign
regulatory interests justify state exercises ofjurisdiction. Then, it addresses
83 Some have suggested discarding the minimum contacts test entirely and
focusing on a variety of factors to determine whether personal jurisdiction is
proper. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 81, at 1137-42.
4See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622 (1990).
85See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S.
CAL. L. REv. 257,269 (1990).
86 See Harold Lewis, Jr., The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal
Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33
MERCER L. REv. 769, 817 (1982); Redish, supra note 81, at 1134.
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the shortcomings of the purposeful availment and "fairness" aspects of the
current minimum contacts test.
A. Territorial Sovereignty Should Impose Limits on State Exercises
ofJurisdiction
It is unremarkable to suggest that territorial boundaries should impose
limits on state exercises of jurisdiction. Few would dispute that the courts
of one state should be denied the power to force a defendant to litigate a
case in that state involving a transaction completely internal to another
state. Otherwise, states would have the power to hear any lawsuit between
any two parties and force any defendant to appear in their courts. Thus,
there would be no meaningful limitation on a state's sovereign power to try
cases in its courts.87 All fifty states could claim jurisdiction over every
cause of action.
Again, however, it must be asked why states should not be able to
entertain a case involving a transaction completely internal to another state.
Although one could offer several justifications, one reasonable justification
stems from American understandings of the source of sovereign power. As
explicitly stated in the Declaration of Independence, sovereign power is
derived from the consent of the governed.88 Adjudicating a lawsuit is a
sovereign act89-a state is exercising its sovereign authority when it forces
a defendant to appear in its courts and adjudicates a cause of action
involving that defendant.
Thus, a state exceeds its sovereign authority when it attempts to assert
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a case involving a
transaction completely internal to another state. Such a defendant has not
consented to the forum state's exercise of authority over him, either
expressly or tacitly. Because a state only has sovereign power over those
who consent to its authority, it may not exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant having absolutely no connection with the forum state who does
not otherwise consent to such jurisdiction. Such a defendant may rightfully
claim that his lack of consent means that the forum state lacks any
authority over him whatsoever.90
" See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)
(trying cases represents sovereign act).
88 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
89 See supra note 87. -
90 In many ways, the state with no connection to a defendant is in the same
position as a "counterfeit" tribunal in the state of residence of the defendant. A
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Consent to sovereign authority may well be the measure of other state
exercises ofjurisdiction. States have traditionally had personal jurisdiction
over their citizens and those present within the state. In the former case, the
citizen has consented to the power of the sovereign simply by being a
citizen.9 In the latter case, the citizen has tacitly consented to the power of
the sovereign by entering into its territory.92
The latter concept is important and may serve as a guiding principle for
restricting state exercises of jurisdiction. A defendant may tacitly consent
to jurisdiction through his conduct.93 The difficulty then becomes identify-
ing what conduct amounts to tacit consent. Conduct that has absolutely no
connection to a state, however, plainly cannot amount to tacit consent and
thus limits state exercises of jurisdiction.
Such limits on state court jurisdiction are consistent with the view of
interstate federalism implicit in the structure of the Constitution.94 Each
state is sovereign, limited only by the Constitution and the supremacy of
federal law. Yet, because each state is sovereign, the sovereignty of the
counterfeit tribunal is one that is not created by the state. For example, citizens of
a state could simply create their own tribunal as happened recently in Texas. See
Peter C. Salaverry, Republic of Texas; Flawed Logic and the Wrong History, TEX.
LAW., May 19, 1997, at 36. Such a tribunal would have no authority over a
defendant because the defendant has not consented to the sovereign authority of
that tribunal. In the words of Locke:
Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power by other ways than
what the laws of the community have prescribed has no right to be obeyed
though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved, since he is not the
person the laws have appointed and, consequently, not the person the
people have consented to.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 73 (Lester Dekoster
ed., William B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1978) (1690) (commenting on usurpation).
Thus, a foreign tribunal claiming authority over a defendant that has not consented
to its authority is in the same position as a domestic tribunal that has usurped the
power of the sovereign.
91 See LOCKE, supra note 90, at 54 (noting that citizens of a sovereign consent
to the power ofthat sovereign and subject themselves to the laws ofthat sovereign).
92 See id. (stating that tacit consent to the power of the sovereign "reaches as far
as the very being of anyone within the territories of that government").
93 See id.
94 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,293 (1980);
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 85; Weisburd, supra note 74, at 394,420; see
also Kogan, supra note 85, at 263.
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other states is necessarily limited to their respective territorial boundaries.91
The fiamers imposed certain restrictions on state power designed to
maintain harmony between the states.96 Thus, limits on state jurisdiction are
justified in light of the general view of states as sovereign entities and the
constitutional goal of maintaining harmony between them.
B. Regulatory Interests Should Allow a State to Exercise Personal
Jurisdiction
As has just been observed, jurisdictional limits justifiably flow from
limits on territorial sovereignty. To be subject to personal jurisdiction, the
defendant must consent to the authority of the sovereign, either through his
citizenship or through his conduct. Because a defendant may tacitly consent
to the jurisdiction of a sovereign through his conduct, a state's ability to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant is measuredby its sovereign power
to regulate that conduct. That is, a defendant who engages in conduct that
may be regulated by a sovereign has tacitly consented to the jurisdiction of
that sovereign.97 This Article is, therefore, consistent with the arguments of
some commentators that have suggested that legislative jurisdiction and
judicial jurisdiction be measuredeither similarly or identically.98
95See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 293.
9 See Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases ofJurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 775, 816-17 (1955).97 See LOCKE, supra note 90, at 54 (arguing that anyone that has "enjoyment
of any part of the dominions of any government" tacitly consents to its
jurisdiction).
98 See Stanley E. Cox, The Interrelationship of Personal Jurisdiction and
Choice ofLaw: ForgingNew Theory Through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court, 49 U. PIr. L. REv. 189, 190 (1987) (arguing that the first stage of the
minimum contacts test for specific personal jurisdiction, in which the Supreme
Court examines whether the defendant's forum state contacts are related to the
litigation, is identical to the test for determining whether a forum state is entitled
to apply its own law); Alfred Hill, Choice ofLaw and Jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 960, 986 (1981) (suggesting that in the ordinary sense,
the power of a forum state to apply its own law and the power to assert long-arm
jurisdiction should coexist, as they both are supported by the same contacts); James
Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980)
(arguing that the constitutionality of choice of law should be governed by the
minimum contacts test); Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1587, 1592 (1978) (arguing that the same basic principles underlie both
personal jurisdiction and choice of law); Stephens, supra note 82, at 106.
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Definingpersonaljurisdictional limits to matchregulatory (legislative)
jurisdictional limits makes sense. First, courts often perform a regulatory
function in civil cases. Thus, personal jurisdictional limits may be viewed
as regulatory jurisdictional limits. Second, personal jurisdictional limits
should be consistent with other judicial jurisdictional limits, such as
criminal'jurisdictional limits. Third, because an exercise of personal
jurisdiction is a sovereign act, such jurisdictional limits should be
consistent with other limits on state sovereignty. A lack of consistency on
either ground creates categorization problems and encourages state
governments to recharacterize state action and reorganize government to
take advantage of broader sovereignty limits. Fourth, personal jurisdic-
tional limits shouldbe congruent to legislative jurisdictional limits because
a state's regulatory power is only meaningful to the extent that the state can
enforce its legislation through judicial action. Fifth, a state having a
regulatory interest in a matter also has an interest in exercising personal
jurisdiction in the matter.
Turning to the first justification, the Supreme Court has often drawn a
distinction between legislativejurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.99 This
distinction is somewhat artificial, because it assumes that there is no
overlap between legislative action and judicial action. In fact, this is not the
case. Courts do exercise regulatory power, albeit not in the same way that
the legislature does. Cases must be brought before a court before it may
exercise its regulatory power, but when it has a case before it, the court has
the power to regulate.
More specifically, courts make law when they decide cases. When a
court crafts a new common law principle or flurther defines a common law
principle by applying it to new facts, the court is regulating. If this did not
constitute regulation, then there would be no differences in the common
law applied in the several states and there would be no need for the Erie
doctrine. As Professor Kogan has observed, Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins'" and its progeny are based upon a view of courts as
lawmakers.' 0' Rather than simply applying existing norms, judges were
seen as active creators of those norms.'02 Federal courts must yield to
norms created by. state courts in passing on issues of state law because
" See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing for comparative purposes Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), and American Oil Co. v. Neil, 380 U.S. 451 (1965)).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
,01 See Kogan, supra note 85, at 348.
'0o See id.
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those state courts are granted the power to regulate on such issues. '03
Similarly, when a state court chooses among competing interpretations of
a statute or when a court determines whether certain conduct falls within
the boundaries of a statute, it establishes a new rule to govern future
conduct.
Commentators critical of the characterization of personal jurisdiction
as a due process issue sometimes point to due process limits as limits on
legislative power rather than judicial power.0'4 Choice of law questions
may involve a question of legislative jurisdiction, which are sometimes
viewed as different from the question of judicial jurisdiction.105 As has just
been observed, courts do exercise regulatory jurisdiction. However, the
converse is also true-legislatures sometimes exercise their power in a way
that might be viewed as judicial."° Questions of judicial jurisdiction and
legislative jurisdiction should be treated similarly.0 7 Although the core of
legislative action may differ substantially in character from the core of
judicial action, legislative acts and judicial acts overlap in certain
respects.' Courts sometimes exercise legislative-like power and legisla-
tures sometimes exercise judicial-like power. One could attempt to identify
the many characteristics of legislative action and judicial action, but two
major generalizations stand out. Legislatures establish general rules that
govern the actions of many while courts apply rules to the actions of the
specific parties before them." 9 Legislatures take actions which govern
conduct in the future while courts address the past conduct of the parties
before them.
Although these generalizations might hold true as to the majority of
legislative and judicial actions, they do not always hold true. Obviously,
103 See id.
See Whitten, supra note 81, at 793.
See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial
Jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 (1991).
" See von Mehren, supra note 7, at 282 (noting that traditional functions may
be treated differently in different states, sometimes as a legislative function,
sometimes as a judicial function).
07 See Kogan, supra note 85, at 326 (noting that Thomas Cooley recognized
that due process restricts both legislative and judicial power); Maier & McCoy,
supra note 105, at 251; Rheinstein, supra note 96, at 810 (stating that Justice Story
recognized limits on the legislative jurisdiction of the states); Stein, supra note 7,
at 745; Weisburd, supra note 74, at 385.
108 See 2 RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN E.NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 17.8, at 646 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that the line between administrative
rulemaking and adjudication is not a clear one).
" See Maier & McCoy, supra note 105, at 254.
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courts also make general rules. When courts decide cases before them, their
opinions may establish rules that henceforth will govern the conduct of
many parties other than those before them. Although a court may be
deciding the specific case before it, general rules of law established in the
case may transcend the specific case. Similarly, the focus on the number of
people affected by a specific act is also misplaced. In a class action, a court
may make rules that govern the conduct of many parties at once. Judicial
action does not only govern past conduct. A court may issue injunctions
that govern future conduct. In certain cases, such as where a court takes
control of a prison or school system, the court may make general prospec-
tive rules that govern the future conduct of many.
The legislature sometimes takes actions that could be characterized as
judicial. Legislatures sometimes adopt narrow rules designed only to affect
a limited number of parties. Special taxation laws provide one example of
this type of legislation." 0 Congress often extends special tax exemptions
to the politically influential. President Clinton used his line-item veto
power to veto some of these exemptions in the 1997 budget bill."M Another
example ofjudicial-like acts by a legislature is the changing of a law during
a pending case because the legislature wishes to influence the outcome of
that case." 2 There, the legislature is entering into a dispute between a
limited number of parties. Similarly, legislatures do not always pass
prospective rules. Legislation is frequently retroactive, provided that
retroactivity meets the requirements of due process.
Overall, this brief discussion of legislative and judicial action suggests
that the two types of action overlap. Because actions by courts and by
legislatures can be similar in effect, drawing a distinction between the two
for jurisdictional purposes is artificial. Such actions can be both similar in
character and in effect, justifying parallel treatment of jurisdictional
questions.
110 See John Harris, Clinton Set to Use New Veto Power; Line-item Cuts to
TargetPork-Barrel Spending, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 11, 1997, at IA
(noting that a tax shelter in the 1997 budget bill could potentially have helped
billionaire Harold Simmons); President and Congress Line-item Laughs,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 1997, at 22 (noting that a tax shelter in the 1997 budget bill
could potentially have helped billionaire Harold Simmons).
"' See Harris, supra note 110, at IA.
".2 The Supreme Court has held that Congress may change the law during a
pending case provided it does not dictate a rule of decision in the case. See
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 438-41 (1992); Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856); United States
v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
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Turning to the second justification for treating personal jurisdiction
limits as regulatory limits, such limits logically should be congruent to
other judicial jurisdictional limits. In the criminal context, judicial
jurisdiction has been circumscribed by regulatory jurisdictional limits.
Those limits will be briefly explored.
In the criminal context,
[t]he jurisdiction of a court necessarily is constrained by limitations upon
the reach of the legislative enactments that the court enforces. Ifa political
entity lacks the legislative authority to govern behavior outside a certain
geographical area, its judiciary will be said to lack "jurisdiction" to apply
its criminal laws to such behavior.
These limits stem from territorial limits of sovereign power, and "states
have power to make conduct a crime only if that conduct takes place, or its
results occur, within the state's territorial borders."' 4
Although these general principles are logical, difficult cases may arise
in the criminal realm. The treatment of crimes occurring in multiple states
provides valuable insights into how personal jurisdiction should be treated
in cases with multistate elements. At common law, most crimes were
deemed to occur at a single location."5 For example, the common law
provided a straightforward resolution to the classic hypothetical where a
person standing in one state shoots a person standing in a different state."6
Because a murder occurred "where the fatal force struck the victim,""' 7 this
hypothetical was not so interesting under common law rules."' Exceptions
to these common law rules were continuing crimes, such as kidnapping,
which could be prosecuted in more than one state."9
Like personal jurisdiction doctrine, however, modem rules recognize
that a crime may not have a single situs. Accordingly, crimes may occur
"3 WAYNER. LAFAVE &JEROLDH. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 737 (2d ed.
1992).
"
4I d. The decisions in this area do not clarify whether territorial limits stem
from limits as to sovereignty alone or whether due process would be violated by
an ultra vires assertion of criminal jurisdiction. See Weisburd, supra note 74, at
396-98. States rarely attempt to extend their criminal power, so case law in this
area is limited. See id. at 398.
"s See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 113, at 738.
16 See Weisburd, supra note 74, at 401.
17 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 113, at 738.
118 See id.
119 See id.
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partly within a number of states and each of those states may legitimately
claim jurisdiction over such a crime. 120 Thus, the classic hypothetical to
which the previous paragraph referred would be resolved by allowing both
states to exercise jurisdiction.
As to crimes committed by a state's citizens, the criminal jurisdictional
rules are again similar to those applicable to personal jurisdiction. Because
a state has the power to regulate the conduct of its citizens, a state can
punish one of its citizens for acts occurring outside of its territorial
boundaries.' One example of this power is the federal prohibition against
the bribing of foreign officials by U.S. citizens."
The Supreme Court has faced the issue of a state's power to punish
criminal acts by its own citizens. In Skiriotes v. Florida,"1 the Court held
that Florida had the power to punish its citizen for harvesting sea sponges
in the Gulf of Mexico despite the possibility that the citizen did the
harvesting in waters outside of Florida's territorial boundaries. 24 The Court
viewed the issue of Florida's territorial boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico
as irrelevant.'2 Florida retained the right of a sovereign state except for
powers granted to the federal government. 126 "There is nothing novel in the
doctrine that a State may exercise its authority over its citizens on the high
seas."
127
Skiriotes rests upon the notion that states are treated as sovereign
entities with the exception of those powers granted to the federal govern-
ment by the United States Constitution. Thus, as long as the state's
regulation of its citizens' conduct does not conflict with that of the federal
government, the state has sovereign authority for such regulation. 28 This
view of states as sovereign entities, except as limited by the Constitution,
is consistent with the treatment of states in personal jurisdiction cases.
120 See id.; see also Perritt, supra note 5, at 51-52; Weisburd, supra note 74, at
401.
121 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 113, at 737; Perritt, supra note 5, at 51-
52. Likewise, parents often claim the power to punish their children for acts
committed outside oftheirjurisdiction. See LOCKE, supra note 90, at31 (discussing
jurisdiction of parents over children).
122 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (1994).
'23 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
'
24 See id. at 76-77.
125 See id. at 77.
126 See id.
127 Id.
'2 See id. at 78-79.
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Overall, criminal jurisdiction andpersonaljurisdiction limits stem from
limits on territorial sovereignty. In both instances, a state has the power to
exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring within its boundaries,
regardless of whether all the relevant events occur within the state.
Similarly, multiple states may have power to prosecute a single crime just
as multiple states may have personal jurisdiction in a civil suit. Finally, as
in civil cases, a state's sovereign power extends to allow the state to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over its citizens without regard to where the
criminal acts occurred. A state may prosecute its citizens for criminal acts
committed abroad just as a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over its
citizens for civil violations committed abroad. Because of these similari-
ties, the boundaries of criminal jurisdiction andpersonaljurisdiction should
be the same.
Turning to the third justification, because an exercise of personal
jurisdiction is a sovereign act, that sovereign act should be circumscribed
by jurisdictional rules that parallel those restricting other exercises of
sovereign authority. The Supreme Court has recognized other limits on
state power. Tax jurisdiction provides an example of how the Court has
restricted state power as a matter of due process. As to property, a state has
jurisdiction to tax only (1) real property within the state and tangible
personal property located within the state and (2) intangible or movable
tangible personal property owned by a person domiciled within the state or
protected in some other way by that state's law.'29 These limits are
substantive due process limits. 30 As to personal income, a state may tax the
income of (1) individuals domiciled therein and (2) individuals generating
income from their occupation, business, or property located within the
state.' Similar rules apply to taxation of corporations.' These limits are
also substantive due process limits.'
Prior to the passage of the Due Process Clause, state jurisdiction to tax
was likewise limited in the ways noted above. Tax on out-of-state property
was deemed to be improper because it was beyond a state's jurisdiction.'
129 See 2 ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 108, § 13.2, at 128.
130 See id.
131 See id. § 13A, at 183-84.
'
32 See id. § 13.4, at 185.
133 See id. § 13.4, at 183-85.
" See Weisburd, supra note 74, at 394-95 (citing St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry
Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423.(1871); Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262
(1868); Hays v. Pacific Steamship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854)).
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An attempt to tax property of another state was viewed as ultra vires and
void.'35 The Court was quite explicit on this point:
Where there is jurisdiction neither as to person nor property, the imposi-
tion of a tax would be ultra vires and void. If the legislature of a State
should enact that the citizens or property of another State or country
should be taxed in the same manner as the persons and property within its
own limits and subject to its authority, or in any manner whatsoever, such
a law would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with the most explicit
constitutional inhibition. Jurisdiction is as necessary to valid legislative as
to valid judicial action. 36
Given this analysis, it is not surprising that the Court later found due
process to prevent taxation of property outside of the state. 37 Because
substantive due process is based upon protecting individuals from ultra
vires acts by the state, the applicability of due process is obvious due to the
Court's prior acknowledgment that the taxation of out-of-state property
constitutes an ultra vires act. Like an improper exercise of personal
jurisdiction, an improper exercise of taxing authority by a state results in
the state exercising authority where it has none, thus violating the due
process rights of those individuals subjected to such false authority. 38
35 See Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 430.
136 id.
'37 See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905).
Although due process prevents a state from taxing in an ultra vires manner, the
boundaries of a state's power arise out of its sovereign character. Like personal
jurisdiction limits, tax jurisdiction limits may be deemed implicit in the
constitutional structure. See Weisburd, supra note 74, at 394.
131 See Weisburd, supra note 74, at 395-96 (citing Rheinstein, supra note 96, at
791-92). Professor Redish has argued that tax jurisdiction cases are distinguishable
because they are based upon a concern for protecting the defendant from a
deprivation of property, a concern which is protected by due process. Tax
jurisdiction relates to specific concerns about the relationship between state and
citizen. Professor Redish argues that in personal jurisdiction cases, on the other
hand, there is no harm to the individual. Thus, courts are only concerned about
federalism, which is not a due process concern. See Redish, supra note 81, at 1128-
29. This view misunderstands the personal jurisdiction due process inquiry.
Personal jurisdiction is also a substantive due process concern. See infra notes 200-
33 and accompanying text. The concern is the same-protecting individuals from'
ultra vires acts by state governments. In the case of personal jurisdiction, the
substantive due process concern is protecting the defendant from a deprivation of
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Taxjurisdiction has many parallels to personal jurisdiction. States may
tax property in the state and the income of those domiciled in the state. A
state may not tax property located in another state.'39 These rules are
similar to the rules stated in Pennoyer that a state has exclusive jurisdiction
over property and persons within the state but no jurisdiction over property
and persons outside the state. In another parallel to personal jurisdiction
doctrine, the Court has also recognized the ability of a state to tax conduct
occurring within the state (income from an occupation, business, or
property within the state), even if the person taxed is not a resident. 140
Because taxation, like judicial jurisdiction, is an act of a sovereign state,
these parallels make sense.
Eminent domain jurisdiction has been treated similarly to tax jurisdic-
tion. The Constitution does not grant states the power of eminent domain.
Instead, the power is implied as it constitutes an attribute of sovereignty.' 41
Accordingly, states are treated as sovereign entities for this purpose as well.
True, their power of eminent domain is limited by other constitutional
provisions which limit their sovereignty.'42 Such limits are no different than
liberty (and arguably property) by a court without power over the defendant. See
Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REv. 479, 508 n.183
(1987).
'
39 See Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 161
(1933); Union Refrigerator Transit Co., 199 U.S. at 204.
140 See Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); Shafferv. Carter,
252 U.S. 37 (1920).
14" See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924). The Court stated:
The power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty and inheres in
every independent state.... The taking of private property for public use
upon just compensation is so often necessary for the proper performance of
governmental functions that the power is deemed to be essential to the life
of the State.
Id.; see also Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 394
(1912) (stating that each state has an inherent right of eminent domain). The power
of eminent domain is sometimes justified on grounds of consent, demonstrating the
influence of Locke once again. Those who consent to be governed also consent to
the fact that private property must give way to achieve a public purpose. See
Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question
ofFederalism, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 833-34 (1989).
142 See West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (holding that a
state may not discriminate against interstate commerce in exercising its power of
eminent domain); Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir. 1967)
(explaining that federal courts may intervene where exercise of eminent domain
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those applying in the context of taxation and criminal jurisdiction. Like
taxation and criminal jurisdiction, eminent domain is also limited by the
boundaries of the state.'43 State territorial boundaries thus provide a
measure of all of these fundamental aspects of sovereignty.
In the eminent domain context, a state's power is limited to real
property within its territorial limits.1" That much is accepted. Logically,
personal property that is permanently fixed in a state is most likely subject
to that state's eminent domain power as was the case in the tax context. 45
This proposition has apparently not been tested. Mobile personal property
and intangible property present additional problems. Courts have not
developed a theory to address these types of property. 46 Based upon the
overall territorial limits on the power to exercise eminent domain and the
difficulties that would arise if multiple states tried to lay claim to the same
violates constitutional rights).
141 See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. at 480 (eminent domain extends to all
property within the jurisdiction of the state which is all lands within the state);
JULIUS L. SACKMAN, 1 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.12, at 2-32
(1981); Ellen Mufson, Note, Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in
Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389, 390 (1985).
' See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. at 480; SACKMAN, supra note 143, §
2.12, at 2-32. The Nichols treatise contends that this limitation does not depend
upon any particular constitutional provision. Apparently, Nichols would argue that
these limits are inherent in the nature of eminent domain because the power derives
from sovereignty itself. Thus, even if the power of eminent domain is inherently
limited, attempts to exceed the rightful scope of power would be considered ultra
vires acts. A court may likely find that a state exceeding the scope of its eminent
domain power violated substantive due process rights of the property owner. As
noted above, substantive due process protects the owner from ultra vires acts of the
state. Even if the scope of state power is not defined by the Constitution, an ultra
vires act may still violate due process.
The rules regarding eminent domain over real property are consistent with the
local action rule. This rule limits the jurisdiction of a state to directly affect title to
real property solely within the boundaries of the state. See Weisburd, supra note
74, at 386. Sovereignty also gives a state exclusive jurisdiction over the land within
its borders. See id. at 387.
'45 See SACKMAN, supra note 143, § 2.12[4], at 2-38 ("It is safe to assume that
in such a case all the modem modifications of the doctrine that mobilia sequunter
personam would be held applicable, and property permanently kept in one state
would be held to be within the jurisdiction of such state and of no other.").
' See id.; Mufson, supra note 143, at 390. Note that, in WestRiverBridge Co.
v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848), the Supreme Court held that intangibles are
subject to eminent domain. See id. at 534-36.
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property, it is likely that courts would give a state jurisdiction over the
personal and intangible property of its citizens. Although courts have not
addressed all relevant jurisdictional issues, those that have been addressed
measure eminent domain jurisdiction based upon territorial sovereignty.
Because eminent domain is considered to be a legislative act,'47 such
limitations may be viewed as limitations on legislative power.
Thus, many types of judicial jurisdiction are limited by a state's
sovereign regulatory power as are other sovereign acts. Of course,
constitutional limits on choice of law limit a state's sovereign regulatory
power directly. There are at least two reasons why all of these questions
should be treated similarly, if not identically. First, classification problems
may result otherwise. All of these jurisdictional limits purport to limit state
power in some way. If different rules apply to different types of state
action, one must first classify the state action to determine which rule to
apply. As stated above, state action is not so easily characterized as judicial
or legislative. Similarly, within the judicial area itself, criminal and civil
penalties may be hard to distinguish at the margin. Second, differing rules
invite gamesmanship on the part of states. For example, if criminal
jurisdiction offers more expansive limits than civil jurisdiction, a state may
choose to reclassify certain conduct as criminal in order to take advantage
of jurisdictional rules. States may also choose to give responsibility for
certain actions to other branches of state government in order to take
advantage of broader jurisdictional rules.
Turning to the fourth justification for treating personal jurisdiction
congruently with limits on state regulatory power, laws are only meaning-
ful to the extent that they can be enforced. 48 As a practical matter, a forum
most often applies its own law when faced with a choice of law question.149
Thus, a state's legislative jurisdiction to regulate conduct is only meaning-
ful if it can exercise judicial jurisdiction to enforce the laws governing that
conduct. Where jurisdictional questions arise in the context of data
communications, this limit may be amplified. For example, suppose that a
Web site operator resides and operates the Web site in State A and
something about the Web site or something caused by the Web site violates
the law of State B. If the Web site operator cannot be sued for effects
47 See Georgiav. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. at483 ("The taking is a legislative and
not ajudicial function .... ).
148 See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
149 See Martin, supra note 98, at 881; Courtland H. Peterson, Proposals of
Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 869,
871 (1981).
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proximately caused by the operator's Web site in State B and if State A
would choose to apply its own law that legalizes the Web site operator's
conduct, then the law of State B may be effectively unenforceable. State
B's law might purposefully be avoided by simply operating the Web site
in a different state.
Even if another state chose to apply the law of the state in which the
effects are felt (the regulating state), the policies of that law may not be
enforced in the same way. Unfamiliarity with the law of the regulating state
may cause the forum state to apply the law incorrectly. Local bias towards
the forum state's view of the propriety of the conduct may cause the
regulatory state's law to be applied in a different way than it would have
been applied in the regulating state. Finally, the forum state may choose to
craft an exception to a statute on equitable principles that the regulatory
state would not recognize (or the forum state would not recognize an
exception where one would otherwise be recognized).
Fifth, choice of law limits require a state to have an interest in
regulating the conduct at issue. If a state has such an interest, it also has an
interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over that conduct. The deterrence
value of laws just described is one interest. In addition, if the regulating
state is not able to exercise jurisdiction, it is deprived of the ability to issue
ajudgment having a stare decisis effect. Because the conduct of parties not
before the court may be affected due to stare decisis, a state with a
regulatory interest in applying its law loses this ability to affect conduct
when it cannot exercise jurisdiction. Of course, a decision of another state
on the matter is only persuasive authority and is less likely to affect the
conduct of others. The effect of a decision on the conduct of others is likely
to be strengthened where the case is tried in the regulating state, as
publicity surrounding the case may provide for increased public awareness.
C. Reasonable Expectations Are a Flawed Basis to Restrict Jurisdiction
In Hanson v. Denckla,"0 the Supreme Court attempted to find some test
by which courts could decide easily whether a state's authority extended to
a particular controversy. The Court had consistently limited personal
jurisdiction based upon state sovereign power, but for some reason did not
want to extend jurisdictional authority to the states' "legitimate regulatory"
sphere.'"' Rather than deciding the case based upon the policies underlying
the personal jurisdiction doctrine, the Court did what courts often try to
150 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
151 See Stein, supra note 7, at 717.
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do-develop a test that is more concrete, easier to apply, and protects the
values underlying the doctrine to which the test is directed. 5 Rather than
acknowledge the reality that the evolution of the personal jurisdiction
doctrine stemmed from the realization that sovereign authority was broader
than the limits established in Pennoyer, the Court returned to a quite
limited view of Lockean notions of consent to the power of the
sovereign.
153
The test in Denckla established purposeful availment as the rationale
for jurisdiction-the defendant purposefully establishes some relationship
with the state and thereby achieves some benefits from state law. The Court
stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.'
54
This test imposes a significant limit on state power-a state cannot take
jurisdiction unless the defendant voluntarily consents to some relationship
with the forum.'55 Subsequent cases have relied on this same rationale.1
56
152 See Jay, supra note 79, at 463 ("Whenever a court employs words as
shorthand substitutes for explanation, there inevitably arises a host of finely
distinguished cases that display an escalating tendency to become removed from
the issues lying behind the original words.").
153 See Stein, supra note 7, at 718.
154 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (citations omitted).
... See Stein, supra note 7, at 719.
156 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297-98 (1980). In later cases,
the Court has added the comment that the purposeful connection must be such that
the defendant must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. See id. at
297. Commentators have observed, quite correctly, that this is a circular
conclusion. See Jay, supra note 79, at 443; Stein, supra note 7, at 701-02.
Expectations about where one is subject to suit are only developed due to prior case
law addressing jurisdiction. Thus, adherence to the rule might freeze or slow
development of jurisdictional doctrine for if the rule is followed strictly, "a
reviewing court.., should deny jurisdiction whenever the prior cases do not point
precisely toward liability to suit in the forum." Jay, supra note 79, at 443. Thus, the
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As ajurisdictional test, purposeful availment is a poor proxy for trying
to measure when a state acts outside of its jurisdictional authority. The rule
is underinclusive. There are many acts that cause significant effects within
a state that implicate the state's regulatory authority, yet these acts are not
the result of a purposeful connection with the state. 7 Examples include
chemical plant leaks, such as the Bhopal disaster, or radiation leaks, such
as occurred in the Chernobyl disaster. In such cases, the defendant's
negligence may cause far-reaching effects outside of the jurisdiction of the
plant, and these effects certainly are not the result of some purposeful
relationship between the defendant and the forum. Another example is
where a product is shipped through a distribution chain to a particular
forum. If the manufacturer has no control over product distribution, then
the manufacturer has not established a purposeful relationship. Although
a state may have a legitimate regulatory interest in such cases, it may not
be able to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant." 8 The rule is thus
underinclusive-it prevents a state from exercising jurisdiction to regulate
conduct with which it has a legitimate concern due to proximate effects
caused within the jurisdiction. Purposeful availment is even harder to unify
with the doctrine of specific jurisdiction, which recognizes jurisdiction
based upon regulatory power.5 9
These problems are magnified in the context of data communications.
Internet users often send e-mail to people without knowing where they are
located. Because particular users can access their e-mail account from
rule might in effect be applied similarly to the rule of qualified immunity, where
a state official is immune from suit unless the official acts in a way that has been
clearly established in prior decisions as a constitutional violation. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 8.6.3, at 416 (1989).
... In Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), the Court rejected the
proposition that a defendant causing effects within the state was subject to
jurisdiction. See Luther L. McDougal III, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts
to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1, 5 (1982); see also Weisburd, supra
note 74, at 379 (arguing that the purposeful availment test does not follow from the
premise that territorial sovereignty limits jurisdiction).
158 This issue is still uncertain in light of the Court's decision in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). It provides an example of a
jurisdictional question that should be easy to resolve, but has bothered the Court
due to its focus on purposeful availment.
"' See Stein, supra note 7, at 700-01 (arguing that "a court's stronger
jurisdictional claim when specific jurisdiction is present cannot be explained solely
by the exchange rationale"); infra note 335 and accompanying text.
1998-991
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
different states, one cannot easily identify exactly where an e-mail is
targeted. The computer where the e-mail is stored may be in a different
state than the person reading the e-mail. Operators of World Wide Web
sites, as a general rule, do not determine the geographic location of those
accessing the Web site. Intemet users often conceal their identities."6 With
an anonymous user, it is even more difficult to say that someone purpose-
fully targeted their communications at a particular state. A communication
may be targeted at a particular anonymous Internet identity, rather than at
a particular person in a particular place. Accordingly, the underinclusive-
ness of the purposeful availment rule becomes especially problematic inthe
world of data communications.
In addition, the Court has held that limits on personal jurisdiction due
to a lack of purposeful availment remain even if the state could constitu-
tionally apply its own law to the case.' This calls into question the
legitimacy of the theory behind the rule. Acknowledging that a state may
apply its law to a controversy admits that the state has a legitimate
regulatory stake in the controversy. As described in Section B, given the
parallel treatment of other forms of jurisdiction, if a state has an interest in
allowing the application of its own law, it should also have jurisdiction
over the defendant. 62
160 Georgiarecently enacted acriminal statute prohibiting Intemet transmissions
which falsely identify the sender or which use trade names or logos which would
falsely imply that the sender is authorized to use them. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-
93.1 (1997 Supp.). This law was struck down inACLUv. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228
(N.D. Ga. 1997), as an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.
161 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958); Stein, supra note 7, at
718.
162 See Hill, supra note 98, at 986; Reese, supra note 98, at 1592; Linda J.
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of An Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88
(1978); cf Cox, supra note 98, at 191 (arguing that "the forum state should apply
its own law to most situations in which it is capable of takingjurisdiction"); Maier
& McCoy, supra note 105, at 256 (arguing that "if the forum does not have a
sufficient relationship to the parties and the cause of action to make it not unfair for
the forum to determine the policies that will inform the decision in the case"
exercising jurisdiction violates due process). Note that this does not mean that a
state should always apply its own law when it has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Many states may have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant due to the multistate nature of the controversy. However, a court
ordinarily chooses to apply one state's law to a controversy. Thus, even if a state
has legislative jurisdiction, it might still choose to apply another state's law when
exercising judicial jurisdiction. Similarly, more than one state may exercise
personaljurisdiction. Some have suggested that a single state should have personal
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Another problem with the rule is that it stems from a limited view of
consent. Recall that consent was one of the fictions used to justify certain
exercises of jurisdiction under the Pennoyer rule. Now, the Court has
implicitly made a special kind of consent ajurisdictional requirement. This
requirement apparently stems from the Lockean notion that government
derives its powers from the consent of the governed.'63 But purposeful
availment apparently requires some type of express consent on the part of
the defendant-the defendant must actually intend to create a connection
with the forum state. Locke's theory of consent is not so limited. Locke
believed that individuals could tacitly consent to state jurisdiction through
their conduct. All that was required was that the individual enjoy any of the
dominions of that government."6 Put another way, whenever a defendant
enjoys the protection of state laws, i.e., his conduct is subject to a state's
laws, he tacitly consents to that state's jurisdiction. States do not need
explicit permission to regulate conduct that is legitimately within their
jurisdiction to regulate.'65 Thus, the intent of the defendant to create a
jurisdiction, just as a single state's law is applied. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 292 (1956); McDougal, supra note 157, at 15;
Stein, supra note 7, at 758-59. This view would result in an underinclusive
jurisdictional test. Just as many states may constitutionally apply their own law to
some controversies, many states may also legitimately exercise personal
jurisdiction in certain cases. Thus, if a cause of action requires several different
elements, then any state in which one of those elements occurred should be able to
resolve the dispute.
63 Professor Stein views the purposeful availment test as based upon
contractual notions of an exchange of burdens for benefits. See Stein, supra note
7, at 691-92. He views Pennoyer as based more upon tort-like justifications. See
id. at 691. Later, however, he equates Pennoyer's consent rationale with his
contractual analysis. See id. at 696. Ultimately, then, the contractual exchange
depends upon consent as ajustification. See id. "[A] defendant can waive her due
process rights by consenting to the judicial authority of a state that otherwise would
not have jurisdiction-usually in exchange for some privilege bestowed by the
state." Id.
164 See LOCKE, supra note 90, at 54 (arguing that anyone that has "enjoyment
of any part of the dominions of any government" tacitly consents to its
jurisdiction).
165 The Supreme Court has held that consent is immaterial in the context of auto
accident cases. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
This case also notes that the defendant never really consents to be sued. See id.
Commentators have questioned the reasoning of jurisdiction based upon implied
consent. See Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the
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connection with a particular state should be irrelevant. Planning and
reliance should yield to a state's need for regulation.
The previous paragraph is in some sense speculation. The Court has
never adequately explained the justification for the purposeful availment
requirement or the jurisdictional premises on which it is based.'66 The
failure to adequately establish the reasoning for the rule has led to
unprincipled decisions by the lower courts. A jurisdictional inquiry in a
typical case under this rule tends to look at various factors and then decide
in a conclusory fashion that sufficient or insufficient contacts have been
shown. 67 Such decisions create uncertainty and generate litigation over
such issues.
The purposeful availment requirement stems from the notion that
defendants should be able to plan their conduct knowing where that
conduct will subject them to jurisdiction. But such a principle has been
debunked as circular.'68 Defendants only have reasonable expectations
about where they will be haled into court because courts have created such
expectations. Planning and reliance thus result in an empty principle to
define the boundaries of jurisdiction. Once a court changes those bound-
aries, expectations change. Thus, reasonable expectations are not useful in
defining boundaries-only in maintaining the status quo. Carried to its
extreme, a reasonable expectations principle would operate similarly to
qualified immunity 69-no jurisdiction would exist over a defendant unless
his or her actions established jurisdiction under clearly established doctrine.
Even if reasonable expectations were a useful concept, the Court could
certainly establish that the violation of a state's laws creates a reasonable
expectation that the defendant could be brought into court in that state.
D. Fairness Concerns Are a Flawed Basis to Restrict Jurisdiction
Several commentators have expressed a view of personal jurisdiction
that would base jurisdictional decisions on questions of fairness to one or
both parties. 70 Fairness considerations couldbe viewedas descending from
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, From Pennoyer to Denckla.- A Review,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569,576 (1958); Stein, supra note 7, at 738 (arguing that a state
need not ask an individual's permission to act as sovereign and need not pay
compensation for the burdens of citizenship).
166 See Stein, supra note 7, at 700.
67 See Jay, supra note 79, at 467; Stein, supra note 7, at 700.
161 See McDougal, supra note 157, at 10.
169 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 156, § 8.6.3, at 414.
"' See Ehrenzweig, supra note 162, at 776; Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional
Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L.
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notions of procedural due process-notice and an opportunity to be heard. 7 1
Although a focus on fairness is not inconsistent with due process concerns,
abstract fairness concerns may carry procedural due process too far.
Traditionally, due process has required notice and an opportunity to be
heard. One could argue that a meaningful opportunity to be heard demands
that convenience be a part of that opportunity. 72 Yet, it is unlikely that
convenience was envisioned as a due process requirement.
Personal jurisdiction has evolved to allow more expansive exercises of
jurisdiction by states as the costs of transportation have decreased and the
ease of communications has increased. Increasing the role of convenience
in the jurisdictional calculus would run counter to this trend. Convenience
has historically not been a focus of procedural due process.ln If conve-
nience becomes the sole focus of personal jurisdiction, it would make ease
of litigation the determinant of jurisdiction at a time when these consider-
ations are becoming less relevant due to modem technology and less
expensive transportation costs.
More fundamentally, a jurisdictional test based upon fairness would
interfere with a state's regulatory authority. Under a test based upon
territorial sovereignty, a state that is prevented from exercising jurisdiction
is denied that opportunity because it has no legitimate claim to regulate the
conduct in question. Under tests based upon fairness, the state may be
prevented from exercising jurisdiction because the forum is just not
convenient for the parties, even though the state has a legitimate claim to
regulate the conduct in question. Friction between states would likely result
under such circumstances as a state may resent being denied the opportu-
nity to regulate a controversy with which it is concerned due to nebulous
fairness concerns. Faimess could also be used as a mechanism to deny a
state the power to exercise jurisdiction in a particularly controversial case.
Because of the danger of causing friction between states, the concerns of
fairness are better addressed in a discretionary doctrine like forum non
conveniens.
REV. 1, 38-40 (1984); Kogan, supra note 85, at 263-64; Redish, supra note 81, at
1137-42; Stein, supra note 7, at 689-90; von Mehren, supra note 7, at 313-22;
Weisburd, supra note 74, at 422-27; Whitten, supra note 81, at 835-52.
171 See Whitten, supra note 81, at 837.
'7 See id.
" See id. Although modem Supreme Court decisions pay lip service to con-
venience and fairness, these factors have played only a peripheral role in the
development of the doctrine, never affecting the outcome of a case. See Stein,
supra note 7, at 704-05.
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Forum non conveniens also provides a better mechanism to deal with
convenience because establishing boundaries for a convenience test is
extremely difficult. Too many variables affect convenience to establish
general rules. Instead, the balancing approach of theforum non conveniens
doctrine allows better adaptation to varying circumstances. Each state
should develop its own concept of fairness in this context because
convenience may mean different things to different states.
Another objection to a constitutional test based upon fairness is that
when a state is acting within its legitimate sphere of regulatory authority,
fairness should not be a consideration in the jurisdictional calculus. A
sovereign state does not need to ask permission to regulate within its sphere
of authority. 74 Nor does the state have to choose a convenient mechanism
to carry out its authority. States are not required to take the convenience of
the defendant into account in exercising their criminal jurisdiction.
Exercises of criminal jurisdiction impose great inconvenience on defen-
dants as they may be subject to incarceration during the pretrial process.
The Court apparently has not considered such inconvenience to be a due
process concern.
State regulatory authority does not diminish in importance simply
because it chooses to label some acts as criminal and other acts as violating
civil norms. Litigation is always somewhat inconvenient-no one views
litigation as an insignificant interference. The inconvenience and expense
of litigation may provide an additional incentive to avoid coming close to
violating the regulatory policies of the state. If a defendant does cross the
line, the inconvenience of litigation can be viewed as just another
consequence of the defendant's illegal act. However, at the jurisdictional
stage, one does not know if the defendant has crossed the line. States can
protect defendants from inconvenience in clearly frivolous cases, as many
do, by providing for the shifting of fees and costs. In other cases where the
defendant ultimately prevails, the defendant may have gotten close to the
line such that the state is justified in exercising jurisdiction to better define
the line.
Fairness is also a vague concept, which is reminiscent of the circular
concept of having a reasonable expectation of being haled into court.175 The
concept of fairness does not provide a test to determine when certain
exercises of jurisdiction are actually fair and when they are not. 76 Some
74 See Stein, supra note 7, at 760; see also Brilmayer, supra note 94, at 85-86
(stating that a state's regulation of activities within a state is the most convincing
justification for jurisdiction).
'
7
" See McDougal, supra note 157, at 10-11.
176 See id.
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proposed tests would base fairness, in part, on a state's regulatory
interest.' Once regulatory interests become a factor however, circularity
reigns-the test for jurisdiction is fairness and jurisdiction is fair because of
some other justification for jurisdiction. Future measures of jurisdiction
depend upon past exercises ofjurisdiction. Thus, one cannot easily identify
what factors should properly be considered in a fairness consideration. 7 1
Even if one could identify these factors, application to specific cases is
difficult. One has enough difficulty defining what factors should enter into
a fairness determination, let alone trying to develop a formula for how
these considerations should interact with one another.'7 9
Finally, measuring a state's jurisdiction to adjudicate based upon the
monetary burdens it imposes provides a dangerous justification to restrict
other exercises of state jurisdiction. Legislative acts certainly impose
monetary burdens as well as behavioral burdens on state residents.
Defendants could legitimately contend that a state's safety regulations
violated their due process rights because compliance with those regulations
is too inconvenient and expensive. State taxation also imposes the burden
of keeping accurate records for tax purposes and imposes the monetary
burden of the tax itself. While states are not required as a matter of due
process to make taxation convenient, neither are citizens relieved from
paying taxes because of the inconvenience or monetary burdens. Those
burdens could be relevant under a view of due process that makes them
relevant.
Overall, fairness and convenience are not a proper focus of the
jurisdictional inquiry. Essentially, these concepts provide a reason to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction when jurisdiction is otherwise proper.
Because convenience and monetary burdens are not and should not be due
process concerns, these concepts are better addressed to the common law
doctrine offorunt non conveniens.
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-
A PROPER RESTRICTION ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional rules proposed in this Article would continue to
make personal jurisdiction limits a matter of federal due process. Some
have argued that the Due Process Clause should not restrict state exercises
of personal jurisdiction. This Part addresses those arguments. It begins by
. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 81, at 1138-39.
' See McDougal, supra note 157, at 10-11.
'
71 See id. at 11.
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summarizing Pennoyer v. Neff,8 the first Supreme Court decision
restricting state exercises of personal jurisdiction pursuant to the Due
Process Clause. Then, Section B responds to the critics who contend that
due process is inapplicable to personal jurisdiction. This Part concludes that
personal jurisdiction is justifiably restricted by the Due Process Clause and
should remain so restricted.
A. Pennoyer v. Neff and Due Process
Most commentators agree that the Supreme Court first established
sovereign power as the focus of the personal jurisdiction inquiry in
Pennoyer v. Neff.' Commentators have criticized this decision for two
major reasons. First, they argue that the Pennoyer Court wrongly focused
on sovereign power as the factor which defines the limits of personal
jurisdiction.'82 Second, they argue that the Pennoyer Court wrongly
restricted personal jurisdiction of the state courts by making personal
jurisdiction a constitutional requirement pursuant to the Due Process
Clause.' As set forth above, this Article contends that sovereign regula-
tory power should be used to establish limits on personal jurisdiction. Part
VI, below, will argue that sovereign regulatory power has driven the
evolution of the personal jurisdiction doctrine. This Part contends that
personal jurisdiction is properly limited as a matter of substantive due
process. Here, for completeness, a brief summary of Pennoyer is pro-
vided.
Marcus Neff failed to pay his attorney J.H. Mitchell for legal services,
causing Mitchell to bring suit against Neff in Oregon, where Neff owned
some land.8 4 Neff, a nonresident of Oregon, was not personally served with
process and failed to appear in the action. After constructive service of
summons by publication, the Oregon court entered a default judgment
against Neff.' 5 The local sheriff sold Neff's land to Mitchell in execution
'
80Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
181 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
'
8 2 See Drobak, supra note 76, at 1027-28; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. Cr. REv. 241, at 262-72; Kogan,
supra note 85, at 301-04; Redish, supra note 81, at 1115-20; Whitten, supra note
81, at 821-35.
183 See Kogan, supra note 85, at 302-04; Redish, supra note 81, at 835-52;
Whitten, supra note 81, at 1120-26.
184 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719-20.
18 5 See id. at 720.
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of the default judgment, who in turn conveyed the land to Pennoyer.186 Neff
sued Pennoyer to recover possession of the land.'87 The Supreme Court
held the default judgment void, reasoning that the Oregon court had no
personal jurisdiction over Neff.'88
Justice Field's majority opinion first stated three international
jurisdictional principles, calling them "principles of public law."'8 9 The
three principles are:
[1] that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory....
[2] that no State can exercise directjurisdiction and authority over persons
or property without its territory....
[3] that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory,
except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by
it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either
persons or property to its decisions. 90
Justice Field drew these principles from Joseph Story's treatise on the
conflict of laws. 9'
Justice Field does not clearly demonstrate why he chose to adopt these
principles. Previous Supreme Court decisions under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause rejected the application of international principles in the
context of the recognition of judgments. 92 Moreover, even Justice Field
186See Perdue, supra note 138, at 486.
'17 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719.
,"I See id. at 734.
'
89 Id. at 722.
190 Id.
' ' JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (6th ed. 1865).
Story based his writings, in large part, on the work of the Dutch jurist Huber. See
Drobak, supra note 76, at 1027 n.60; Hazard, supra note 182, at 258. However,
because Story significantly distorted Huber's original work, Story is mainly
responsible for applying these principles to a federal union. See Hazard, supra note
182, at 258-60.
'
92 See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (holding that states may
be bound byjudgments rendered by courts in another state under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause); see also Bimeler v. Dawson, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 536, 541 (1843)
(noting that Mills established that judgments of other states should be treated as
domestic judgments, not foreign ones). But see D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 165 (1850) (holding that some international principles are exceptions to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause).
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recognized that relations among a union of states differed from relations
among independent sovereignties.9 3 In spite of these difficulties, the
majority adopted the international principles. However, the opinion did
not stop there. Rather than apply the international principles as common
law doctrine, Justice Field proceeded to incorporate these principles into
the Due Process Clause, thereby making them matters of constitutional
law.
Apparently Justice Field decided sua sponte to make personal
jurisdiction a matter of constitutional law because the parties did not raise
a due process argument either in the lower court or in the briefs before the
Supreme Court.194 Nevertheless, Justice Field proclaimed:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their
enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a
court ofjustice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties
over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of
law. Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms a
definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of power
affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be no
doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They then
mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles
which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the
protection and enforcement of private rights. To give such proceedings
any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that
is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit;
and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the
defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service ofprocess
within the State, or his voluntary appearance. 195
Pennoyer is thus recognized as the case establishing a constitutional
jurisdictional theory based on sovereignty and power.196 Under this theory,
'
93 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
'
9 a See Whitten, supra note 81, at 821.
'
95Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
196 See Drobaksupra note 76, at 1028. Specifically, Pennoyer is based upon the
theory that a state has police power over persons and property within its borders.
See Stein, supra note 7, at 693. This is Justice Field's solution to the problem of
restricting the power of the states to matters of proper local concern. See Hazard,
supra note 182, at 245.
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a state could not serve process on a defendant except within its borders.197
In support of his theory, Justice Field cited only Cooley's A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations.'19 Thus, Justice Field's oft-criticized opinion
established two important principles: (1) that territorial sovereignty is the
measure of personal jurisdiction for states and (2) that a state violates due
process when it exceeds its territorial authority. As discussed below,199 the
case law predating Pennoyer in state courts provides more support for the
Pennoyer decision than is commonly understood.
B. Substantive Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction
Justice Field's opinion in Pennoyer has been widely criticized.2cl Such
criticisms are numerous and varied.2"' The most common and perhaps the
strongest criticism is that Justice Field had no authority for incorporating
principles of federalism into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 The argument has been summarized by Professor Redish
as follows, "At no time prior to the Supreme Court's unsupported decision
in Pennoyer was there a connection between the development of the
doctrine of due process and the limits imposed on personal jurisdiction
based on federalism concerns."2 3 By federalism, these critics apparently
mean the division of power between the several states.
This Section takes issue with this contention in three ways. First, the
methodology employed in launching this criticism is questionable.
Essentially, these critics would judge the applicability offederalism to the
Due Process Clause by analyzing both the previous decisions of state
governments pursuant to state due process clauses and the identifiable
purposes in framing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The analysis is too focused-it searches for precedent for the proposition
that federalism was a due process concern and fails to address the more
accepted general purposes of the Due Process Clause. The focus of an
inquiry as to whether due process protects a given right should be on the
'
97 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
'9' See id. at 733-34 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 405 (3d ed. 1874)).
199 See infra Part VI.B.
20 See Kogan, supra note 85, at 302-03 & n.191.
201 See id.
212 See id. at 302-03.
203Redish, supra note 81, at 1120-21.
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more general purposes of due process, not on whether the Due Process
Clause was addressed to any particular action by a state government.0 4
Second, critics incorrectly assume that the due process limits on jurisdic-
tion discussed in Pennoyer flow from a concern over federalism and the
avoidance of interstate friction. Instead, these limits flow from the principle
that due process protects an individual from ultra vires acts of state
governments. Due process limits on personal jurisdiction thus have a
substantive component as well as a procedural component. Third, viewed
at this more general level, Pennoyer did have ample authority from which
to draw.
The methodology of Pennoyer's major critics is similar. They attack
"the relevance of federalism to a due process analysis."2 5 Due process
protects the rights of individuals, not the rights of states.206 The language
of the rule does not suggest any federalism component, nor does the policy
or history of the concept.07 England's development of due process in the
absence of geographical subsovereignties likewise does not address
federalism concerns.0 8 State court decisions addressing personal jurisdic-
tion prior to Pennoyer, with the exception of a few aberrations, did not
consider due process to be concerned with issues of federalism.0 9 Finally,
the history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment did not raise
federalism as one of the concerns of due process. 210 The Fourteenth
Amendment was concerned with the need to establish the federal govern-
ment as supreme over the states, not in affecting relations among states.2 '
204 See Whitten, supra note 81, at 735-36 (focusing on whether due process has
a "substantive" component in the context ofjurisdictional matters). But see id. at
757 (arguing that due process was based on general principles and should be
interpreted as such in the future).
205 Redish, supra note 81, at 1120; see also Fullerton, supra note 170, at 8-9;
Lewis, supra note 86, at 809.206 See Redish, supra note 81, at 1120.
207 See id.; Whitten, supra note 81, at 804-21.
208 See Redish, supra note 81, at 1122; see also Whitten, supra note 81, at 738-
45. 209 See Whitten, supra note 81, at 795.
21 See Redish, supra note 81, at 1124-25; Whitten, supra note 81, at 804-21.
2. See Redish, supra note 81, at 1125 (noting that World-Wide Volkswagen
makes clear that "concerns of interstate relations compel the sovereignty
limitations" in personal jurisdiction doctrine). Thus, the Supreme Court has at
times, perhaps, misunderstood the Pennoyer reasoning as to why sovereignty
concerns impose due process limits on exercises of personal jurisdiction by state
governments.
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This argument has several fundamental problems." 2 The focus of the
aigument is somewhat narrow-was federalism a purpose of the Due
Process Clause or not? After concluding that federalism really was not a
purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, critics
then reject Pennoyer as wrongly decided. This limited focus would rule out
a due process restriction on a particular state action based upon one
arguable basis for restricting that action. Depending upon how one defines
the basis for restricting the action, one might always be able to define that
basis narrowly enough that there is no precedent for that basis. Critics
would then reject the due process restriction as not grounded in precedent.
Instead, the focus should be on the more general purposes of the Due
Process Clause. A critical examination of a due process restriction on state
action should consider whether that restriction is consistent or inconsistent
with such general purposes. There may be several possible reasons for a
particular due process restriction. Those reasons should at least be
compared with the general purposes for due process restrictions on state
action. More appropriately, the analysis should focus on the restriction
itself and whether that restriction is consistent with the purposes of the Due
Process Clause, rather than focusing on the reasoning supporting the
restriction.
One general purpose of due process restrictions on state action is to
protect persons from ultra vires acts by the state. Such restrictions are
commonly referred to as substantive due process restrictions. Substantive
due process is based upon the premise that there are certain actions which
the state may not take, no matter how proper the procedures provided to
take those actions.2 3 Substantive due process began to develop as a legal
212 Although not entirely clear from their articles, one could possibly make
another criticism of this style of argument. These critics would apparently reject
due process protection against any state action that was not prohibited by the Due
Process Clause prior to its enactment or that was noted as prohibited during the
course of its enactment. If applied more broadly, this analysis would freeze the
application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to those issues
addressed prior to its enactment. Courts would have no ability to address new
problems that arguably raised due process concerns. In addition to these problems,
this form of analysis would create a practical problem for litigants-due process
arguments would entail research of cases of over one hundred years ago which are
not as well-indexed in digests or available through other sources as are modem
cases.
213 See Whitten, supra note 81, at 793-94 (noting that due process sometimes
limits the power of the legislature to accomplish its objective by any means).
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doctrine prior to the Civil War, making it a relevant point of discussion for
analyzing Pennoyer.
14
A brief review of substantive due process will prove helpful in looking
at Pennoyer from a more general point of view. Lockean notions of natural
rights had a strong influence on the development of American government,
including Jefferson's famous discussion of inalienable rights in the
Declaration of Independence.21 5 Concerned about protecting these natural
rights, theorists began to argue that "if a legislature passed any law which
restricted vested rights or violated natural law, it exceeded all bounds of the
social compact in restricting the freedom of some individuals."216 By
denying these individuals the "guarantees of the basic social compact," the
state had denied them due process of law.2"' Even prior to the Civil War,
the doctrine of substantive due process began to take hold in decisions of
both state and federal courts.18
The most significant federal decision prior to the Civil War that
adopted a theory of substantive due process219 was DredScott v. Sanford.n0
In his opinion, Chief Justice Taney relied on a vested rights theory when
stating that Congress had no power to pass the Missouri Compromise,
thereby depriving slave owners of due process.221 Although this case gave
the Court the first major opportunity to establish a theory of substantive
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it failed to do so. Similarly,
in the Slaughter-House Cases,"2 the Court rejected the substantive due
process theory over dissents by several Justices, including Justice Field."3
Influenced by the political situation at this time, however, Justice Field's
views of substantive due process were soon accepted by a majority of the
Court.' 4 As has recently been observed by Professor Kogan, Field's
opinion in Pennoyer is consistent with Field's general view of substantive
due process-that the Due Process Clause prevents ultra vires acts by the
214 See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, § 15.1, at 380 (citing E.
CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 58-115 (1948)).
2,5 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
216 2 ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 108,'§ 15.1, at 380.
217 Id.
211 See id.; Whitten, supra note 81, at 793-94 (observing that the Due Process
Clause had been interpreted prior to Pennoyer to have substantive implications).
2 9 See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, § 15.1, at 381.
'0 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
221 See id.
22 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
'See 2 ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 108, § 15.2, at 384-85.
224 See id. at 385.
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state. 5 Accordingly, critics of Pennoyer should have considered whether
the decision was consistent with the general purpose behind the substantive
aspect of due process.
This brief review of the doctrine of substantive due process raises the
second and third objections to the analysis of the commentators that attack
the theoretical basis forPennoyer. The second objection is that commenta-
tors critical of Pennoyer assume that federalism concerns drove the
decision in that case. This is simply not so-Justice Field relied upon his
view of substantive due process. 6 His focus was on the rights of individu-
als vis-a-vis the states, not on the rights of states vis-a-vis other states. 7
The third objection is that these commentators find no support for
Pennoyer because of their characterization of the type of support needed.
When the focus is placed on one of the general purposes of due pro-
cess-protecting citizens from ultra vires acts of the state-there is adequate
support for the opinion.
Justice Field did not appeal to federalism as a reason for restricting the
personal jurisdiction of state courts. Instead, his language was more
consistent with his view of substantive due process. In the critical portion
of the opinion, Justice Field stated:
Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving those terms a definition
which will embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting private
rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be no doubt of their
meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They then mean a course
of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have
been established in our systems ofjurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights?228
This language does not appeal to concerns of federalism. Instead, it
indicates Justice Field's belief about substantive due process, though
cautiously stated in general terms.
' See Kogan, supra note 85, at 337; Stein, supra note 7, at 706; Weisburd,
supra note 74, at 410-11. The limit on state power results from the nature of states
as sovereign entities. Justice Field thus looked beyond that amendment itself to
define what acts are ultra vires. See Perdue, supra note 138, at 504-07.
226 See Perdue, supra note 138, at 508 & n.183 (noting that substantive due
process was the basis for restricting personal jurisdiction and that the mere
existence of a proceeding in an improper forum is a taking of liberty).
2-"See Stein, supra note 7, at 711, 713.
228 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
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The critical language quoted above from Pennoyerrefers to restrictions
on exertions of state power that affect private rights and the difficulty of
drawing lines as to what is forbidden and what is not. Justice Field's
concern appears to be addressed to protecting the rights of individuals
against unauthorized exertions of state power, not to protecting states from
other states due to concerns of federalism. 29 The first clause quoted from
the opinion probably represents a statement by Justice Field that the
substantive due process debate had not yet been resolved due to difficulties
in drawing proper lines. The "difficulties" to which he refers may possibly
refer to the sharp division of the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases. After
all, Justice Field did not abandon his theory of due process after his
Slaughter-House dissent; he continued to press his view in dissents until it
was adopted by the full Court.3 0 Given the Court's unwillingness to accept
Justice Field's views at that time, the subtlety of the language in the excerpt
quoted above is not surprising. Justice Field's decision is at least arguably
based, and probably is based, upon his view of substantive due process, not
on any view of due process based upon federalism.
Viewed in this light, Justice Field had ample authority for his position
in Pennoyer that due process limited state exercises ofjurisdiction.3 As
observed previously, Justice Field's view of substantive due process had
taken hold even before the Civil War and was even beginning to surface in
the decisions of the Supreme Court. The case law discussed above provides
further support for Justice Field's view as at least ten states viewed the
service of process outside of a state's territorial boundaries as an ultra vires
act by the state.u2 Even critics of Pennoyer admit that at least some state
decisions are consistent with Pennoyer 33 Thus, Justice Field did not just
come up with the rule announced in Pennoyer on his own. When under-
stood in light of Justice Field's own views about due process, his opinion
had adequate support.
The pre-Pennoyer authority is thus consistent with a view that personal
jurisdiction is defied by territorial limits on sovereign power. Sovereignty
limits the proper sphere of state action. Thus, a state which tries to reach
beyond that sphere violates the Due Process Clause. These due process
229 See Stein, supra note 7, at 693-94. Specifically, due process limits on per-
sonal jurisdiction restricted state police power to interfere with a person's right to
liberty. See Kogan, supra note 85, at 333-36.230 See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, § 15.2, at 386.
231 See Hazard, supra note 182, at 270.
1 2 See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
233 See.Whitten, supra note 81, at 817-18.
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limits result from the need to protect individuals from ultra vires acts by
states, including the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals not served
with process in the state.
VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction doctrine is often considered to have been based
upon different theories at different times in history. Pennoyer2 34 and
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,"-5 are viewed as at odds with one
another. This Article contends that personal jurisdiction doctrine instead
evidences a historical evolution, based upon an overriding general limiting
principle. The basic principle upon which personal jurisdiction doctrine is
based, and should be based, is territorial limits on sovereign authority.
Although the territorial view of personal jurisdiction is often associated
with Pennoyer, territorial limits on state power provided a limiting
principle beforePennoyer and continue to provide such a limiting principle
today. Basedupon this principle, personal jurisdiction doctrine has evolved
from a view of sovereign power over persons and property to a view of
sovereign power over persons, property, and conduct.
This Part explores the evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine. As
previously observed, 6 the historical foundation of restrictions on state
court jurisdiction is important as the Court has considered historical
practice to be important in the context ofjurisdiction. In addition, when the
Court makes an improvement to the minimum contacts test such as that
suggested here, it is likely to attempt to reconcile the new test with prior
cases. Thus, it is useful to explore the history of personal jurisdiction and
attempt to deduce some overriding principles.
Because this Article views territorial sovereignty as the principle
limiting state exercises of personal jurisdiction, this Part first examines
both English and American authority to determine whether sovereignty has
historically limited personal jurisdiction. After an examination of this
authority, it is apparent that Justice Field had more support for his position
in Pennoyer than is commonly assumed. Next, this Part explores the
evolution of the doctrine after Pennoyer. Over time, the Court has
recognized that states may properly regulate conduct connected in some
way with the state, as well as people and property within the state.
24 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).236 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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A. Common Law Origins ofJurisdictional Doctrine-The Contribution
ofEngland with Regard to Sovereign Power
English limits on personal jurisdiction have evolved similarly to the
way that such limits have evolved in the United States, especially during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Most importantly, English
authority prior to Pennoyerviewed territorial boundaries as imposing limits
on personal jurisdiction. Because England had no geographical subsover-
eignties, its courts did not have to face some of the difficult jurisdictional
issues faced by United States courts . 37 Still, the English experience in
many ways is relevant to that of the United States. United States judges
looked, in part, to English law in analyzing jurisdictional problems prior to
Pennoyer. Because the unique problems associated with a federation of
independent states and various political forces served to affect the
evolution of jurisdictional doctrine in the United States, the English
evolution will only be summarized here.
Some have questioned the relevance of physical power over a
defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant in English
common law courts.231. Jurisdiction over defendants under early case law,
it is argued, depended upon either express or implied submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.? 9 This view of English precedent has some appeal.
Common law courts were initially unwilling to take jurisdiction over a
defendant who, although personally summoned, did not appear before the
27 As a general matter, the "English law ofjurisdiction by the early nineteenth
century was too ill-defined, too sparse, and too unsuited for a union of states to
play a significant role in the development of the American doctrine of personal
jurisdiction." Drobak, supra note 76, at 1022 n.30. Still, English case law does
offer some development of issues that U.S. courts would later confront. See
Hazard, supra note 182, at 258.28 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 162, at 297.
239 See id. at 297-98 & n.61. Professor Ehrenzweig contends that English
concepts of personal jurisdiction depend upon allegiance or consent rather than
physical power. See id. at 296-300. The issue of consent is addressed in the text.
Allegiance, however, is not inconsistent with a view of jurisdiction based upon
sovereign power. Whether jurisdiction depends upon physical power over a person
residing within the jurisdiction or upon the allegiance of a citizen, sovereign power
can still be considered as the basis for such jurisdiction. In fact, these two
concepts-allegiance and physical power-could be viewed as alternative bases of
jurisdiction based upon sovereign power. A sovereign may exercise jurisdiction
over its citizens, wherever they may be, and over those persons present within its
borders.
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court.24 To obtain the defendant's appearance, a court could seize the
defendant's property, imprison the defendant, or subject the defendant to
outlawry, but a defendant who endured such procedures could still refuse
to appear and thwart the plaintiff's efforts to obtain a remedy.24' Thus,
consent of the defendant was initially required to subject the defendant to
jurisdiction.
In 1725, however, a fundamental change occurred in English concepts
of jurisdiction. The Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725242 brought about two
major changes in English procedure. First, a plaintiff could force a
defendant's involuntary appearance by serving the defendant with a
summons, rather than seeking to force the defendant to submit to jurisdic-
tion by attachment, writ of distringas, or arrest.243 Second, a defendant
failing to defend himself or herself after receiving a summons could be
held liable to the plaintiff by default-which was the birth of the default
judgment.2" Notice that this procedure required the defendant to be
summoned. At this point in English history, a sheriff served a summons on
a defendant and a summons could not be served beyond the territorial
limits of the sheriff sjurisdiction.245 At least initially, then, the power of an
English court extended only to defendants personally served within the
jurisdiction of the court. Like early practice in the United States, direct
sovereign authority over the defendant's person was required.
240 See Drobak, supra note 76, at 1019; Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in
Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 56
(1968).
"I See Levy, supra note 240, at 58 (citing 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 592 (2d ed. 1899)).242Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725, 12 Geo. 1, ch. 29.
243See Levy, supra note 240, at 69 & n.84. The Plymouth Colony made such
a reform in 1644 by establishing a process whereby parties could serve a summons
upon defendants. Thus, sovereign power over a defendant played a role in the
American colonies' concept of jurisdiction prior to the transition in England. See
id. at n.84.
21 See Drobak, supra note 76, at 1019-20 n.24 (discussing the default judgment
procedure created by the Frivolous Arrest Act); Hazard, supra note 182, at 248
(discussing the default judgment procedure created by the Frivolous Arrest Act).
245 See Maier & McCoy, supra note 105, at 260; Simon E. Sobeloff,
Jurisdiction ofState Courts overNonresidents in OurFederal System, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 196, 198 (1957) (explaining that the "common law directed its attention to
territory as the measure of judicial power"). English courts wished to avoid
entering an unenforceable judgment. Territorial limits provided one way to avoid
this problem. See Drobak, supra note 76; at 1020 n.26; Hazard, supra note 182, at
253.
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As to parties outside thejurisdiction of England, plaintiffs had to resort
to the tool of outlawry. Outlawry allowed a plaintiff to reach the defen-
dant's property, including debts owed to the defendant, where the
defendant was evading arrest.246 However, this procedure was expensive for
the plaintiff and could take a great deal of time to execute. 47 Later, in 1811,
a statute2 4 was enacted that allowed plaintiffs to seize the defendant's
chattels and the issues of his land after leaving the summons at his home.249
Such actions allowed the plaintiff to obtain a judgment against the
defendant and to satisfy the judgment using the seized property."0
Although the "quasi-in-rem" label was not attached to this type of action,
it could be considered to be such an action. 51 The English courts narrowly
interpreted the 1811 statute, however, requiring the plaintiff to show that
the defendant's absence was due to an attempt to avoid service.z 2
Collectively, this brief summary of English history reveals jurisdic-
tional limits based upon sovereign power, even if sovereign power was not
explicitly offered as a basis for such limits. 2 3 The early history shows that
the English courts believed that the physical presence of the defendant was
necessary to support an exercise of jurisdiction. 4 Later, the concepts of
jurisdiction by summons and the default judgment extended the power of
English courts.2 A defendant could be compelled by the sovereign to
246 See Levy, supra note 240, at 90.
247 See id. at 89-90.
248 51 Geo. 3, ch. 124 (1811); see Levy, supra note 240, at 90 & n.186.
249 See Levy, supra note 240, at 90.
'"
0 See id. This was in contrast to earlier procedure under which the defendant's
property could be seized, but was only forfeited to the state for failure to appear in
response to the summons. See Drobak, supra note 76, at 1019 n.24; Maier &
McCoy, supra note 105, at 260; Silberman, supra note 162, at 40. This was little
help to the plaintiff who was essentially left without a remedy.
11 The Lord Mayor's Court of London had a similar attachment procedure, but
jurisdiction was territorially restricted to the city of London and the cause of action
had to arise within the jurisdiction. Such an action was somewhat similar to a
quasi-in-rem action. See Silberman, supra note 162, at 42.
2 See Levy, supra note 240, at 90.
2" In some contexts, England did claim authority to adjudicate conflicts that
arose abroad as an exercise of its absolute territorial sovereignty. See Maier &
McCoy, supra note 105, at 261.
214 See Sobeloff, supra note 245, at 198. Anything within the physical reach of
the power of the English king was subject to the king's power. Judgments reached
without jurisdiction were void. See Hazard, supra note 182, at 270 n.102.
2
" See Hazard, supra note 182, at 248 n.19.
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appear by service of summons within the jurisdiction ofEngland.5 6 Service
could only be made within the jurisdiction, however, presumably because
that was the territorial extent of the sovereign's power." 7 If the defendant
was so notified, then the sovereign had the power to decide the case against
him by way of a default judgment.5 8 The advent of a quasi-in-rem-like
proceeding may likewise be viewed as resting on the sovereign's power
over the defendant's property. Thus, Professor Levy's view that English
courts were concerned with physical power is well justified."9 Early
English conceptions of jurisdiction can be seen as dependent upon a
sovereign's power over either persons or property.
Like the United States, however, England realized that jurisdiction over
persons and property within its borders was insufficient to allow its courts
to exercise jurisdiction in all cases in which it was interested. There were
certain acts or transactions which affected England but were beyond the
reach of its courts due to lack of jurisdiction over either the defendant's
person or property. However, England expanded its jurisdiction again to
handle such problems. In 1852, England gave the common law courts
power over defendants in breach of contract actions where the contract was
made in England.260 Courts were allowed to proceed in such actions against
aliens and British subjects abroad where (1) a writ had been personally
served or reasonable efforts at service had been made of which the
defendant was aware and (2) the defendant either willfully did not appear
or was living abroad to defraud creditors.261 Similar provisions were made
for service outside the jurisdiction of the courts of chancery.262 These
advances in English jurisdictional thinking may have been based upon a
view of sovereign power-the power to decide cases involving conduct that
occurred in England or had substantial effects in England.
English cases dealing with recognition of judgments by other sover-
eignties also provide some support for a view of jurisdiction based upon
territorial sovereignty. For example, in the famous case of Buchanan v.
Rucker,26 Lord Ellenboroughrefusedto enforce ajudgment entered against
2s6 See id.
2S7 See id.
2s8 See id. at 248-49.
" See also Maier & McCoy, supra note 105, at 260 (stating that "jurisdiction
in England requires physical presence of defendant").260 See Levy, supra note 240, at 91.
261 See id.
262 See id. at 92.
263 Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1808).
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the defendant by a court in Tobago. That court had issued process by
nailing a summons to the courthouse door. The English court would not
enforce the judgment because the sovereign could not acquire jurisdiction
through such notice." The Buchanan court also held that a judgment
obtained without jurisdiction over a party was void.265 The court's dictum
also suggests that Tobago's jurisdiction was limited to its territorial
boundaries and that service of process must be within its borders to bind a
defendant.266 Lord Ellenborough explained, "Can the island of Tobago pass
a law to bind the rights of the whole world? Would the world submit to
such an assumed jurisdiction?" 267
Other English cases provide support for the proposition that ajudgment
obtained without jurisdiction is void.268 In fact, one of these cases notes that
the failure to provide notice to a defendant is "contrary to the first
principles of justice." 6 9 If "first principles of justice" can be equated with
due process, then English precedent provides some support for treating
personal jurisdiction as a matter of procedural due process. Early American
courts also relied on the rule that a judgment obtained without jurisdiction
is void, which was clearly established by the time of Pennoyer.270
21 See id. Note, however, that this case may provide some support for Justice
Story's ideas because the court's dicta implies that a sovereign can only serve a
party when within its borders. See id. at 547.265 See id.
26 See Hazard, supra note 182, at 257 (quoting Rucker and noting that the
Tobago statute must necessarily be understood to apply to persons who have been
present and within the jurisdiction so as to be subject to the process of the court).267Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. at 547.
263 See Fisher v. Lane, 95 Eng. Rep. 1065 (K.B. 1772); The Case of the
Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613).
269 Fisher, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1068.
270The pre-Pennoyer case law provides overwhelming support for the propo-
sition that a judgment obtained without jurisdiction over one of the parties is
void. See Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437 (1850); Hollingsworth
v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466 (1830); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609
(C.C.D. Mass. 1828); Dennison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 508 (1827); Aldrich v.
Kinney, 4 Conn. 380 (1822); Bimelerv. Dawson, 5 Ill. 536 (1843); Beard v. Beard,
21 Ind. 321 (1863); Mitchell's Adm'r v. Gray, 18 Ind. 123 (1862); Cone v. Cotton,
2 Blackf. 82 (Ind. 1827); Hakes v. Shupe, 27 Iowa 465 (1869); Darrance v.
Preston, 18 Iowa 396 (1865); Weil v. Lowenthal, 10 Iowa 575 (1860); Gleason v.
Dodd, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 333 (1842); Newell v. Newton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 470
(1830); Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. 232 (1828); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 461
(1813); Freedman v. Thompson, 41 Miss. 49 (1866); Smith v. McCutchen, 38 Mo.
415 (1866); Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N.H. 257 (1834); Curtis v. Martin, 2 N.J.L. 399
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B. Pre-Pennoyer American Authority Regarding Personal Jurisdiction
Although English case law provides only marginal insight into
determining how personal jurisdiction should be limited in a union of
independent states, the general principles embodied in English cases are
helpful and provide some support for Justice Field's view of the problem.
Sovereign power did limit English exercises of jurisdiction, at least
initially, based upon territorial boundaries. English law, however, only
served as a guide for jurisdictional principles in the United States. Thus,
American authority prior to Pennoyer is most relevant to the issue of
whether personal jurisdiction was limited by territorial sovereignty. This
Section discusses that authority and concludes that pre-Fourteenth
Amendment case law establishes that territorial boundaries provided
meaningful limits on personal jurisdiction.27" '
(1805); Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407 (N.Y. 1835); Holbrook v. Murray, 5
Wend. 161 (N.Y. 1830); Pawling v. Willson, 13 Johns. 192 (N.Y. 1816); Fenton
v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 194 (N.Y. 1811); Robinson v. Ward's Ex'rs, 8 Johns. 86 (N.Y.
1811); Kilbum v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. 1809); Armstrong v. Harshaw,
12 N.C. 116 (1827); Miller's Ex'r v. Miller, 8 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 113 (1829); St.
Albans v. Bush, 4 Vt. 58 (1832); Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 263 (1828); Rape v.
Heaton, 9 Wis. 328 (1859).
Several of these cases considered whether a judgment previously rendered
within the same state was valid. See Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321 (1863); Mitchell's
Adm'r v. Gray, 18 Ind. 123 (1862); Darrance v. Preston, 18 Iowa 396 (1865);
Smith v. McCutchen, 38 Mo. 415 (1866). In addition, at least one pre-Pennoyer
case allowed a defendant to make a special appearance to directly challenge
personal jurisdiction, rather than requiring collateral attack. See Weil v. Lowenthal,
10 Iowa 575 (1860); see also Hakes v. Shupe, 27 Iowa 465 (1869) (allowing direct
challenge to personal jurisdiction where affidavit of service did not specify date
and where defendant was served outside of the state); Freedman v. Thompson, 41
Miss. 49 (1866) (allowing direct challenge of personal jurisdiction due to absence
of notice). Consequently, Justice Field had some support for holding that a
judgment which would be void in another state was also void in the rendering state.
See Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 715,732 (1877) (citing Smith v. McCutchen, 38 Mo.
415 (1866)); Mitchell's Adm'r v. Gray, 18 Ind. 123 (1862); Hakes v. Shupe, 27
Iowa465 (1869); Darrancev. Preston, 18 Iowa396 (1865)). Butsee Whitten, supra
note 81, at 821-24 (arguing that the cases Field cited merely establish that the state
statutes at issue in those cases were not "intended to have an extraterritorial
effect").
271 Notice and an opportunity to be heard were also recognized as due process
requirements prior to Pennoyer, as was the fact that ajudgment obtained without
jurisdiction was void. See Whitten, supra note 81, at 754. Many early cases did not
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refer to the due process or law of the land clauses contained in the appropriate state
constitution. Rather, these decisions spoke of notice to a defendant in terms of"first
principles of justice." See Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 40 (N.Y. 1809);
Fisher v. Lane, 95 Eng. Rep. 1065, 1068 (K.B. 1772).
Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232 (1828) provides a typical example of
such a case. There, Hall brought suit against Williams and Fiske in Massachusetts
to enforce a judgment obtained against Williams and Fiske in Georgia. Fiske had
no notice of the suit and was not personally served. The court first observed that
state courts must give full faith and credit to judgments rendered in another state
"in the same manner that they would upon a record of any court of their own state."
Id. at 237. Before the adoption of the Constitution, the court observed, judgments
of other states were treated like judgments made by foreign countries. After the
states adopted the Constitution, however, such judgments had to be treated as
domestic judgments. See id. The court then reached the question of notice and
whether Massachusetts courts must treat the Georgiajudgment as conclusive, even
if the Georgia court had no jurisdiction over one of the parties. To this issue, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held:
If it appeared by the record that the defendants had notice of the suit, or that
they appeared in defence [sic], we are inclined to think that it could not be
gainsaid; for as we are bound to give full faith and credit to the record, the
facts stated in it must be taken to be true, judicially; and if they should be
untrue by reason of mistake or otherwise, the aggrieved party must resort
to the authorities where the judgment was rendered for redress, for he could
not be allowed to contradict the record by a plea and by an issue to the
country thereon. But if the record does not show any service of process, or
any appearance in the suit, we think he may be allowed to avoid the effect
of the judgment here, by showing that he was not within the jurisdiction of
the court which rendered itfor it is manifestly againstfirstprinciples, that
a man should be condemned, either criminally or civilly, without an
opportunity to be heard in his defence [sic].
Id. at 239-40 (emphasis added); see also Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.)
466, 472 (1830) (noting that notice giving an opportunity to appear and defend
constitutes a requirement "dictated by natural justice"); Dennison v. Hyde, 6 Conn.
507, 518 (1827) (invalidating ajudgment obtained in another state without notice
"accords with the dictates ofjustice"); Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380,384 (1822)
("To bind a defendant.., when he was never personally summoned, nor had notice
of the proceeding, would be contrary to the first principles ofjustice."); Bradshaw
v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407,418 (N.Y. 1835) ("To bind a defendant personally by a
judgment, where he was never summoned or had notice of the proceedings, would
be contrary to the first principles of justice."); Robinson v. Ward's Ex'rs, 8 Johns.
86, 90 (N.Y. 1811) ("To bind a defendant by a judgment, when he was never
personally summoned, or had not notice of the proceedings, would be contrary to
the firstprinciples ofjustice."); Kilbum v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37,40 (N.Y. 1809)
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A review of the case law and an important secondary source at the time
ofPennoyer reveals that personal jurisdiction was widely viewed as limited
by territorial borders. Few, if any, cases viewed these limits as stemming
from the due process clauses of the various states. Yet, states viewed
attempts to serve defendants outside of their territorial boundaries as ultra
vires acts.
As observed above, Justice Field cited only Cooley's treatise as
authority for making personal jurisdiction a matter of due process. In that
treatise, Cooley makes an important statement. He observes that:
[]t will often happen that the party proceeded against cannot be found in
the State, and personal service upon him is therefore impossible, unless
it is allowable to make it wherever he may be found abroad. But any such
service would be ineffectual. No State has authority to invade the
jurisdiction of another, and by service of process compel parties there
resident or being to submit their controversies to the determination of its
courts; and those courts will consequently be sometimes unable to enforce
a jurisdiction which the State possesses in respect to the subjects within
its limits, unless a substituted service is admissible.272
Cooley goes on to explain that substituted service may only be made in in
rem proceedings. 211 This passage offers support for the proposition that a
state may not serve a defendant beyond its boundaries. Although Cooley's
work is merely a treatise, it was a widely respected treatise.274 In fact, some
have viewed Cooley's treatise as "America's second constitution. 27 s Thus,
("To bind a defendant by a judgment, when he was never personally summoned,
or had notice of the proceedings, would be contrary to the first principles of
justice."); Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328, 333 (1859) (stating that to hold someone
bound by ajudgment where they never had an opportunity to defend "would seem
to be the very essence of injustice").
These early opinions, therefore, can reasonably be interpreted as making notice
and an opportunity to be heard due process requirements under state constitutional
due process and law of the land clauses. Another line of cases refer to due process
specifically in deciding whether proper notice was provided. See Beard v. Beard,
21 Ind. 321 (1863); Mason v. Messenger, 17 Iowa 261 (1864); Happy v. Mosher,
48 N.Y. 313 (1872); United States Trust Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 18 N.Y.
199 (1858).272 COOLEY, supra note 198, at 403.
273 See id. at 403-04.
274 See 2 ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 108, § 15.2, at 386.
275Kogan, supra note 85, at 325.
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Cooley's view would restrict personal jurisdiction based upon territorial
sovereignty, just as territorial boundaries restrict a state's ability to serve
a defendant with process. In other words, physical power was required for
a state to exercise jurisdiction.
In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Holmes remarked that "[t]he
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.'2 76 Perhaps no case in
American history better embodies ajurisdictional theory based on physical
power than Pennoyer.17 In Pennoyer 78 the Court held that a state may not
serve process on a defendant outside of the state, based on Justice Story's
international jurisdictional principles . 9 This part of Pennoyer constitutes
one of the most criticized portions of the opinion. Professor Ehrenzweig
argues that the Court adopted the "physical power" rationale with "little
warning. ' Upon closer examination, however, the precedent reveals that
a number of courts subscribed to the theory that a state could not provide
for service of process outside of its jurisdiction.28'
In fact, courts in ten different states subscribed to the theory that a state
could not provide for service outside of its borders." 2 As Professor Drobak
observed, "Personal service outside the forum, although giving actual
notice of the litigation, had no legal effect because the forum state's power
was thought to end at its borders."2 3 Courts employing this rule were
heavily influenced by Story. Two opinions relying on sovereignty to
276 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
277 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 162, at 292-93 (stating that Pennoyer
depends on the "physical power" concept and that Pennoyer significantly altered
jurisdictional doctrine).271 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
279 See id. at 722. Justice Field arguably viewed Justice Story's rules as a
solution to the problem of notice to defendants absent from the jurisdiction. See
Hazard, supra note 182, at 252.
20 Ehrenzweig, supra note 162, at 308.
"' See Drobak, supra note 76, at 1022-23; Stein, supra note 7, at 740.282 See Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828); Kibbe v. Kibbe,
1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497
(1848); Bimeler v. Dawson, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 536 (1843); Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind.
321 (1863); Hakes v. Shupe, 27 Iowa 465 (1869); Darrance v. Preston, 18 Iowa
396 (1865); Weil v. Lowenthal, 10 Iowa 575 (1860); Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass.
(6 Pick.) 232 (1828); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1813); Smith v. McCutchen,
38 Mo. 415 (1866); Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. 1809); St. Albans
v. Bush, 4 Vt. 58 (1832); Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328 (1859).283Drobak, supra note 76, at 1022.
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resolve jurisdictional issues, one from Missouri284 and one from Iowa,285
demonstrate this influence.
In Smith v. McCutchen,8 6 the Missouri Supreme Court considered
whether Smith could recover in a garnishment action against McCutchen.287
Smith had earlier obtained a default in personam judgment against Ogle on
a "mere order of publication published in a newspaper," and sought to
garnish McCutchen as Ogle's debtor.88 McCutchen defended that the
judgment obtained against Ogle was void.8 9 In resolving the question, the
court stated:
No sovereignty can extend its powers beyond its own territorial limits to
subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. Jurisdiction
must be founded either upon the person of the defendant being within the
territory of the sovereign where the court sits, or his property being within
such territory; for otherwise there can be no sovereignty exerted upon the
known maxim, extra territoriam jus dicenti impune non paretur. Even,
therefore, should a Legislature of a State expressly grant such jurisdiction
to its courts over persons or property not within its territory, such grant
would be treated elsewhere as a mere attempt at usurpation, and all
judicial proceedings in virtue of it held utterly void for every pur-
pose-Story, Confl. L. § 539.290
The court expressed itself unequivocally.
Iowa went one step further than Missouri. Unlike Missouri, the Iowa
legislature provided for service of process outside of the state.29' In Weil v.
Lowenthal,292 the sheriff of Scott County, Iowa, served Lowenthal in Rock
Island County, Illinois, which lies just across the Mississippi River from
Iowa.293 Lowenthal made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction.294 The
Iowa Supreme Court first held that the sheriff could not serve process
284 Smith v. McCutchen, 38 Mo. 415 (1866).
2s Weil v. Lowenthal, 10 Iowa 575 (1860).
286 Smith v. McCutchen, 38 Mo. 415 (1866).
287 See id. at 416.
288 Id.
2" See id.291Id. at 417.
291 See Darrance v. Preston, 18 Iowa 396, 399 (1865).
292 Weil v. Lowenthal, 10 Iowa 575 (1860).
293 See id. at 576.
294 See id.
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outside of his jurisdiction.25 Next, the court went on to consider whether
an Iowa court could ever obtain personal jurisdiction over someone served
with process outside of the state. The court concluded:
As a citizen of a sister State, he owed no allegiance nor was he amenable
to the laws of this State, unless found within its jurisdiction. The
constitution of our State does not give, nor can the legislature by any
enactment confer, upon the District Court, jurisdiction over the person of
a citizen of another State. This doctrine is so well settled, and carries with
it so much common sense and justice, that we regard it as useless to add
anything further in support of it.... Story in his work upon the Conflict
of Laws, section 539, says, "no sovereignty can extend its process beyond
its own territorial limits to subject either person or property to its judicial
decisions. Every exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit is a
mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any
other tribunals. 296
Again, the court spoke in plain language. Importantly, the Iowa court
asserted that the principle that a state cannot serve a defendant with process
outside of its borders is "well settled." Assuming the Iowa court was
correct, this decision strongly rebuts the charge of many critics that Justice
Field had little support for the sovereignty-based jurisdictional theory
espoused by Pennoyer.297
Other cases have made similarly strong statements regarding territorial
limits. As explained by the Supreme Court of Georgia, "the rule is firmly
fixed that no sovereignty can extend itsprocess beyond its territorial imits,
to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. This is the
rule by the law of nations-by the Common Law-and is recognized by the
American Courts."29" Similarly, while interpreting the Full Faith and Credit
Clause in D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 299 the Supreme Court relied upon territorial
jurisdictional principles. There, the Court upheld Louisiana's refusal to
enforce a judgment rendered in New York over a defendant who had not
been served with process.3" The Court treated territorial sovereignty limits
as exceptions to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 0'
295 See id. at 577.
2961 d. at 578.
297 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
29
' Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 515 (1848).
299 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
3 See Redish, supra note 81, at 1123 (construing D'Arcy, 52 U.S. at 176).
30 See id. at 1124. Significantly, my research does not reveal a single case
suggesting that a state did have power to legally serve a defendant outside of its
[VOL. 87
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
Overall, pre-Pennoyer American authority plainly establishes that
states viewed service of process outside of the state as an ultra vires act.
Such service was ineffective to obtain personal jurisdiction over a
defendant so served. Thus, the stage was set for Justice Field to connect the
ultra viresjurisdictional rules with rules regarding substantive due process.
As observed above, Justice Field viewed the Due Process Clause as
protecting a defendant from ultra vires acts by state governments. Because
service outside of a state was viewed as an ultra vires act, substantive due
process restrictions on personal jurisdiction are logical.
C. State Sovereign Power in a Modern Federal System
Following Pennoyer, jurisdictional principles had to evolve as the
United States became an increasingly mobile society. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington 2 was a result of this evolution. Although some would
view International Shoe as more of a revolution,0 3 the decision is more
properly characterized as part of an evolution.3° Those who would
characterize the case as a revolution contend that International Shoe
abandoned Pennoyer's justification for jurisdiction-physical power. 05
Viewed at a proper level of abstraction, however, physical power is not the
theory behind the decision in Pennoyer, but is the implementation of the
true theory. The true theory behind Pennoyer is that the sovereign power
of states is limited and personal jurisdiction is likewise limited to the extent
of that sovereign power. Sovereign power over persons and property within
the borders of the state was the first attempt at defining how far that power
should go. International Shoe and its progeny represent an evolution to a
broader scope of sovereign power. States' sovereign power should also
extend to conduct within their borders or conduct having substantial
proximate effects within their borders, as well as to persons and property
within its borders.
In the years betweenPennoyer andlnternationalShoe, courts struggled
to provide states with greater regulatory power while remaining true to the
territorial rules established in Pennoyer. This Section will briefly summa-
rize that struggle. Although different fictions were employed to handle
borders.
302 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
303 See Jay, supra note 79, at 434, 473; see also Stein, supra note 7, at 692.
31 See Stein, supra note 7, at 692-93.
3
"s See Jay, supra note 79, at 429 (arguing that International Shoe "seemed to
rest on an entirely different conceptual foundation" than did Pennoyer).
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different jurisdictional problems, the reason for employing such fictions
remained constant. Courts tended to employ such fictions when it was felt
that a state should legitimately be able to exercise jurisdiction over a
controversy, but the controversy did not quite fit existing jurisdictional
rules. These fictions expanded state jurisdiction to regulate conduct, in
addition to persons and property. When the Court decided International
Shoe, it removed the need for several fictions, but the evolution of
jurisdictional doctrine remained, and still remains, incomplete. That
evolution will now be summarized, beginning with the decision in
Pennoyer.
Although the general theory of Pennoyer-that limits on the sovereign
power of a state prevent ultra vires exercises of personal jurisdiction-had
a soundprecedential basis, the specific implementation of that principle left
much to be desired. Those limits of sovereign power had to be defined. The
Pennoyer court imposed limits on state sovereign power based upon "well
established principles":
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.... The
other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned;
that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory.30 6
These principles focus on physical entities-only persons and property
within the state's borders were subject to jurisdiction. As Professor Kogan
has observed, this focus on the physical stemmed from Lockean notions of
property.0 7 A person was viewed as having a property right in his body.0 8
A state'sjurisdiction was limitedby a person's choice as to where to locate
his body.0 9 Thus, the only justification for exercising jurisdiction was the
consent of the individual "either by filing an appearance or by placing her
body within the state's boundaries." 310 This reasoning is similar to that
which underlies the modem focus on the purposeful availment of the
protection of a state's laws.311
3 1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
307 See Kogan, supra note 85, at 325-26.
308 See id. at 339.
309 see id.
310 Id. Of course, Locke would not have so restricted jurisdiction. Locke
believed that a state could exercisejurisdiction overthose whose conduct amounted
to tacit consent to its jurisdiction. See LOCKE, supra note 90, at 20-21.
311 As will be discussed below, the focus on consent goes too far. True, under
Lockean notions of government, the government derives its power from the
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It did not take long for the Court to realize that a doctrine of personal
jurisdiction based upon these principles was unworkable, particularly in a
country where citizens were free to cross state lines on a regular basis. In
fact, the Court acknowledgedthe limits of these principles a few pages later
in the opinion and the straggle to find workable limits on sovereign power
commenced.312 That struggle continues even today.
Two exceptions to the limits on sovereign power are described in the
Pennoyer opinion itself. First, a state may exercisejurisdiction over divorce
cases or cases involving the "status" of its citizens because a state always
has the power to determine the status of its inhabitants.3" 3 This exception
was interpreted more broadly to allow a state to exercise power over absent
citizens. 314 Second, a state may force a legal entity such as a corporation or
partnership to consent to the appointment of a representative in the State to
receive service of process on behalf of the entity.315 These exceptions seem
to stem from a feeling that the Pennoyer restrictions on personal jurisdic-
tion were too limiting. Other situations also exist where the state should be
able to exercise jurisdiction. The Court merely had a problem identifying
what those situations were and formulating a rule that would encompass
them.
In the years that followed, courts struggled with the Pennoyer
framework as the limits on sovereign authority became increasingly
restrictive and unworkable in a nation with an expanding industrial
economy and an increasingly mobile citizenry.3" 6 In attempting to live
within the constraints of that progress, courts used the two exceptions
described in the opinion to find jurisdiction in cases that did not fit neatly
consent of the governed. The issue, however, is when this consent occurs.
Requiring consent of the governed for each exercise ofjudicial jurisdiction would
require consent to be given endlessly.311 See Hazard, supra note 182, at 271-72.
313 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877).
314 See Stein, supra note 7, at 696 & n.39.
"I See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735-36. This exception developed in state courts
because the Supreme Court originally rejected the proposition that a corporation
could be deemed to be present in a state other than its state of incorporation. See
von Mehren, supra note 7, at 298 (citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 519,588 (1839)). Consequently, a corporation could only be sued in its state
of incorporation or in a state where it held property. See id. To solve this problem,
the consent tool was developed. See id.
3 6 See Stein, supra note 7, at 695-96; see also Hazard, supra note 182, at 246;
McDougal, supra note 157, at 2.
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within the Pennoyer framework. 17 Those exceptions ended up being
stretched as far as possible to support expansive jurisdiction by state courts.
Automobiles proved especiallyproblematic. Automobiles increasedthe
number of people crossing state boundaries. Additionally, the use of
automobiles increased the number of tort cases with multistate elements
because of the accidents that went along with automobile travel. After the
accident, a nonresident would return to his state of residence, theoretically
preventing a lawsuit because a state could not serve notice outside of its
territorial boundaries. 18 To address this problem, legislatures used one of
the Pennoyer exceptions to justify exercises of jurisdiction in automobile
accident cases.3 19 The alleged tortfeasor was deemed to have constructively
consented to jurisdiction by using the highways of the state wishing to
exercise jurisdiction 20 Although the Court acknowledged the regulatory
need of the state, it still relied upon consent as the basis for a state's
exercise of jurisdiction.32'
37 See Stein, supra note 7, at 695-96. These exceptions were stretched so far
that they became tantamount to legal fictions. See McDougal, supra note 157, at
2.
318 See Hazard, supra note 182, at 274.
319 See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
320 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); Hazard, supra note 182, at
274; Stein, supra note 7, at 696. Along with constructive consent, the motorist was
deemed to appoint the Secretary of State as the motorist's agent for service of
process. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State did not have to give notice of the suit
to the motorist in some states. Struggling with the limits of Pennoyer and its limits
on extraterritorial service of process, the Supreme Court proceeded to require mail
notice. SeeWuchterv. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928). Although ProfessorHazard
finds this result unattainable within the Pennoyer system, see Hazard, supra note
182, at 274, one can at least make some sense of this decision. Perhaps the
substantive due process constraint of Pennoyer is satisfied by service within the
state on the motorist's registered agent, while procedural due process requires an
extra effort to give notice to the motorist where the agent is always unreliable due
to some characteristic of that agent. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust,
339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (Notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.... But when notice is a person's
due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process."). Even though Mullane
was decided after International Shoe, its reasoning does not depend upon the
minimum contacts test. Thus, even under the Pennoyer framework ofjurisdiction,
procedural due process may have properly required notice calculated to reach the
defendant, not notice that was a "mere gesture."
321 See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356. The Court stated:
In the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably
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Consent, however, was just amyth.31 In a later case involving the issue
of implied consent to a waiver of objection to venue in federal court as a
result of the use of state highways, the myth was rather bluntly denounced:
In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does not rest on
consent at all. The liability rests on the inroad which the automobile has
made on the decision of [Pennoyer v. Neff].... The potentialities of
damage by a motorist in a population as mobile as ours, are such that
those whom he injures must have opportunities of redress against him
323
In a mobile society where people cross state lines frequently, the Pennoyer
framework proved inadequate. States should have the power to adjudicate
disputes over persons and property within their borders but sovereignty
means something more. States, it was felt, should also have the power to
regulate conduct as well as persons or property. Consent was not necessary
for that right; it was only needed because of the Pennoyer framework.
Presence was another myth used to justify jurisdiction in cases where
the Court correctly felt that a state ought to be able to exercise jurisdiction
but technically could not due to a strict application of Pennoyer. Instead,
the courts deemed a defendant to be present in the state due to some act or
omission.324 Typically, corporate presence was used as a justification to
exercise jurisdiction over a corporation who had done something wrong
within a state but had not appointed an agent for service of process within
that state.3 3 Again, courts were searching for a way to allow a state to
calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents
alike, who use its highways. The measure in question operates to require a
non-resident to answer for his conduct in the State where arise causes of
action alleged against him, as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient
method by which he may sue to enforce his rights.
Id. The Court plainly saw the valid regulatory interest of a state, but could not quite
identify the jurisdictional principle that would allow the furtherance of that
regulatory interest through a private lawsuit.311 See Stein, supra note 7, at 696.
31 Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
324 See Hazard, supra note 182, at 273.
32 See id.; von Mehren, supra note 7, at 299 ("'A foreign corporation is
amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent, only
if it is doing business within the state in such manner and to such extent as to
warrant the inference that it is present there."' (quoting Philadelphia & Reading
Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264,265 (1917))). Note that the results that this system
encouraged were worse than if extraterritorial service of process had been allowed
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regulate conduct within its borders as well as persons and property
therein.326
The evolution continued in International Shoe. In that case, the Court
began to recognize that the regulatory interests of a sovereign state justified
its exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents served with process
outside of the state, even though the Court did not say so explicitly. In an
attempt to develop a test that would take a state's regulatory interest into
account yet prevent state courts from overreaching, the Court developed the
minimum contacts test. Although fairness concerns began to creep into the
jurisdictional calculus, the underlying theme of sovereign power remained.
As discussed above, International Shoe represents a significant step in
the evolution of jurisdictional doctrine, not a revolution. This is because
Pennoyer expresses a jurisdictional theory of sovereign power while the
implementation of that theory constitutes a test based upon physical power.
Physical power is a means to an end, not an end in itself. International Shoe
continues to recognize sovereign power as a jurisdictional theory, while it
expands upon the implementation of the theory begun in Pennoyer.
Unfortunately, the minimum contacts test proves to be a difficult proxy 27
for measuring the proper extent of sovereign power.
The minimum contacts test requires "sufficient contacts or ties with the
state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state
to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there. 328 On its
face, this test says nothing about when a sovereign state should have
jurisdiction over a controversy. In fact, the test does not say much at
all-only that there must be enough contacts to make jurisdiction reason-
able. The entire problem exists, however, because courts had not been able
to define when jurisdiction truly was reasonable.
At least a portion of International Shoe acknowledges the regulatory
need of a sovereign state to regulate conduct which affects persons or
things within its jurisdictional boundaries. As the Court noted:
Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional acts of the
corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability on
from a procedural due process perspective. In some cases, the corporation never
even received notice from its "appointed agent" and default judgments against the
corporation were upheld. See Hazard, supra note 182, at 273-74.
326 See Stein, supra note 7, at 696-97.
327 See id. at 697 ("The minimum contacts test, however, is not a jurisdictional
justification. Minimum contacts only imply the existence ofanotherjustification.").
328 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,320 (1945).
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the corporation has not been thought to confer upon the state authority to
enforce it, other such acts, because of their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render
the corporation liable to suit.329
This acknowledgment is based upon a recognition of the need for states to
regulate conduct. 330 However, it does not go far enough. Notice that the
power of a state does not extend to all causes of action that arose due to
"single or occassional acts" of a corporate agent in the state, but only to
those that are "sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit" because
of their nature, quality, and circumstances. This statement is somewhat
circular-jurisdiction is reasonable when the circumstances make it
reasonable to exercise jurisdiction.33' Still, by acknowledging the potential
for jurisdiction based upon conduct, rather than on consent or presence, the
Court had at least been true to- the sovereign theory of jurisdiction
underlying Pennoyer.3
Following International Shoe, the Court continued to rely, at least in
part, on the regulatory authority of a state as the basis for a valid exercise
of personal jurisdiction. The evolution is exemplified, perhaps, by
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.333 In that case, the
Court explicitly recognized a distinction between specific and general
jurisdiction.334 Specific jurisdiction is based upon contacts with the state
that implicate the state's regulatory interest-those contacts that relate to the
cause of action directly.335 General jurisdiction depends upon contacts so
extensive that a party can be deemed to be present within the state.336 Thus,
general jurisdiction carries forward the Pennoyer concept of presence and
acknowledges a sovereign interest in regulating that party based upon that
presence. Specific jurisdiction, however, is dependent on sovereign power
to regulate conduct. To the extent that the Supreme Court apparently
recognizes specific jurisdiction as a separate category of cases, the Court
329 1d. at318.
330 See Stein, supra note 7, at 698-99.
33' See id. at 699 (arguing that the Court failed to articulate the boundaries of
extraterritorial service). This language is also similar to the language basing
jurisdiction on where a defendant can reasonably expect to be haled into court. This
justification for jurisdiction has also been criticized as circular. See id. at 701.332 See id. at 698-99.
333 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).334 See id. at 414 nn.8 & 9.335 See id. at 414 n.8.
336 See id. at 414 & n.9.
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is recognizing that the sovereign power to regulate conduct within a state's
borders alone may justify jurisdiction.37 This basis for jurisdiction does not
depend on any mythical presence.
Since Pennoyer, the Supreme Court's approach to jurisdiction has
evolved from a sovereign power over people and property to a sovereign
power based upon people, property, and conduct. This evolution has
rightfully extended state jurisdictional power to address disputes that the
state could not otherwise address. Unfortunately, as described above,
notions of purposeful availment and fairness have entered the jurisdictional
equation and have even started to dominate it. Future improvement of
jurisdictional theory should focus on identifying those cases where a state
has the sovereign right to regulate the conduct or transaction that is at issue
in the dispute.
VII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION INVOLVING THE INTERNET
AND OTHER MULTIUSER COMPUTER ENVIRONMENTS
The stage is now set for the next step in the evolution of personal
jurisdiction doctrine. The constraints of purposeful availment and
inconvenience (a.k.a. fairness) should now be removed from the jurisdic-
tional calculus. The minimum contacts test should be expanded to
recognize personal jurisdiction in cases where events upon which the
defendant's liability depends involve conduct which occurs at least
partially within the forum state or which proximately causes effects there.
This Part applies the proposed rules to several different factual scenarios
that either are, or are likely to be, common and are likely to generate
litigation. This Part next responds to concerns of some commentators that
expansive jurisdictional rules will affect Internet usage.
A. Application of Proposed Rules
Application of the above jurisdictional rules, like the application of any
set of jurisdictional rules, will be straightforward in some cases and more
complicated in others. Here, the above jurisdictional principles will be
analyzed in the context of several types of torts which either have occurred
or are likely to occur in the context of data communications. Some
scenarios present easy cases, while others present more difficult issues.
When analyzing various types of torts, the difference between the proposed
jurisdictional rules and the existing jurisdictional rules is best illustrated in
I" See Stein, supra note 7, at 703.
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the context of prior personal jurisdiction cases involving data communica-
tions.
Targeted data communications, such as e-mail,338 present fairly
straightforward jurisdictional questions. "Targeted" refers to the fact that
an electronic mail message is directed at someone. That "someone" might
be personally unknown to the sender of the e-mail message, but e-mail
messages are targeted at a person having a particular address. Certainly, it
is possible to target many persons simultaneously with a single e-mail
message. An example is the weekly Net SAAver e-mail that American
Airlines sends to subscribers to alert them to weekly airfare specials.3 9
American Airlines does not send these messages by typing the e-mail
address of each recipient every week; that would be impractical. Instead,
American maintains an electronic mailing list of recipients and sends the
e-mail to all of them.340 Yet, each of these e-mail messages can still be said
to be targeted at a specific person-they are specifically targeted at each
person on the list, rather than broadcast by some other method to the public
at large.
Certain torts involving e-mail messages are most likely to cause harm
to the recipient of the message. In other words, the recipient is the likely
plaintiff in a cause of action arising out of the e-mail message. The content
of the communication may create the cause of action. For example, such
content may cause the recipient emotional distress. An e-mail message to
a child might have pornographic or violent pictures attached, causing
emotional distress. Similarly, an e-mail message may create a cause of
action because its content amounts to sexual harassment or racial hate
speech. Each of these causes of action depends upon some emotional or
psychological effect on the recipient of the message.
These are easy cases-both the state from which the e-mail originated
and the state in which the e-mail was read may properly assert jurisdiction.
The origination of such an e-mail message amounts to an act comprising
a part of the conduct on which the sender's liability depends. The state in
which that conduct occurs may rightfully regulate that conduct as a portion
of the tortious conduct occurred within the state.3 41 Similarly, receiving and
338 See infra notes 421-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of electronic
mail.
339 See American Airlines Homepage (visited Aug. 30, 1998) <http://www.AA.
com>.
... One signs up for this service using American Airline's Web page. See id. at
Specials: Net SAAver.
341 See supra Part II.
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reading such an e-mail message also constitutes an event upon which the
sender's liability depends. Unless the message is read, no cause of action
arises. Thus, the reception and the reading of the message is equally as
important an event as the writing and sending of the message. Similarly,
the reading of the message must cause some emotional or psychological
harm to the message recipient for a cause of action to arise. Again, the
emotional or psychological harm amounts to a proximate effect of the
message in the state where the message is received and read. Because some
of the events upon which the defendant's liability depends occur in the
states from which the e-mail was sent and in which the e-mail was received
and read, these states may exercise personal jurisdiction over the sender of
the e-mail message.342
E-mail communications may also lead to other torts where the injured
party is the recipient of the message, but the harm is not caused simply by
reading the message. Other acts may need to take place after the message
has been read before a cause of action accrues. Common law fraud as well
as Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 1 Ob-5343 fraud fall into this
category. For either type of fraud to occur, there must be some type of
communication, followed by an action by the recipient of the communica-
tion in reliance upon the substance of the fraudulent communication. 344 Of
course, a communication must be sent as well. The above analysis
regarding torts involving emotional and psychological harm would
similarly apply to fraudulent torts. For liability to attach, a fraudulent
communication must first be made. The state from which the communica-
tion originatedwould thus have personal jurisdiction over the sender of the
message because the sending of the fraudulent message is one event
necessary to establish the liability of the sender. In addition, the state in
which the communication is received would also have personal jurisdiction
over the sender of the message because the reading of the message by the
recipient is also an event necessary to establish the liability of the sender.
Additionally, a third state may also exercise personal jurisdiction. If the
recipient of the message acts in reliance upon the fraud in some third state,
that state also has personal jurisdiction over the defendant because conduct
based on reliance is a necessary event upon which either the recipient's or
the sender's liability depends.
342 See supra Part III.
343 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (outlining the elements
of liability for fraudulent misrepresentation); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 466 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing generally
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lob-5 liability).
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One reported case found personal jurisdiction, in part, based upon e-
mail messages containing fraudulent information about a corporation that
led to a purchase of the corporation's stock. In Cody v. Ward,3 45 the
defendant, a California resident, posted allegedly fraudulent information
about a Louisiana corporation on Compuserve. In addition, the defendant
called the plaintiff and sent the plaintiff e-mail messages that were
allegedly fraudulent.3" The court held that the telephone calls and e-mail
messages were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction but expressly
declined to address the significance of the Compuserve messages.3 47 In
applying the purposeful availment test, the court held that the defendant
could reasonably expect to be sued in Connecticut based upon these
contacts. Although the case was an easy one due to the defendant's
knowledge of the plaintiff's residence, one could read the case broadly as
construing the sending of e-mail messages as purposeful availment.
In some cases involving other torts arising out of e-mail messages, the
plaintiff will be a third party rather than the recipient of the message.
Normally, such torts will involve a trespass by the sender of the message
on some intangible interest of the third party. An e-mail message could
contain libelous statements which cause harm to a third party's intangible
reputation in the state where the libel is received. Similarly, an e-mail
message could violate an intellectual property right of a third party. The
message may include a trademark or trade dress348 confusingly similar to
that of a third party. E-mail messages might also contain false statements
about a product being advertised, giving a competitor a cause of action for
unfair competition. A celebrity might find his name or likeness being used
without permission in an e-mail containing advertising, violating the
celebrity's right of publicity. Suits might also arise for misappropriation of
trade secrets where an e-mail message contains trade secrets owned by a
third party.
Although these cases are arguably different from the cases where the
e-mail message injures the recipient rather than a third party, they should
actually be treated similarly. The state from which the message was sent
may exercise personal jurisdiction over the data communication because
the act of sending the message comprises one of the events upon which the
"I Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997).346 See id. at 44-45.
347 See id. at 45-46.
34 A trade dress is "the total appearance and image of a product," which
includes size, texture, shape, etc. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1493 (6th ed.
1990).
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defendant's liability depends.349 Similarly, the state in which the message
was read may exercise personal jurisdiction because the harm to the third
party occurs where the message is read.35 The reading of the message is
another event on which the defendant's liability depends and it is the
reading of the message that causes harm to the third party. For example, the
trend in intellectual property cases is to recognize harm to an intangible
interest of the third party in the state where either an infringing trademark
is used, a product infringing a copyright is distributed, or a patented
product is soldwithout authorization.35" ' Harm occurs in such states because
that is where trespass on the third party's intangible property interest
occurs. Similar reasoning applies in libel cases-a person has an intangible
reputational interest everywhere and that interest is infringed only in those
locations where the libel ispublished. Thus, the state of reception of a data
communication that infringes an intangible interest of a third party may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the sender of that data communication,
while in some limited circumstances the state of the third party's residence
may not. If the communication is not read in the state of the third party's
residence, no event on which the defendant's liability depends occurs there,
and that state has no regulatory power to exercise over the data communi-
cation.352
Each of the above scenarios represents a straightforward application of
the jurisdictional rules proposed above for data communications. Both the
state of origination and the state of receipt of the e-mail may exercise
jurisdiction. This result does not depend upon any particular knowledge of
the defendant. The defendant need not know who will receive the e-mail
message or, more importantly, in what state the recipient of the e-mail
resides. Persons may maintain an anonymous or pseudonymous existence
on the Internet. 3 The potential anonymity of the recipient of the message
See supra Part m.
"'See Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech, Harm and Self-Government: Understanding
the Ambit of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1474
(1991) (arguing that damage to defamed person is only caused after libel is read)
(citing Hustler Magazine Co. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
351 See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1569
(Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 512 U.S. 1273 (1994) (patents); Keds Corp. v. Renee
Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215,218 (1st Cir. 1989) (trademarks); Arbitron Co.
v. E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 400,404 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (copyrights).
352 Some courts have chosen to exercise jurisdiction because a libel caused
economic harm to a resident of the forum. The reasoning of these cases is flawed.
See supra note 24.
... See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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is irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction. A state does not lose regulatory
power merely because the defendant directs a tortious communication at an
anonymous recipient. In most cases, the conduct will be equally culpable
regardless of knowledge of the recipient's identity.
Under existing precedent, the defendant's knowledge might affect the
issue of personal jurisdiction. For example, a defendant can make a strong
argument that he or she did not purposefully avail himself or herself of the
protection of a state's laws where the defendant does not know who the
recipient of its communication is or where that recipient resides. Although
plaintiffs may legitimately take an opposite position, the inquiry is difficult
under the existing personal jurisdiction rules and would likely lead to
inconsistent outcomes. When fairness considerations are injected into the
mix, the potential for conflicting results increases substantially. Existing
jurisdictional principles, then, do not adequately address easy cases under
the proposed jurisdictional rules. Additionally, existing rules may be even
more clumsy in more difficult cases.
A slightly more difficult case would involve an e-mail message that
contains a virus capable of destroying certain information on any computer
with which it comes in contact and which is capable of being easily spread
to other computers. As to the recipient of the message, the analysis is
identical to the torts cases above-both the state from which the e-mail was
sent and the state in which it was received may exercise jurisdiction. A
more difficult question arises when, unbeknownst to the original recipient
of the message, the virus spreads to other computers connected to the
Internet or connected to the original recipient's computer. Based upon the
proposed jurisdictional rules, any state where the virus destroys informa-
tion could exercise jurisdiction over the creator of the virus. Because the
destruction of the information, no matter where it occurs, is an event upon
which the virus sender's liability depends and is a proximate effect of the
original data communication, the state in which the destruction occurs may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant."' In other words, this
problem should be treated as if the virus creator sent the virus to every
person whose information is destroyed by the virus. A virus creator should
not be able to escape jurisdiction in states to which the virus was spread
automatically. By setting up the virus so that it would be spread automati-
cally, the virus creator proximately causes damage wherever the virus
destroys information. Again, existing jurisdictional rules would not resolve
the issue so easily because a serious question would arise regarding
purposeful availment by the virus creator.
" See supra Part m.
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Some instances of computer break-ins shouldbe treated similarly to the
virus hypothetical. Here, the term "computer break-in" refers to unautho-
rized access to a computer system. A computer trespasser may use the
Telnet service355 over the Internet to perform a computer break-in. Because
a computer connected to the Internet by a Telnet server may also be
connected to an internal network of computers owned by a single party, the
computer trespasser might be able to use his entry into the internal network
using the Telnet server to break into other computers on the internal
network. All of these computers on the internal network could be located
in separate states. If the computer trespasser releases a virus that destroys
data and that virus spreads to computers on the internal network in separate
states, then the result is identical to the virus hypothetical-the state from
which the computer trespasser sent the communication and the states where
the virus destroys data may all exercise personal jurisdiction over the
trespasser. Again, the trespasser's knowledge of where the computers
receiving the virus are located is irrelevant.
The same results are obtained where the computer trespasser deletes
data either on the computer running the Telnet server (the accessed
computer) or on a computer connected to the accessed computer. In such
circumstances, the accessed computer may make it appear to the trespasser
that certain data is stored on the accessed computer, when in fact it is stored
on a computer in another state that is connected to the accessed computer
through the internal network. If the computer trespasser issues a command
to delete a file stored on another computer (the remote computer), then the
accessed computer would likely process that command and route it to the
appropriate remote computer. Existing jurisdictional rules make this a
difficult problem as the computer trespasser may not know the state in
which the accessed computer is located, may not know where the remote
computer is located, and has sent a data communication only to the
accessed computer. Purposeful availment becomes a difficult inquiry in
light of these possibilities. One could view the routing of the command by
the accessed computer to the remote computer as a unilateral act of the
owner of the accessed computer, similar to driving a car to Oklahoma from
New York.356 Under the proposed jurisdictional rules, however, the
question is not difficult. The deletion of data on the remote computer
proximately results from a data communication initiated by the user and is
355 See infra notes 440-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Telnet
service.
356 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96
(1980).
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an act upon which the computer trespasser's liability depends. Thus, the
state in which the data was deleted may properly exercise jurisdiction over
the computer trespasser.
The above examples involving electronic mail illustrate torts that might
occur due to communications involving push technology.357 Thus, a
communication received from a push service could lead to a cause of action
for emotional distress, fraud, racial hatred, sexual harassment, libel,
trademark infringement, right of publicity infringement, copyright
infringement, trade secret misappropriation, or any other tort that may arise
out of a communication. If a push communication contains a virus, then
tort causes of action relating to damage caused by the virus might also arise
from such a communication. The above-stated analysis applicable to
viruses spreading from an e-mail message is equally applicable to torts
arising from push communications. Like viruses, push communications
may proximately cause effects on which the sender's liability depends in
many different states. Each of these states has a right to regulate data
communications causing such effects. This result is also consistent with the
treatment of the jurisdictional question relating to users of electronic mass-
mailing lists-such as the example set out above for airline ticket specials.35
In both examples, one who sends a communication to numerous locations
is subject to jurisdiction in all locations where the communication
proximately causes harm upon which the sender's liability depends.
The analysis in the previous paragraph was primarily concerned with
untargeted push technology-that is, push communications not targeted at
specific people. Some push technologies require subscriptions, making the
communications targeted and most analogous to e-mail distributed using
an electronic mass-mailing list.359 In the future, push communications will
be more like television-the push messages are broadcast using particular
push "channels" and anyone will be able to tune in.360 Usenet services
provide another form ofuntargeted electronic communications.36' True, the
content of the message contained in a Usenet posting may be targeted at a
particular person or an anonymous person. Such messages, however, are
not sent to particular people. Instead, they are posted on Usenet servers
throughout the Internet for anyone to read who has access to Usenet
117 For a discussion of push technology, see infra notes 490-95 and accom-
panying text.358 See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.361 See infra notes 490-95 and accompanying text.
361 For a discussion of Usenet, see infra notes 430-39 and accompanying text.
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services. Usenet services should be treated like untargeted push technolo-
gies. Accessing a Usenet server is very similar to selecting a particular push
channel. In both cases, the user's computer will send messages to servers
to retrieve the available information and that information will be sent to the
user's computer.362 In both cases, the sender of a communication broadcasts
the communication to various points on the Internet. Senders of Usenet
messages causing torts should thus be subject to jurisdiction in the state
from which the communication was sent and the state in which the
communication causes damage.
The difficulty in the application of the minimum contacts test to World
Wide Web data communications was discussed above in Part II. In contrast
to the uncertainty and difficulty in applying existing jurisdictional rules to
World Wide Web sites, the proposed jurisdictional rules provide a
straightforward jurisdictional analysis in such cases. When an accessor
"visits" a Web page, the Web server sends a copy of that Web page to the
accessor's Web browser.363 Thus, the Web server sends a data communica-
tion to the accessor's Web browser. If the contents of that data communica-
tion (the Web page) cause tortious injury when read, then the owner of the
Web server is subject to jurisdiction in the state where that data communi-
cation causes damage. A state where the contents of a Web page proxi-
mately cause damage may exercise personal jurisdiction over the owner of
the Web page no matter whether the recipient or a third party is injured by
the communication. 31 The reasoning relevant to third-party injury in the
context of e-mail is equally applicable here.365 Similarly, the analysis above
regarding viruses attached to e-mail messages applies equally to rogue
applets attached to Web pages.366 Where an applet attached to.a Web page
proximately causes tortious effects in states other than that in which it was
originally received, the Web page owner is subject to personal jurisdiction
in those states.
Notice that the proposed jurisdictional rules focus on the conduct
which a state may legitimately regulate, regardless of the relationship of the
defendant with the state or his intent to purposefully establish a relationship
with that state. The wisdom of this rule becomes apparent when one
considers the potential evolution of the Internet. Computers on the Internet
362 Compare infra note 434 and accompanying text with infra notes 490-91 and
accompanying text.
363 See infra note 453 and accompanying text.
31 See supra Part III.
311 See supra notes 338-54 and accompanying text.
366 For a discussion of applets, see infra notes 460-68 and accompanying text.
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communicate with one another using numerical Transmission Control
Protocol/Internetworking Protocol ("TCP/IP") addresses. 67 Although
having no geographical significance now, these addresses, like telephone
numbers, could be altered to carry geographical significance. If this
evolution takes place, Web site operators could control, to a certain extent,
the geographical regions from which their Web sites are accessed.161 Those
viewing personal jurisdiction questions involving Web sites from the
perspective of purposeful availment may find personal jurisdiction
appropriate because the Web site owner can geographically restrict the
distribution of its Web page. Thus, control over geographical distribution
might be outcome determinative under existing jurisdictional rules.
The result under the proposed rules is unchanged-personal jurisdiction
over a Web page operator is appropriate wherever the Web page proxi-
mately causes tortious injury, even if the Internet does not provide an
adequate mechanism for restricting geographical access. Suppose that a
child in Texas accesses the Barney Web Page, thinking that this Web page
is for Barney the dinosaur. The child clicks on a box that says "View
Barney," thinking that she is going to see a picture of Barney. Instead, a
man named Barney engaged in a sexual act appears on the screen, causing
the child severe emotional distress and an aversion to Barney.369 Whether
the Internet allows a Web page owner to geographically restrict access to
its Web page or not, the child still suffers emotional damage. Texas does
not suddenly become more interested in preventing such acts merely
because the Web site operator could have chosen to prevent residents from
Texas from accessing its Web page. Texas should be able to regulate such
conduct proximately causing harm to its residents. The Web site operator's
367 See supra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
368 Total control may not be possible unless Telnet is altered. Suppose that the
Internet is changed such that TCP/IP addresses indicate the geographical location
of one attempting to access a Web page. The Web page operator might allow
access only to residents of Maine. However, an Internet user in Texas with access
privileges on a computer connected to the Internet located in Maine could use
Telnet to log into the Maine computer and then access the Web page. Telnet would
make it appear to the Web server that the accessor was from Maine. If Internet
addressing were altered to include the TCP/IP address of the point at which a
communication originated (the Texas computer), as well as the computer to which
an answer to the communication should be sent (the Maine computer accessed
through Telnet), then Web pages could base access on one or both of these
addresses.
369 This situation would be truly hypothetical to some adults as they already
have an aversion to Barney.
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liability in no way depends upon its ability to control geographical access
to its Web site. Similarly, such ability should have no bearing on a state's
power of personal jurisdiction.
B. The Sky Will Not Fall Under the Proposed Rules
Several commentators would adopt narrow jurisdictional rules in cases
involving data communications, particularly in the context of Web sites,
because of the fear that more expansive jurisdictional rules would interfere
with legitimate uses of the Internet.3 70 These commentators contend that
one of the Internet's strengths is the ability of average citizens to partici-
pate at low cost.371 If jurisdictional rules are expansive, then citizens will
be deterred from participating and only those with deeper pockets will
establish Web sites.372 Average users cannot afford the cost of defending
multiple suits in multiple jurisdictions.3 3 Further, these commentators
lament that the average user cannot afford the cost of complying with the
regulatory requirements of every jurisdiction. Critics also state that
subjecting corporations to jurisdiction in all fifty states simply by posting
a Web page on the Internet is viewed as somehow unfair.374 Although these
arguments are appealing on their surface, ihey fail to withstand more
careful scrutiny.
The first argument is that low cost participation is an advantage of the
Internet and expansive jurisdictional rules would raise the cost of Internet
participation such that only those with deep pockets would establish Web
pages. This argument has several flaws. It makes a value judgment that
370 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 5, 46, 60 (arguing that Web site passwords
established through telephone or mail communications would harm advantages of
the Internet's automation and that expansive jurisdictional rules would drive away
users without deep pockets); see also Ackerman, supra note 5, at 422-23 (arguing
that expansive jurisdictional rules present "frightening" prospects for the future of
business conducted on the World Wide Web).
371 See Burk, supra note 5, 60.31 See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (noting that a finding of jurisdiction based upon
operation of a Web site would have a "devastating impact" on the users of the
World Wide Web); Burk, supra note 5, 60; Kalow, supra note 5, at 2253; see also
Ackerman, supra note 5, at 422-23 (noting that the growth of the Internet may be
impeded by jurisdictional rules).373 See Burk, supra note 5, 60.
31 See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 425 (noting that 50-state jurisdiction
resulting from posting of a Web page is seemingly unfair).
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more participation on the Internet is better, particularly participation by
those that do not have deep pockets. One can certainly take the opposite
view-that the Internet drowns users with so much information that
encouraging creation of more Web sites is bad. Searching for a particular
location on the Internet can be cumbersome because thousands of Web
sites may have words falling within the scope of a search. Excessive
generation of Web sites makes searching for information inefficient
because a user may have to visit more Web sites to find what he or she is
looking for or review a long list of potential Web sites containing the
information the user seeks. Moreover, those with deeper pockets, as a
general rule, may be more likely to create Web sites appealing to a broad
segment of the public.375 A user searching for Web sites about Elvis Presley
probably does not care to waste time (and potentially money) visiting a
Web site run by the Penobscott family which contains family photos,
including one of their dog, Elvis Presley.376
In addition, the low cost participation argument makes a value
judgment that having more Web pages is more important than punishing
Web page operators for wrongdoing. Presumably, lessening the number of
places where a lawsuit can be filed will marginally reduce the number of
lawsuits filed, some of which would be meritorious. When parties do not
enforce their rights, the deterrent value of laws is reduced, encouraging
further wrongdoing.377 Courts deciding jurisdictional issues should not
make such value judgments. If expansive personal jurisdiction truly has
negative effects on the World Wide Web, Congress could choose to restrict
jurisdictional rules or liability rules.
The jurisdictional rules proposed by this Article are neutral in two
ways. First, they make no judgment as to whether having a certain number
of World Wide Web pages is good or bad. Instead, these jurisdictional rules
375 But see GERARD VAN DER LEUN & THOMAS MANDEL, RULES OF THE NET:
ON-LINE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR HUMAN BEINGS 149 (1996) (noting that
some corporate entities, presumably eager to get into the Internet game, "spawn
info junk that jams Web sites and fritters away hours of a user's day promising but
failing to deliver high impact information"). One would have a difficult time
empirically determining whether Web sites controlled by large or small entities are
the most valuable.
376 This example is purely hypothetical.
377 See Joel Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went
Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. RBV. 785; Charles Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the
Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 65
(1996); Eric Gouvin, Note, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A New
Approach to an Old Problem, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 99 (1986).
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depend upon the neutral principle of territorial sovereignty. Courts should
not make jurisdictional rules based upon their value judgments as to the
effect that their exercise of jurisdiction will have on the conduct of others.
Second, these rules do not attempt to balance the importance of the
regulation at issue against some threat of reduced Internet usage or
inconvenience to the defendant. Courts should respect established laws and
not attempt to determine which ones are most important. Likewise, courts
should not determine jurisdictional rules by speculating as to the potential
implications of an exercise of jurisdiction.
Next, one might question the fears that those of lesser means will avoid
setting up Web pages due to expansive jurisdictional rules. Certainly,
potential liability may deter people from undertaking otherwise useful
activities. Theoretically, at least, the expansion of jurisdictional rules
should not affect the liability of the Web site operator. Because liability for
damages is likely to be a significant deterrent to certain conduct, liability
rules may arguably be the most important determinant of the number of
Web site operators. The location where liability is determined is arguably
less important. A Web site operator can hire a lawyer where a suit is filed
to defend the lawsuit. Although the lawyer and client may have to travel for
certain meetings, these travel expenses are likely to be insignificant
compared to the cost of legal fees and other litigation expenses.3 78 The
greatest amount of travel expense arises when a case reaches trial, but only
a small number of lawsuits ever reach that stage. 79 Lawsuits are expensive
to defend wherever they are brought and an out-of-state venue may or may
not add significantly to that cost.80 While some courts have established
expansive jurisdictional rules and others have aggressively sought to
regulate the Internet,381 no empirical evidence exists to support the
contention that expansive jurisdictional rules will chill Internet participa-
tion.
Also, if jurisdictional rules do affect behavior, one might contend that
expansive jurisdictional rules perform a useful deterrent role. Ifa Web page
378 See Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 47 n.9 (D. Conn. 1997) (noting that
litigating out-of-state is not so burdensome because of features such as fax
machines, telephone conferences, and overnight mail).
379 See id. (noting also that litigating out-of-state is not so burdensome as most
cases do not go to trial).310 Similarly, a Web page operator sued by multiple parties in multiple suits is
more likely to be deterred from operating the Web page in the future by legal fees
and the cost of liability, rather than by the location of those suits.
381 See Burk, supra note 5, 3-4.
[VOL. 87
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
operator truly desires to avoid being sued in different states, the operator
will likely operate the Web page in a conservative manner, seeking to avoid
any type of lawsuit. More aggressive Web page operators that skate closer
to the line defining liability face greater risks of litigation. Because
deterrence increases when laws are enforced, making such enforcement
easier may serve a valuable deterrent function, leading to more responsible
use of the World Wide Web, rather than merely less total use.
Commentators in favor of restrictive jurisdictional rules point to the
inexpensive nature ofInternet communications.8 2 Deterrence concerns are
heightened precisely because of the inexpensive nature of Internet
communications. The Internet allows several advantages in communica-
tion. It allows inexpensive communication to people over long distances,3"3
as well as communication to many people simultaneously.384 Finally, the
full-text searching capabilities allow Internet users to easily locate a party
having some sought-after knowledge, thus reducing the costs of obtaining
information. Inexpensive communications media have disadvantages as
well. One seeking to harm others with one's communications can do so
inexpensively, from a long distance away, and with an effect on many
different parties. Where a tool can be used for significant good and
significant evil, the potential for evil suggests that jurisdictional rules
which create additional deterrence are desirable.
A second argument advanced by commentators against liberal
jurisdictional rules is that average Web page operators cannot afford the
cost of complying with the regulatory rules in all fifty states.385 Again, no
empirical evidence suggests that this is the case. Parties often have to take
actions that satisfy the strictest laws of a plurality of states. For example,
states may have varying standards as to the degree of warning required for
certain products. Because manufacturers do not want to create separate
documentation for all states, they might create one set of documentation
complying with the strictest law. One often purchases soft drink cans
containing deposit information for a different state. By putting deposit
information for those states that require deposits on all cans, a soft drink
bottler may avoid the costs both of making a number of different cans and
of supply distribution problems caused by those different cans. If certain
laws prove to be particularly problematic in interfering with Internet
transactions, then these laws may be scrutinized under substantive
382 See id. 60.383 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
384 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
385 See supra notes 371-74 and accompanying text.
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doctrines, such as the dormant commerce clause, that may affect their
validity. Congress could also choose to preempt those state regulations that
were particularlyproblematic. The deterrence rationale discussedabove has
application here as well-if jurisdictional rules encourage Web site
operators to avoid engaging in conduct close to the line of illegality, then
jurisdictional rules may promote a desirable level of behavior.
Turning to the third argument-that jurisdiction in all fifty states is
simply unfair-one cannot ignore the implicit rejection of a theory of
jurisdiction based upon sovereign power in such an argument. Some causes
of action arising out of communications with Web pages will involve
federal causes of action such as patent infringement, trademark infringe-
ment, or copyright infringement. Where federal rights are involved,
commentators have argued that a national contacts approach is appropriate,
reasoning that personal jurisdiction is based upon territorial sovereignty
and violations of federal law implicate the regulatory authority-of the
United States. 86 Assuming that Congress provided for such jurisdiction, as
they have in several contexts,387 those who argue that jurisdiction in all fifty
states is unfair necessarily reject a national contacts theory. Because the
national contacts theory is consistent with this Article's contention that
personal jurisdiction is properly based upon territorial sovereignty,
jurisdiction in all fifty states resulting from the operation of a Web page
may well be fair. In addition, fairness has no place in an analysis of
personal jurisdiction.388 A defendant that causes harm in all fifty states
should be made to answer for that harm in all fifty states.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Internet and other arenas for data communications present many
new challenges from a legal standpoint. Defining the limits of personal
jurisdiction is one important challenge. This Article has proposed some
general rules to guide courts in deciding issues of personal jurisdiction.
Although these rules do not mesh with the modem manifestations of the
minimum contacts rule, the proposed rules are consistent with the
minimum contacts approach at a more abstract level. Both the minimum
386 See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien
Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85 (1983).
387 See Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process
Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1988)
(Federal Interpleader Act and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
311 See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
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contacts test and the proposed rules implicate considerations of territorial
sovereignty. In a future case, the Supreme Court will hopefully delineate
a guiding principle underlying the rules of personal jurisdiction. Future
cases presenting new difficulties like those presented by data communica-
tions will arise some day, and courts will once again face the prospect of
attempting to apply rules that somehow do not seem to fit the situation.
When such cases are encountered, a consideration of guiding principles
should steer courts to decide cases correctly and consistently. Those are the
goals that the proposed rules seek to further.
IX. APPENDIX-
THE INTERNET AND OTHER MULTIUSER COMPUTER SYSTEMS
This Article has proposed jurisdictional rules for disputes involving
data communications. Because of their potential importance to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues, this Appendix briefly summarizes some
technical details of popular types of data communications. In spite of the
popularity of the Internet, computer bulletin boards are still widely used
and are discussed first. Next, this Appendix explains the nature of computer
communications using the Internet, beginning with a general discussion of
Internet operation. Although many people are aware of electronic mail and
the World Wide Web, the Internet offers other services that may spawn
litigation. Thus, the Internet discussion also addresses Internet service
providers, Usenet services, and Telnet services.
A. Bulletin Boards
Although not used as widely as the Internet, computer bulletin boards
are still prevalent.389 A computer bulletin board typically is comprised of
a computer operated by an individual or an organization. One or more
modems3 90 connect to the computer, which is set up to receive dial-up
communications from users of the bulletin board. Some bulletin boards
charge subscription fees and require password access, while others operate
389 See Byassee, supra note 4, at 200 n.13.
39A modem (short for modulator/demodulator) electronically prepares digital
information for transmission over a communications medium, such as a telephone
line. The modem also receives a signal over a communications medium which can
be converted to digital data. See DON MACLEOD, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR THE
LEGAL RESEARCHER 1:4 (2d ed. 1997).
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free of charge.39' Bulletin boards may be general in nature or may be targeted
towards a particular common interest of their users.392
When a user desires to access a bulletin board, she contacts the bulletin
board using her computer, often over regular telephone lines with a modem
connected to the computer. Normally, the bulletin board will then prompt the
user for some type of information to identify the user, even if the bulletin
board provides free access. Bulletin boards commonly provide a series of
menus that allow the user to navigate through their various features. During
this navigation, the bulletin board sends data, including perhaps text, pictures,
and sound, to the user's computer. The user's computer acts as if the user had
gone to the physical location of the bulletin board computer, sat down, and
begun using the bulletin board computer itself.
Bulletin boards provide many different types of services. Some allow
users to engage in conversation about a variety of topics. Thus, bulletin
boards may include a newsgroup-like service where users can make
comments about various subjects and read the comments of other users.
Another common service available on bulletin boards is an upload/download
capability. Users are often allowed to upload software, pictures, graphics,
sound recordings, electronic documents, or any other type of content to share
with other users.3 3 Similarly, bulletin board users may often download such
content, either in exchange for content of their own or for a small fee." 4
Because of this capability, bulletin boards have been a popular forum for
copyright infringement.395 Bulletin boards may also provide a forum for users
to play games against other users, either interactively while on-line or
separately. Role-playing games may be played over a period of time. Bulletin
boards may also provide features such as games ornews information that may
be used while connected to the bulletin board but may not be downloaded by
the user.
B. The Internet
The Internet is a large computer network;3" more specifically, it is a
network of many computer networks.397 Although the history of the Internet
391 See Byassee, supra note 4, at 200 n.13.
392 See id.
393 See id.
394 See id.
395 See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
396 A computer network comprises computers connected to one another by
communication links and operable to communicate with one another in away that all
computers understand so that the networked computers may exchange and share
information. See JAVEDMOSTAFA ETAL., THE EASYINTERNETHANDBOOK2 (1994).
397See Burk, supra note 5, 7; MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at 25.
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is complicated, a very brief summary is appropriate because the Internet
has only become widely known to the public at large within the past five
to ten years. The U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agenicy ("ARPA')
planted the seeds for the modem day Internet in the late 1960s.398 ARPA
wanted to study how networks could be effectively used with computers
and to create a way to allow scientists at dispersed geographic locations to
work together. 99 In late 1969, the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network of U.S. Department of Justice4° ("ARPAnet") was born.
Computers at UCLA, Stanford University, UC Santa Barbara, and the
University of Utah formed the first network.4"' From these humble
beginnings, the ARPAnet evolved and led eventually to the creation of the
Internet. As the ARPAnet grew, a need developed for more sophisticated
communications protocols. In 1983, the TCP/IP was adopted as the official
communications protocol for the ARPAnet. °2 The adoption of this protocol
led to the development of the Internet because it allowed a common
communication mechanism addressed to many services for communication
among many different types of computers using various operating systems.
Soon, computer networks in many different countries were interconnected
to form the Internet. Computers connected to these networks communi-
cated with one another using the TCP/IP protocol.0 3 Today, the Internet
connects tens of millions of users, with a projection that the network will
serve 100 million users by some time in 1998.4 The Internet's exponential
growth in recent years has been triggered primarily by the advent of
Windows-oriented applications to access various sites on the Internet.
These hyptertext-driven applications have allowed the Internet to evolve
to offer easy access to graphics, pictures, video clips, sound, and stylized
text.
The Internet is a distributed network, meaning that the shared
information accessible on the network resides in multiple locations, rather
than a single location.4" 5 In addition, it means that data communications
398 See DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 8 (1994).
399 See id.
40See History ofARPANET(visited Sept. 9, 1998) <http://www.dei.isep.ipp.pt/
docs/arpa.htm1>.
401 See DERN, supra note 398, at 9.
4 2 See id. at 10-11; see also MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at 21-22.
403 See DERN, supra note 398, at 12-13.
41 See Zembek, supra note 5, at 344; McCarthy, supra note 4, at 536; see also
MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at23 (noting that the Internet connects thousands
of networks).405 See Byassee, supra note 4, at 200.
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traveling through the network do not follow any predefined path and do not
have to travel through any centralized location.4"6 The computers on the
Internet are connected in a hierarchical fashion. An individual using the
Internet normally connects to a network or large mainframe computer,
known as a "domain," that is connected directly to the Internet. The
domain, in turn, is connected to a mid-level regional network which
connects a number of domains. Mid-level regional networks are connected
to a backbone network, such as the NSFNET °7 in the United States. 0
Backbone networks are then connected to other backbone networks to
support worldwide communications. As the level in the hierarchy gets
higher, the computing power of computers increases as does the capacity
and speed of the communications links.
The Internet is a packet-switched network.40 9 That means data to be
communicated between two computers connected to the Internet is divided
into smaller packets of information. The information to be transmitted is
broken up into packets by the source computer and reassembled by the
destination computer."0 Each packet contains the information to be
communicated, a source address, and a destination address.41" ' Packets are
like a letter-they contain two addresses and some information. However,
Internet packets also contain additional information identifying the size of
the packet and some other control information. The computers directly
connected to the Internet are programmed to route the packets to their
401 See id.
407 See NIC (visited Sept. 9, 1998) <http://sunsite.unc.edu/usenet-i/info.nsfnet.
html>.
408 For a discussion of the structure of the Internet, see MOSTAFA ET AL., supra
note 396, at 24-30.4
'
1 A packet-switched network should be distinguished from a circuit-switched
network. In a circuit-switched network, users communicate with one another by
setting up a "circuit" or connection through the network which remains connected
until the users have finished their communications. The telephone network is an
example of a circuit-switched network. When a first person dials a phone number
of a second person, the telephone network sets up a path through the network to
allow communications between those two persons. When a suitable path has been
established, the telephone of the second person rings. The circuit remains
connected until one party hangs up the phone. Circuit-switching may make
inefficient use of the communications circuit because that circuit may not be fully
utilized while it is maintained. For a brief discussion of circuit-switching, see
MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at 17, and Burk, supra note 5, 8.
4 10 See Burk, supra note 5, 8.
411 See MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at 18.
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proper destination based upon the address and control information in the
packets.
The source and destination addresses contained within the packets are
unique identifiers of source and destination computers. These numerical
identifiers are known as Internetworking Protocol ("IP") addresses.1 2
Unlike telephone numbers, however, the IP address for a specific computer
provides no indication of the geographical location of the computer
residing at the address. IP addresses contain two pieces of information, the
IP network address and the local address.413 The IP network address refers
to the address of a particularnetwork connectedto the Internet, whereas the
local address refers to a specific location within that network. For example,
the University of Wisconsin may have a single network connection to the
Internet identified by its IP network address but the computer science
department and psychology department may have their own department
networks identified by a local address.
In practice, though, Internet users do not concern themselves with IP
addresses. Instead, users identify computers using Internet domain
addresses.414 The computer that creates the packets to send over the Internet
uses software to look up the IP address associated with that domain
name.415 A domain name, however, may be structured similarly to an IP
address, containing a network portion and a local portion. The network
portion is usually the name of the organization, while the local portion
comprises the name of the network or computer within the organization.4 6
Referring to the example in the previous paragraph, the domain name for
Professor Cooper's computer on the psychology department network at the
University of Wisconsin might be "Cooper.psych.UWis.edu." The "edu"
portion of the address identifies the University as an educational institution.
Although some domain names contain geographic information, many do
not.417 All of the Internet services discussed below use IP addresses and
domain names for communications.
No authority directly regulates the Internet.4 1 Domain names are
assigned by a central authority in each country on the Internet, but that
authority does not otherwise regulate actions by the Internet's users.
4See DERN, supra note 398, at 69-70.
413 See id. at 69.
414 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
415 See DERN, supra note 398, at 75-76.
4 16 See MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at 69.
417 See DERN, supra note 398, at 74-75.418 See Burk, supra note 5, 10; Byassee, supra note 4, at 200-01.
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Instead, the Internet operates by informal agreement among its users. The
owners of those computers forming the Internet backbone agree to
exchange all data transferred to them that satisfies various TCP/IP
protocols .419 Each computer acts essentially on its own, receiving informa-
tion from computers to which it is directly connected and sending
information to those computers.
1. Internet Service Providers
Individuals desiring to access the Internet often do not set up their own
domain. Instead, they subscribe to services provided by an Internet service
provider such as America On-line, Prodigy, or Compuserve. These services
maintain a network of computers that constitutes an Internet domain
connected directly to the Internet. A user that subscribes to Internet service
through one of these providers normally uses a modem to connect his
computer to one of the computers in the Internet service provider's
network. The Internet service provider then provides facilities to allow the
user to access the Internet. In addition, the Internet service provider
normally has facilities to allow its users to receive electronic mail from
other Internet users. When a user logs onto the Internet service provider,
the service provider's computers make the user's electronic mail available
for viewing.
Internet service providers, such as those listed above, also provide
other bulletin board-like services to their subscribers. These services may
include software shopping services that allow users to purchase and
download software, newsgroups where users can carry on discussions about
a variety of topics, news services where news is provided on a variety of
subjects, and "chat" services that allow users to talk to other users of the
service in real time. Chatting involves carrying on a conversation with
another user by typing the information to be communicated with the other
user being able to quickly respond.420
2. E-mail
Electronic mail is one ofthe most widely usedinternet services.42 Like
the label suggests, electronic mail is an electronic version of mail. Internet
users can type a message and send it to anyone else connected to the
419 See Byassee, supra note 4, at 201.
420 See MACLEOD, supra note 390, at 2:41.
421 See DERN, supra note 398, at 129.
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Internet, provided that the user knows the Internet address of the intended
recipient of the message. In addition to messages, Internet users can attach
pictures, graphics, video clips, data, sound, or entire computer software
applications to an electronic mail message.4 In short, electronic mail
provides a convenient means to communicate data of virtually any kind to
another Internet user anywhere in the world in a matter of seconds or
minutes. In addition, one can easily send electronic messages to many
different individuals and can forward received messages to others.
The operation of electronic mail is straightforward. An electronic mail
user application, such as Lotus CC:Mail, allows a user to create electronic
mail messages to send to others as well as to read electronic mail messages
received from others. This application is also known as an e-mail client
application.4' E-mail clients often provide the ability to reply to received
messages, forward them to someone else, and store them in an organized
manner. In addition, an e-mail client may allow the user to attach files to
an electronic mail message to be sent or retrieve and store attachments to
received messages. The e-mail client application interacts with an e-mail
server application, also known as a post office application.424 The post
office application interacts with the Internet, sending e-mail messages out
over the Internet and receiving e-mail messages from the Internet.
Although an Internet domain that supports e-mail must necessarily have
one post office, a domain can have many post office applications.
Returning to the example above, the University of Wisconsin could have
one electronic mail post office for the entire campus or one for each
smaller network on the campus.
Electronic mail is low priority traffic on the Internet because the
Internet presumes that the e-mail message need not be transported
immediately.4' Like a regular letter, e-mail may be delayed depending
upon the traffic on the Internet. Electronic mail is a store and forward
technology. When a post office receives a message intended for another, it
stores the message on disk and tries to send the message at some point.
When the message is sent, the post office waits to receive an acknowledg-
ment that the message has reached its destination. If no such acknowledg-
ment is received, then the post office attempts to send the message again.42 6
42 See id. at 131-32.
" See id. at 134. However, some applications use the terms "client" and
"server" in the opposite sense. See id.
424 See id. at 134-35.
421 See id. at 136.
426 See id.
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This feature comes in handy when someone unplugs the computer before
a message is delivered. The confirmation function can be used to provide
a notification to the sender of the message that the message was success-
fully delivered, analogous to a return receipt for a registered letter.
For users, such as salespersons, that travel from place *to place
frequently, various special features are available for electronic mail. One
special feature is voice e-mail. Voice e-mail allows a user to call a specific
number on the phone and "listen" to the user's electronic mail by way of
a speech synthesizer that converts the text of an e-mail message into
synthesized sound.427 Another special feature one can purchase is the ability
to have e-mail messages sent to one's alphanumeric pager.428 Thus, one
sending an e-mail message cannot assume that the recipient of the message
will actually read that message where the recipient's computer is located.429
3. Usenet
Usenet services have been referred to as the bulletin board of the
Internet.430 Usenet provides a number of newsgroups organized topically
to allow Internet users from all over the world to communicate on a variety
of subjects. 431 Internet users may access these newsgroups and make
contributions to ongoing discussions about a topic or simply monitor the
discussions. These newsgroups allow what amounts to worldwide
roundtable discussions. Internet users may share information, discuss
politics, and address questions about particular topics to other people
interested and knowledgeable about those topics.
Usenet operates similarly to e-mail. Each posting to Usenet comprises
an individual message like a textual e-mail message that may be read and
shared by many users." In addition, these messages may contain graphics,
pictures, sound, software applications, etc., that may be downloaded by
427 See id. at 139.
428 See id.
429 This concept has particularly interesting consequences when trying to apply
the purposeful availment rule to disputes involving Internet communications. See
infra Part VII.A.
430 See DERN, supra note 398, at 195. "Usenet is fair, cocktail party, town
meeting, notes of a secret cabal, chatter in the hallway at a conference, Friday night
fish fry, conversations overheard on an airplane, and a bunch of other things." Id.
at 197 (quoting Ed Vielmetti, Vice-President for Research at MSEN, an Internet
service provider in Ann Arbor, Mich.).
431 See id. at 196-98.
432 See id. at 198.
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others accessing Usenet.433 Unlike e-mail, however, Usenet does not
automatically provide the user with a personal copy of each newsgroup
message. Instead, many users retrieve the information from a Usenet server
that acts like a bulletin board.434 Another difference is the life of the
message. Normally, an e-mail message is not deleted until the user chooses
to do so. Usenet messages, however, are automatically deleted by the server
after they reach a certain age.435
User interaction with Usenet, however, is similar to interactions
involving e-mail. A user has a newsreader application that operates on his
computer to allow both the reading of material posted to newsgroups as
well as the creation of his own contribution to a newsgroup.43 6 Newsreader
applications can provide a number of features to save the user time, such
as keeping track of which news items the user has already read.437 To
access Usenet, a user usually needs an account with an organization that
maintains a Usenet server.43 Usenet servers are a bit complicated. When
a user generates a contribution to a newsgroup, that contribution is sent to
a Usenet server. That server then distributes that message to other Usenet
sites throughout the world.439 Thus, copies of the newsgroups are stored in
various locations around the world. In addition, the server receives copies
of messages from other Usenet sites and stores them locally. A copy of
each message theoretically is maintained on every Usenet site in the world.
4. Telnet
The Telnet service allows an Internet user to log into a computer or
computer network connected to the Internet but located in a distant
location. The user can then interact with that computer as if the user were
actually present at the distant location. Originally, this Internet service was
designed to allow scientists from all over the country to share access to
supercomputers without having to be present at the location of the
411 See id. at 199.
434 See id. at 202.
431 Some organizations, however, archive Usenet messages and make copies
available for purchase. See id. at 204; Can Privacy be Protected in Cyberspace?
Even Those Who 've Never Been on the Net May Be at Risk; April Issue of Home
PC Reveals How Privacy Is Compromised on the Net and Offers Consumers Tips
on How to Protect Themselves, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 25, 1997.436 See DERN, supra note 398, at 211-13.
437 See id. at 216-17.
438 See id. at 211.
439See id. at 196-97.
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supercomputer.440 Although resource sharing is still one purpose for remote
login, other uses of this feature have become prevalent. For example, a
salesperson traveling on business may desire to access the computer system
back at the company facility. To do so, the salesperson could access the
Internet wherever he or she is located and use a Telnet connection to the
company computer system. Remote login through Telnet also allows
Internet users to access on-line library card catalogs and databases. Certain
weather information and other news is also available through remote login.
Some companies even connect soda machines and candy machines to the
Internet and use remote login to determine the current inventory of the
machine.44
Again, the traveling salesperson example will be used to illustrate the
operation of the remote login service. The salesperson's computer will use
a piece of software called a Telnet client.442 Of course, the computer must
be connected to the Internet in some way. The user may request a Telnet
connection to the company computer using the Internet domain name for
that computer.443 The Telnet client handles all communications with the
company computer. The company computer, on the other hand, has to have
a Telnet server program available to support Telnet operation. For security
reasons, some companies may not allow remote login using Telnet. When
the Telnet client sends a request to the company computer seeking
permission to initiate a Telnet session, the company computer activates the
Telnet server program. After proper security procedures are followed, the
Telnet client and server may then interact so that the salesperson may use
the company computer as if the salesperson were back home in his or her
office.444
One can make multiple remote logins using Telnet. For example, while
remotely logged in to the company computer, the salesperson might use a
Telnet client available on the company computer to access a supercomputer
in a different location. 445 Unfortunately, remote login may allow a hacker
who obtains unauthorized access to a particular computer to conceal his
identity. Because the source address of a packet of Internet information is
the source address of the computer from which the packet is sent, multiple
Telnet logins may conceal the true location of the hacker. In this situation,
44' See id. at 248-49.
44 See id. at 250.
442 See id. at 255.
443 See id. at 253.
4 See id. at 255.
445 See id. at 262-63.
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any packet sent will be labeled as originating from the remote computer,
and not from the hacker's computer.
5. The World Wide Web
The most widely used Internet service" 6 and the one perhaps most
responsibie for the explosion in Internet use outside of the technical
community is the World Wide Web. The Web allows users who employ a
piece of software known as a browser to view electronic documents stored
on computers connected to the Internet. The browser communicates with
a piece of software on a remote computer known as a Web server.
Electronic documents accessible on the Web, however, are not documents
in the traditional sense. Web "pages" may contain text, graphics, pictures,
sound, video, and even other computer software that is used to create
special effects for a particular Web page. Besides viewing Web pages and
obtaining information from them, a Web browser also allows the user to
interact with certain Web pages and send information to the operator of that
Web page. For example, a Web page owner may conduct a survey of those
who access the Web page by obtaining input from users who access that
Web page. On some Web pages, a user can page through a computer
catalog and use the browser to provide the user's credit card number and
a list of products that the user desires to purchase. Thus, Web pages, if
programmed to do so, can provide a type of two-way communication with
one who accesses them. Normally, a user of the Internet is able to view a
Web page using a browser within seconds, no matter where in the world
that Web page is located.
In Internet history, the World Wide Web is a relatively recent
phenomenon. As late as 1994, the World Wide Web was viewed as just
another "contender" to be the major Internet resource for remotely
accessing information, services, and resources." 7 The Web's emergence as
the primary tool for remotely accessing information stems mainly from its
use as a commercial tool. Such usefulness results from the hypertext
capabilities of the Web as will be discussed below. Traditionally, Internet
users have looked down upon commercial use of other Internet services,
often engaging in some sort of punishment of those who attempted such
commercial use. 8 The Web, on the other hand, has embraced commercial
446 See Byassee, supra note 4, at 202 n.22.
" See DERN, supra note 398, at 323. Prior to 1994, the leading tool used to
access information on the Internet was Gopher. See Byassee, supra note 4, at 202
n.22.
448 See VAN DER LEUN & MANDEL, supra note 375, at 146-47.
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use of the Internet, allowing businesses to make contacts with people all
over the world." 9 Most large businesses, at the very least, now use a Web
page to convey information about their products and services. Of course,
where there is commerce, there are violations of the law.
Internet browsers interact with Internet servers in a client-server
relationship much as clients and servers for other Internet services
interact."' The Internet browser serves as the client for Web services. An
Internet browser is comprised of software that runs on a user's machine and
is able to access and display Web pages in response to user commands.
Because Web page data has a universal format, the particular brand or
model of the user's computer is unimportant. The user's Web browser
interprets the data making up a Web page using this universal format and
tailors that information for display on the user's particular type of
computer.45 1 Because companies would not want to create a Web page for
every type of computer, the universal format of Web pages provides a
critical element in the success of the World Wide Web. Creators of Web
pages need not concern themselves with the type of computer that will be
accessing their page; one size fits all. Most Internet browsers employ
Windows and a graphical user interface controlled by a mouse to allow
efficient and pleasurable access to Web pages.
World Wide Web servers are comprised of software that runs on
computers connected to the Internet. Web servers frequently are available
twenty-four hours per day and await requests to access the Web pages
stored on them. Web browsers generate requests to Web servers using the
TCP/IP address for the Web server.452 Of course, all the user needs to know
is the Internet domain name for the Web server. When a Web server
receives a request from a Web browser for a Web page, the Web server
transfers the entire contents of that Web page to the requesting browser.453
This concept is important to the jurisdictional issues discussed above. The
entire Web page is actually transferred to the requesting Web browser.
Repeated interactivity with a Web page is not possible as the protocol
that Web pages use to communicate is not designed for back and forth
449 See id.
410 See Augsburg College: Internet Basics (visited Aug. 2, 1998) <http://aug3.
augsburg.edu/library/aib/www.html>, at What Makes the WWW Work?.
411 See id. at Introduction to the World Wide Web.
452 See How Does the Web Work? (visited Aug. 2, 1998) <http://www.telstra.
com.au/docs/www.guide/guide. 10.html>.
453 See id.
[VOL. 87
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
interactive communications.5 4 Instead, each request to a Web server is
completely independent of any other request.45 Still, creative use of the
various Web resources allows the creation of a limited amount of perceived
interactivity. Any such interactivity is facilitated by the Web browser and
comprises a separate transaction with the Web server. Although one might
think that one is interacting with a particular Web page through a series of
communications analogous to an on-line session with Lexis or Westlaw,
this is not the case.456 Web servers cannot keep track of which items a user
has viewed or prior input provided by the user, unless that Web server
keeps track of each user's identity. A user who merely retrieves a Web
page and displays it on the user's browser, however, has not provided any
information to allow a Web page server to identify that user during future
communications unless the Web server employs a device called a cookie,
discussed below.
As mentioned, the Web provides an attractive method to exchange
information because it allows electronic documents to contain graphics,
pictures, sound, animation, video, etc. A special language employing the
technique of hyptertext allows such effects. Hypertext allows one to insert
special codes into a document that may be used to create special effects for
displaying text, pictures, etc.457 Web browsers are designed to interpret the
hypertext contained in a Web page electronic document to facilitate display
of that document on a user's computer screen. 458 Hypertext does not require
a picture to be inserted directly into the electronic document that serves as
a Web page. Instead, the Web page creator can specify the location of
another computer file that contains the picture. That location can be
454 The hypertext transport protocol, HTTP, was designed to be a stateless
protocol, allowing only responses from Web servers to requests by Web clients.
See David Morro, Demystifying Web Hyper Links, NETWORK WORLD, July 31,
1995, at 41.
455 See id.
456 See Alan Frank, Lesson 96: HTML and CGI; BuildingInteractive Web Sites;
Common Gateway Interface Tutorial, LAN MAG., Aug. 1996, at 27. HTML is a
read-only format. It is not interactive except to the extent that it allows one to use
a mouse to navigate around a Web page when that page is stored on one's
computer under control of a Web browser. See id.
411 See generally A Beginner's Guide to HTML (visited Aug. 2, 1998)
<http://www.ncsa.uiuc.edu/GeneraYInternetWWW/HTMLPrimerAll.html>; How
Does the Web Work?, supra note 452, atHTML-The Hypertext Markup Language.
458 See Augsburg College: Internet Basics, supra note 450, at Introduction to
the World Wide Web.
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anywhere on the World Wide Web or on a computer connected to the Web
server.459 Portions of a Web page, then, may reside at different points in the
world and end up being assembled together through the work of the Web
browser. When the Web browser encounters data identifying the location
of a picture, rather than the data for the picture itself, it sends out another
request over the Internet to retrieve the picture.
The hypertext concept is so powerful that it actually allows a Web
server to transfer an entire piece of computer software used to create
special effects or perform some other function.' ° Such programs are known
as applets.46' An applet is a miniature software application commonly
designed to perform one small task."2 An example of an applet would be
a software routine to cause information from a Web page to scroll across
the bottom of a computer screen much like stockprices or weather bulletins
scroll across the bottom of one's television screen on certain channels.
Applets, although providing powerful effects and functions for Web pages,
may also be used for improper purposes.463 For example, some applets can
be used to invade one's privacy by recording the contents of one's hard
drive and sending that information to some other Internet user.41 An applet
might be used to read a user's financial information stored on his hard drive
or his passwords to other computer accounts.465 In fact, a computer club
concerned about security has created an applet that accesses a user's copy
of Intuit Quicken, obtains the user's bank account number, and initiates an
electronic funds transfer.41 Applets might also be used like computer
viruses to interfere with the operation of any computer with which it comes
into contact. 7 Because of these potential misuses of applets, users of Web
browsers should be careful to properly screen applets and not simply allow
411 See A Beginner's Guide to HTML, supra note 457 (discussing linking).
460 See Gary McGraw & Edward Felten, Avoiding Hostile Applets, BYTE, May
1997, at 89.
461 See The Sourcefor JAVA Technology (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://java.
sun.com/applets/index.html>.462 See PATRICK NAUGHTON, THE JAVA HANDBOOK 4-6, 253 (1996).
463 See Eve Chen, ActiveX and Java: The Next Virus Carriers?, COMPUTER
TECH. REv., Spring 1997, at 38.
41 See McGraw & Felten, supra note 460, at 89.
46 See Chen, supra note 463, at 38. In fact, applets might even be used to gain
control of a computer's microphone and eavesdrop on communications occurring
in the room where the computer is located. See McGraw & Felten, supra note 460,
at 89.
466 See Chen, supra note 463, at 38.
467 See McGraw & Felten, supra note 460, at 89.
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them to be automatically loadedupon accessing a Web site. Merely visiting
a Web page with a malicious applet could cause that applet to be loaded
onto one's computer.46'
As discussed above, some Web sites allow a certain amount of
interactivity with the Web page. For example, a user of a Web site for
computer shopping may need to type in her name, address, telephone
number, product number, and credit card number to order merchandise.
This type of transaction is not as easy as one might think. Recall that when
a user accesses a Web page, a copy of that page is sent to the user's Web
browser. That is the extent of the contact between the Web browser and
server. No connection between the browser and server is established, such
as might be established in a Lexis or Westlaw session. Because of the lack
of a connection, the kind of interaction that is desirable for an Internet
shopping transaction is not possible. The World Wide Web does allow a
type of remote communication, however, using the common gateway
interface.
In the Internet shopping example, the Web page for the shopping Web
site would include a hypertext form comprising a series of boxes that
would allow the shopper to enter the relevant data using her Web
browser. 9 The form included with the Web page would also have a send
button for the user to click on with the mouse after completing the form.
When the send button is pushed, the user's Web browser sends the data
from the form to a special location on the Web server with the shopping
Web page.470 This location is controlled by the common gateway interface,
which accepts the input that the user entered on the form and executes the
appropriate software program in response to the received information.47
Computer software connected to the common gateway interface then
processes the data to accept the user's order.4' To provide the user with an
46 See Chen, supra note 463, at 38.
469 "HTML forms are similar to paper forms: They provide specific space in
which to enter specific data items." Frank, supra note 456, at 27.
470 See Ray Duncan, How the Common Gateway Interface Works: CGI Lets
Your Server Retrieve Datafrom Web Browser Forms, PC MAG., Sept. 24, 1996, at
207; Alan Frank, Lesson 97: HTML and CG, Part ff: Sending User Input to a CGI
Program, LAN MAG., Sept. 1996, at 25.471 The common gateway interface is the standard way of achieving some level
of perceived interactivity with a Web page. See Duncan, supra note 470, at 207;
Frank, supra note 456, at 27.
47 Web servers use a special directory to store such executable programs,
known as the CGI-BIN directory. Web servers know that files stored in this
directory are programs to be executed, rather than hypertext documents to be sent
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acknowledgement of her purchase, the Web server might generate a special
hypertext page by inserting a few hypertext statements in an existing
hypertext document and then sending that page to the user's Web
browser.473 The returned page appears just like any other Web page to the
user's Web browser.
Cookies are another feature of the World Wide Web that allow a Web
server to learn something about the user who has made a request for a Web
page. Recall that when a user accesses a Web page, the Web browser
knows the identity of the user because the Web server must have this
information to know where on the Internet to send the Web page.474 Certain
Web servers keep track of which areas of a Web page a particular user
accesses and use that data to selectively provide information to the user the
next time that the user visits that Web page.475 To keep track of a user's
desires, the Web server may send back a cookie to the user's Web browser
when the Web server returns a copy of the Web page.476 The cookie can
contain any information that the Web server chooses to maintain for users
who access the Web page. When the user next attempts to access the Web
server that created the cookie, the user's Web browser will send the cookie
to the Web server to provide the Web server with the information stored in
the cookie.477
Although cookies can be useful, they can also lead to problems. Some
have expressed concern about cookies being used to obtain private
information about a user, including the contents of the user's hard drive.47 8
Such concerns are valid ones where applets are concerned but unfounded
for cookies because cookies are not operational software. Instead, cookies
to the requesting Web browser. The common gateway interface activates the proper
program in this directory in response to a request from a Web browser and passes
any data supplied by the browser to the program. See Duncan, supra note 470, at
207; Frank, supra note 456, at 27.473 See Duncan, supra note 470, at 207; Frank, supra note 456, at 27.
474 See Jason Snell, Big Brother Meets the Cookie Monster, MACUSER, July
1997, at 96 (noting that in addition to the user's TCP/IP address, the user's browser
also sends information about what Web browser and operating system is running
on the user's computer as well as the domain name of the last Web page that the
user previously visited).475 See Ed Bott, Clsfor Cookie, PC/COMPUTING, July 1997, at 324; Snell, supra
note 474, at 96.476 See Snell, supra note 474, at 96.477 See Bott, supra note 475, at 324; Snell, supra note 474, at 96.478 See Bott, supra note 475, at 324; Snell, supra note 474, at 96.
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are merely a small amount of data.479 Cookies are only problematic in the
sense that a hacker might be able to disguise himself or herself as another
user by capturing that user's cookie. When this happens, the hacker might
be able to retrieve private data about the user. For example, if a Web server
maintains a record of the user's credit card number based upon the user's
cookie, false use of the cookie might place the cookie in the hands of a
criminal.48 °
One particularly powerful aspect of the World Wide Web is the ability
to conduct text searches. Several Web servers actually serve as Web
searchers, also known as search engines, allowing a user to conduct
boolean searches for the occurrence of key words on a Web page.4 81 Search
engine providers claim to maintain copies of nearly every Web page
available on the World Wide Web.482 To do so, these computers maintain
huge databases of information organized in a way to allow efficient
searching.483 Because Web pages allow one to provide hypertext links to
other Web pages, the search engines guide users to Web pages containing
the requested terms using hypertext links to the relevant Web pages.48 4
41'A cookie may only be four kilobytes in size. See Snell, supra note 474, at 96.480 See Sharon Machlis, Want Security? See What Hacker Does with a Cookie,
COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 31, 1997, at 69.
481 See Web Searching: It's a Text Thing, IMAGING WORLD, Sept. 1996, at 53;
see also MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at 134.
482 At least one service, Open Text, makes this claim. See Web Searching: It's
a Text Thing, supra note 481, at 53. Other search engines approach this goal. See
id. Maintaining an index of every page on the Internet is difficult because Web
pages are constantly changing. Web servers with search engines employ software
sometimes referred to as robots orWeb wanderers to continually access Web pages
and ensure that the indexed Web page is up to date. See id. Wanderers also follow
hyperlinks in an attempt to discover new sites that have not yet been indexed. See
id. Note that many search engines do not store the entire text of a Web page. Each
Web page may have a meta tag associated with it. Meta tags are textual in nature
and provide a brief summary of the contents of the Web page. Ordinarily, Web
browsers do not access the meta tag. Some search engines index the meta tag while
others may index only the first few hundred text characters contained on a Web
page. See id.
483 The Alta Vista search engine indexes 30 million Web pages and over 3
million Usenet articles. The Infoseek search engine employs 30 computers, high
speed telephone lines, and 350 gigabytes of disk space. See Web Searching: It's a
Text Thing, supra note 481, at 53.
484 See MOSTAFA ET AL., supra note 396, at 134.
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Some popular search engines include Yahoo!,8 5 infoseek,486 Alta Vista,487
excite,488 and Lycos.489
The latest Internet advance is push technology, so named because
information is pushed to the user rather than being pulled in by the user
through a Web browser.4 90 With push technology, the user employs a
special type of Web browser designed to receive broadcast information
from a push technology Web server.49' For example, a push technology
news service might broadcast news over the Internet, identifying the type
of story being transmitted. Identification of story type prevents the user
from being buried in an avalanche of information. The push technology
browser can be used to filter the information received and provide the user
only with that information that the user desires to receive.492 In addition, the
user might only be prompted with a brief message about a news story that
allows the user to choose to read or reject the story.493 Push technology may
also be used in the future to deliver updates of software packages that a
485 Yahoo! (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http://www.yahoo.com>.
486 infoseek (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http://www.infoseek.com/Home?pg=
Home.html&svx=logoR2>.487 Alta Vista (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http://altavista.digital.com/>.
488 excite (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http://www.excite.com/>.
489 Lycos (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http://www.lycos.com/>.
490 See Ed Bott, Push: Promise or Peril, PC/COMPUTING, Sept. 1997, at 318;
Jason Snell, When Push Comes to Shove, MACUSER, Oct. 1997, at 89. Some push
technology is only push in its appearance to the user. The user's computer is
actually pulling information in at specific time intervals, checking for new
information of interest to the user, and notifying the user of relevant information.
See Bott, supra, at 318; William R. Stanek, Pushing the Envelope with Push
Technology, PC MAG., Sept. 23, 1997, at 245.
491 Some have noted that push technology in its present form sends much
useless data over the Internet as those receiving the broadcast data certainly will not
use all of the data. The large amounts of data broadcast also have potential to slow
down the network and overwhelm disk storage available on a push subscriber's
computer. See Stephen E. Arnold, Push Technology: Driving Traditional Online
into a Corner, DATABASE, Aug. 18, 1997, at 36; Snell, supra note 474, at 89.
492 See Arnold, supra note 491, at 36. Other more cynical commentators have
noted that "[p]ush technology is just another buzzword for annoying people with
unwanted commercial crap." Id. This view is not unsupported. Airlines and car
rental companies have announced plans to use push technology to alert potential
customers to discounts and special offers. See Clinton Wilder & Justin Hibbard,
Pushing Outside The Enterprise-Companies Begin to Tap Push Technology's
Potential as a Sales and Marketing Tool, INFO. WK., Aug. 4, 1997, at 20.
41 See Snell, supra note 474, at 89 (describing BackWeb push service).
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user previously purchased.41 Push technology can also be used by
businesses to provide intelligent agents that keep track of a user's previous
interaction with a Web server and use that interaction to guide the user on
subsequent visits-kind of like having your own on-line sales clerk.495
Although push technology is in its infancy, it promises to be a widely used
technology in the future.
494 See Bott, supra note 490, at 318; Pushing Software, BYTE, Aug. 1997, at 84
NA 8. Although this sounds like an attractive service, it also raises the possibility
of misuse, such as spreading a virus by pushing the virus to owners of a particular
software package. See Bott, supra note 490, at 318.495 See Rivka Tadjer, Giving Content a Push, COMM. WK., June 2, 1997, at 73.
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